A MANDATORY VIEW OF FEDERAL COURT
JURISDICTION: A GUIDED QUEST FOR THE ORIGINAL
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INTRODUCTION

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter once wrote:
No provisions of the Constitution, barring only those that
draw on arithmetic, . . . are more explicit and specific than
those pertaining to courts established under Article III. "The
judicial power" which is "vested" in these tribunals and the
safeguards under which their judges fuxiction are enumerated
with particularity. Their tenure and compensation, the controversies which may be brought before them, and the distribution of original and appellate jurisdiction among these
tribunals are defined and circumscribed, not left at large by
vague and elastic phrasing. The precision which characterizes these portions of Article III is in striking contrast to the
imprecision of so many other provisions of the Constitution
dealing with other very vital aspects of government.1
Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite Frankfurter's confident assertions, the meaning of article III is not only far from evident,
but has been made positively murky by judicial and scholarly misinterpretation, as this Article will attempt to show.
As adopted by the Constitutional Convention in 1787, article III
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Constitution is straightforward and uncomplicated on its face").
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of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:
SECTION 1. The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall-not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
SECTION 2. The Judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-tp all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and
Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
- The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have
directed.2
The meaning of the judicial article has perplexed
judges, and scholars since its inception and has spawned
debate concerning the scope of congressional control over
jurisdiction.' The debate has been fueled by recurrent

practitioners,
a significant
federal court
proposals in

U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §§ 1-2.
3 See R. BFERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); W.
2

CROSSKEY, PoLITIcs AND THE CONSTrrUTION

616-20 (1953); J.

GOEBEL, HISTORY
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Congress to curtail portions of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS

TO 1801, 196-412 (1971); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 7-34 (1980); C. RICE, CONGRESS AND SUPREME
COURT JURISDICTION (1980); Abraham, Limiting Federal CourtJurisdiction:A "Self-

Inflicted Wound?", 65 JUDICATURE 179 (1981); Auerbach, The Unconstitutionalityof
CongressionalProposals to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts, 47 Mo. L. REv.
47 (1982); Bator, CongressionalPower over the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 27
VILL. L. REv. 1030 (1982); Baucus & Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact
on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REv. 988 (1982); Berger,
Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's "Court-Stipping" Polemic, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 611 (1983); Bice, An Essay Review of Congress v.
The Supreme Court, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 499 (1971); Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction:"
CongressionalAbuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REv. 3 (1973); Eisenberg,
Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J.
498 (1974); Forkosch, The Exceptions and Regulations Clause of Article III and a
Person's Constitutional Rights: Can the Latter be Limited by Congressional Power
Under the Former?, 72 W. VA. L. REv. 238 (1970); Frank, HistoricalBases of the
FederalJudicialSystem, 13 LAW & CoNTr P. PRoas. 3 (1948); Hart, The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialetic, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953), updated and reprinted in B. BATOR, P. MISmUKN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 330 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER];

Kay, Limiting Federal CourtJurisdiction:The Unforeseen Impact on Courts and Congress, 65 JUDICATURE 185 (1981); Levy, CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: A Reappraisal,22 N.Y. INrRA. L. REv. 178 (1967);
McClellan, CongressionalRetraction of Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect the Reserved Powers of the States: The Helms PrayerBill and a Return to First Principles,
27 VILL. L. REv. 1019 (1982); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court'sAppellate urisdiction: HistoricalBasis, 47 MINN. L. REv. 53 (1962); Meserve, Limiting Jurisdiction
and Remedies of Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 159 (1982); Ratner, MajoritarianConstraints on Judicial Review: CongressionalControl of Supreme Court Jurisdiction,27
VILL. L. REv. 929 (1982); Ratner, CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Ratner,
Power]; Redish, CongressionalPower to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under The Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VIii.
L. REV. 900 (1982); Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to
Control FederalJurisdiction:A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 143
(1982); Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower
Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45
(1975); Rice, Congress and the Supreme Court'sJurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REv. 959
(1982); Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the
Proposals in Congress Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190 (1981); Rotunda, Congressional
Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem of
School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981); Sloviter, Introduction: Legislative Proposalsto Restrict the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts: Are They
Wise? Are They Constitutional?, 27 VILL. L. REv. 895 (1982); Strong, Rxfor a Nagging Constitutional Headache, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 246 (1971); Taylor, Limiting
Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Unconstitutionality of Current Legislative Proposals,
65 JUDICATURE 199 (1981); Tribe,JurisdictionalGerrymandering:Zoning Disfavored
Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129 (1981); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 229 (1973); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1965); Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v.
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the United States or the inferior federal courts.4
Such proposals are, of course, not a recent phenomenon, having
been advanced frequently in Congress over the last fifty years to alter
or avoid politically controversial decisions. 5 Some would curtail the juKlein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1189 (1981); Note, Congressional Power Over
State and Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Hill-Burton and Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Examples, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 131 (1974).
" Some of the more recent examples of such proposals include: H.R. 72, H.R.
326, H.R. 408, H.R. 989, H.R. 1335, H.R. 2347, H.R. 4756, H. Con. Res. 97, S. 481,
S. 1742, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (removing federal court jurisdiction over cases
attacking "voluntary" prayer in the public schools); H.R. 340, H.R. 761, H.R. 869,
H.R. 1079, H.R. 1180, H.R. 2047, H.R. 3332, H.R. 5200, S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S.
1647, S. 1743, S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (restricting the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to issue certain mandatory school busing orders as remedies in school
desegregation cases); H.R. 73, H.R. 867, H.R. 900, H.R. 3225, S. 158, S. 583, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (restricting the jurisdiction of the federal courts over cases involving abortion laws); H.R. 2365, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (curtailing federal
court jurisdiction over cases challenging the validity of any federal law providing for
male-only registration for, or induction into, the military service).
I See, e.g., S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (proposal to remove the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to review any state criminal conviction based on a confession of the
accused that was admitted into evidence "as voluntarily made"); S. 4058, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968) (removing the jurisdiction of the federal courts to review or set aside
any finding by a state court of obscenity in a criminal prosecution); H.R. 1584, H.R.
1586, H.R. 2400, H.R. 712, H.R. 6621, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) and H.R. 11,926,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (removing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over cases challenging the apportionment of any state legislature); S. 3069, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964) (mandating a stay of any such apportionment case brought in a federal
court until the end of the second regular session of the state legislature); S. 3386, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (removing federal court jurisdiction over cases involving state
bar admissions); S. 2646, H.R. 9207, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) (removing Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over state subversive legislation, contempt of Congress, federal employees security program, and state bar admission cases); H.R. 11,795 and
H.R. 8906, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (various responses to the school desegregation
decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); H.R. 10,128, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1935) (divesting all state and federal courts other than the Supreme Court of
jurisdiction over cases as to the constitutionality of any act of Congress enacted under
congressional powers to provide for the general welfare, to tax, to regulate interstate
commerce, to issue money, or which affects substantive due process rights); see also,
H.R. 10,839, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935) (removing the power of inferior federal
courts to declare any statute of the United States unconstitutional) and H.R. 2265,
H.R. 3895, H.R. 5172, H.R. 5485, H.R. 7154, H.J. Res. 276, H.J. Res. 293, H.J.
Res. 307, H.J. Res. 366, H.J. Res. 372, H.J. Res. 496, S. 1098, S. 1276, S. 1890, S.J.
Res. 98, S.J. Res. 100, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (requiring the vote of a specified
extraordinary majority of the Supreme Court Justices to declare an act of Congress
invalid); H.J. Res. 372 and H.J. Res. 496, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (requiring a
two-thirds vote of the justices of the Supreme Court to declare invalid any state or
federal act). See generally 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 465-66 (1922); Fite & Rubinstein, Curbing the Supreme Court-State Experiences and Federal Proposals, 35 MICH. L. REv. 762 (1937); Martig, Congress
and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 34 MICH. L. REV. 650 (1936);
Nagel, Court-CurbingPeriods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965);
Richter, A Legislative Curb on theJudiciary, 21 J. POL. ECON. 281 (1913); Stumpf,
CongressionalResponse to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interactionof Law and Polit-
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risdiction of the inferior federal courts, leaving that of the Supreme
Court intact. 6 Other jurisdictional proposals would remove the jurisdiction of both the inferior federal courts and the Supreme Court, leaving
only the state courts to resolve the federal questions that such cases
pose.7 There also have been attempts to eliminate only the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over a class of cases, leaving the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts intact, the most notable example
being Ex parte McCardle.8 Other proposals would only curtail the
remedies that an inferior federal court may issue in a case otherwise
within the court's jurisdiction.9 Other bills have been introduced in response to politically controversial cases with the intent to alter the
structure or procedures of the federal courts. 10
ics, 14 J. PuB. L. 377 (1965).
1 See, e.g, S. 158, H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (the so-called "Human
Life Statute" proposed by Senator Helms and Congressman Hyde to curtail the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts to issue any injunction or declaratory judgment in cases
involving state or municipal laws or ordinances regulating or restricting the availability
of abortions).
7 See, e.g., S. 1742, 9th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (curtailing all federal court jurisdiction over cases attacking the practice of voluntary prayer in the public schools).
8 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) (sustaining the retroactive repeal by Congress
of Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain appeals of habeas corpus applications from
the lower federal courts on writ of error).
The two most important and enigmatic cases on the question of congressional
power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts are Ex parte McCardle and United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (invalidating legislation directing the
Court of Claims and the Supreme Court to summarily dismiss war claims cases
brought by individuals who had accepted a pardon and providing that the acceptance of
the pardon should be treated as conclusive evidence of disloyalty during the Civil War).
In addition to the statutes at issue in these cases, Congress has enacted certain other
statutes that have received less attention as jurisdictional curtailment statutes. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) (Anti-Tax Injunction Act prohibiting most federal court injunctions against the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under state law); 28
U.S.C. § 1342 (1976) (Johnson Act prohibiting federal court interference with state
rate orders for public utilities); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) (Anti-Injunction Act prohibiting federal courts from restraining pending state proceedings except in certain circumstances). The Anti-Tax Injunction Act and the Johnson Act, indeed, were enacted in
the 1930's in response to decisions of the federal courts hostile to the interests that the
statutes sought to protect.
I E.g., S. 528, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981) (the so-called "Neighborhood School
Act" designed to restrict the power of the federal courts to issue mandatory school
busing orders); see Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (sustaining provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 depriving federal courts of "jurisdiction" to
issue injunctions in certain labor disputes); Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 369 F.
Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973) (sustaining section 401(b) of the Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 providing that the receipt by a private hospital of federal funding does
not authorize any court or public official to require the hospital to perform abortions or
sterilizations if the hospital prohibits them on the grounds of religious belief or moral
conviction), affd, 523 F.2d 75 (1975).
10 The most famous of such proposals was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
court-packing plan. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-52 (10th ed. 1980); Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D.
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This Article will examine the history surrounding the drafting and
ratification of the judicial article in order to discern any original intention of the framers"1 that might be relevant to current debates over the
Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347. Proposals were also submitted in Congress during the feud between the Court and the New Deal Democrats to
either oust the Court of jurisdiction to declare federal laws unconstitutional or to raise
the number of Justices whose concurrence was necessary to invalidate a federal or state
act. More recently, such sweeping curtailments of federal court jurisdiction have also
been introduced in Congress, albeit without receiving any serious consideration. See
e.g., H.R. 5183, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (providing for congressional disapproval
of federal court decisions declaring any federal or state law unconstitutional); H.R.
114, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction to modify,
directly or indirectly, any order of a court of any state that was subject to review by the
state's highest court); H.R. 5181, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (curtailing the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue orders requiring the expenditure of federal or state
funds without legislative authorization); see also H.J. Res. 384, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) (providing that the Supreme Court would exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases in which the constitutionality of a federal or state.law is drawn in
question and requiring unanimous concurrence of the Justices to invalidate an act).
Obviously, many of these sweeping proposals are patently inconsistent with the constitutional plan established in article III. Nevertheless, they indicate the breadth of legislative power that some members of Congress have on occasion believed may be exercised over the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
" As used in this Article, "original intention of the framers" or "original understanding of the framers" refers to constitutional meaning derived from objective data,
such as the available published debates, votes, and writings of the members of the Philadelphia Convention and the state ratification conventions. In ascertaining such meaning, the objective record must be read in light of the linquistic conventions and jurisprudential assumptions and concerns of the time. Reference to an objective original
understanding, however, should not be taken to mean that the process of ascertaining
meaning is completely devoid of subjective elements. The process of ascertaining the
meaning of a written text ultimately involves a search for the collective subjective understanding held by the drafters of the document. Indeed, there is a school of historical
interpretation that requires some analysis of the subjective elements of understanding
and intent. See, e.g., J. PococK, PoLrrscs, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY (1971); Pocock, PoliticalThought and PoliticalAction:
A Synposiun on Quentin Skinner, 2 POL. THEORY 251 (1974); Skinner, Meaning and
Understandingin the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. & THEORY 3 (1969).
References in this Article to the objective original understanding imply only that
the data upon which the argument will be based are made up of objective primary
historical documents and accounts, rather than some psychobiographic resort to unarticulated, subjective premises that may have motivated the framers. While the non-legal
historian can tolerate the ambiguities and uncertainties engendered by such subjective
inquiries, the lawyer needs more definitive guidance from history and is less tolerant of
the ambiguities introduced by more wide-ranging psychological inquiries. This is not to
say, however, that the lawyer's search for original understanding should attempt to
create definitive understandings where none existed. The legal historian always must be
methodologically circumspect, cautiously asking whether the data yield or suggest a
definitive original understanding or whether the conclusion offered merely constitutes a
conclusion that later generations have retroactively imposed on malleable and inconclusive historical materials.
The interpretive approach presented here seeks to derive meaning from the conventional data generally used by lawyers and courts in searching for the original meaning of statutes or constitutional documents. This approach places heavy reliance on the
views that drafters were willing to express publicly, at least within the halls of the

19841

FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

source and scope of congressional power over the jurisdiction of the
Philadelphia Convention. The methodology deliberately gives little weight to more
speculative, unarticulated motivations. The approach also does not treat all drafters as
equals. It places primary reliance on the actions and statements of most vocal and active
proponents or drafters of the document, on the assumption that the views would have
been openly challenged or corrected if out of step with the remainder of the supporters
of the document. While the author recognizes that this methodology is open to attack by
those favoring a more subjective analysis of original understanding, he adheres here to
the conventional approach out of respect for legal and historical traditions and because
he views any departure from this approach as introducing highly speculative and imponderable features into the interpretive search for meaning.
In searching for such original understanding, the legal historian must also always
remember that she is looking at the primary historical data through lenses that have
been clouded by contemporary issues and by the perspective of intervening legal, social,
and political history. Thus, in this sense the legal historian's quest for original understanding may never truly replicate the framers' understanding. See Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation,79 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1064-66 (1981). Serious doubt has been
cast on the existence of pure objective history. See H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND
METHOD (1975); P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO
PHILOSOPHY (1958); Taylor, Interpretationand the Sciences of Man, 25 REv. METAPHYSICS 3 (1971). Contra E. HIRSCH, VALIDrrY IN INTERPRETATION 245-64 (1967).
Nevertheless, the legal historian can fortify herself against potential misinterpretation
by attempting to assure, as suggested above, that the perspective adopted in reviewing
the data involves the linquistic and jurisprudential conventions of the drafters' era, not
those of the historian's training or time.
While pristine historical certainty may be unattainable, these impediments to historical exploration should not prevent embarkation on the journey nor taint the knowledge of the historical terrain that the exploration yields. Just as Heisenberg's uncertainty principle tells the scientist that the very process of scientific measurement of the
natural world changes that world and colors the data derived from the exploration, the
problems of historical interpretation are affected by the legal perceptions and predilections of the legal historian as well as those of the contemporary society in which the
historian was trained and operates. Nevertheless, just as Heisenberg's observation has
merely counseled caution rather than causing the process of scientific inquiry to grind
to a halt, the difficulties in ascertaining original understanding should cause lawyers,
courts, and historians to be cautious and demanding in their inquiries, not to abandon
the historical quest. Contra Sandalow, supra, at 1060-71 (comments of Dean Sandalow
attacking the validity of any search for original constitutional understanding that would
limit the interpretive discretion of the courts).
While there are important differences between the process of statutory construction and constitutional adjudication, there are remarkable similarities as well. In both
situations there is the same problem of ascertaining a single meaning or, at least, a
limited range of meaning, from a multi-member body, not all members of which may
have spoken on or agreed to the views offered by the most active participants in the
debates.
With all its analytical problems and pitfalls, attempting to ascertain an objective
original understanding of a statute is necessary to limit judicial discretion in order to
support the views of democratically elected legislative representatives. See generally
Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realistic Appraisal of the JudicialFunction in a
DemocraticSociety, 67 IOWA L. REv. 711, 717-21 (1982). While majoritarian concerns
should be more limited in the sphere of constitutional adjudication, see id. at 721-25,
unbridled judicial discretion similarly must be eschewed. Where clearly ascertainable,
original understandings of constitutional clauses should be followed to help preserve the
proper allocation of roles within constitutional government, just as the legislative intent
of the drafters of a statute should be followed to help assure representative democratic
government.
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federal courts. Hopefully, this examination will bring truth to Justice
Frankfurter's vision of simplicity, albeit a truth of which the Justice
might not have approved.
While some of the literature on congressional power over federal
jurisdiction addresses the history of the judicial article summarily, the
bulk of the writing in this field has been devoted to more current doctrinal and policy considerations. This Article departs from that tradition by focusing attention exclusively on the original intention of the
drafters and ratifiers of article III, eschewing for the present the modern doctrinal implications of that inquiry.
Thus, this Article does not directly address the constitutionality of
modern proposals to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.
The findings of this Article, however, may significantly influence that
debate. The constitutionality of the proposals to curtail jurisdiction
turns on complex questions involving the interpretation of prior precedent and the view one takes of the appropriate role of constitutional
text and original intention in the resolution of constitutional questions.
For the interpretivist, a2 this Article may therefore provide insights and
Judicial discretion, of course, must exist in the process of constitutional adjudication, particularly where the original intent of the framers is obscure or non-ascertainable or where the constitutional question presented to the court was not foreseen by the
drafters of the Constitution. Thus, this Article is devoted to ascertaining whether there
is any clear objective evidence of an original understanding regarding congressional
power over the scope of federal court jurisdiction. If that question is answered in the
negative, then the courts' interpretive discretion would not be limited by any historical
original understanding of article III. On the other hand, if such a dear original understanding can be demonstrated, as argued in this Article, the discretion of the courts to
interpret article III is thereby limited. Interpretation of a constitutional clause contrary
to its originally intended meaning simply cannot readily be reconciled with any theory
that supports a written constitution.
"2 The interpretivist school tends to view the process of constitutional decisionmaking exclusively as a search for the original intent or understanding underlying the
text of the Constitution; non-interpretivist thinkers tend to look to a much wider range
of sources for guidance in such decisionmaking. For a small sample of the debate between the interpretivist and non-interpretivist schools of thought in constitutional law,

compare R.

BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDIcIARY

283-99, 363-72 (1977), and Ber-

ger, Paul Brest's Brieffor an Imperialjudiciary, 40 MD. L. RE. 1 (1981), with Bice,
supra note 3, and Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding,60
B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980). See generally Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories:
A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHmo ST. L.J. 3 (1981). For a recent
rejection of the relevance of original understanding and interpretivist thinking to interpretation of article III, see Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982):
If this simple reading [of article III] were correct and we were free to
disregard 150 years of history, this would be an easy case. ...
[The] question is what limits Article III places on Congress' ability to
create adjudicative institutions designed to carry out federal policy established pursuant to the substantive authority given Congress elsewhere in
the Constitution. Whether fortunate or unfortunate, at this point in the
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ammunition with which to launch an attack on the constitutionality of
jurisdictional curtailment proposals. It may also pose some difficult
questions regarding proposals to abolish diversity jurisdiction."3 For the
noninterpretivist, this excursion into legal history may pose troublesome, although non-dispositive, questions regarding the appropriate
scope of congressional power over federal court jurisdiction. Furthermore, for scholars of any ilk, the conclusions of this piece may stimulate
further inquiry into the legitimate scope of departure from the originally intended meanings of constitutional provisions. In this Article, the
author proposes, however, only to present and interpret the historical
data surrounding the adoption of article III, leaving to later debate the
equally important issue of the current significance of that information.
The debates over congressional power to curtail federal court jurisdiction generally have centered around the interpretation of particular clauses in article III taken in isolation. Thus, disputes over the existence and scope of congressional power to curtail the appellate
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court have focused on the
interpretation of the exceptions and regulations clause24 of section 2 of
article III. Analyses of the power of Congress to curtail the jurisdiction
of the inferior federal courts have focused almost entirely on the language in section 1 of article III, authorizing Congress to vest article III
jurisdiction in such inferior courts as it "may from time to time ordain
and establish" 15 and on the corollary congressional power contained in
section 8 of article I "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court.""6 Little attention has been paid to the light that the overall
structure of the article sheds on the meaning of its constituent clauses
or to the bearing that the debates in the Constitutional Convention and
the ratification process have on ambiguities in the language of article
III. This Article is devoted to precisely such an inquiry.
The conclusion of this inquiry is that the framers, by providing
that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish,"' 7 intended to mandate that Congress
history of constitutional law that question can no longer be answered by
looking only to the constitutional text. This Court's cases construing that
text must also be considered.
Id. at 93-94.
11 See, e.g., H.R. 6691, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 6816, 97th Cong., 2d

Sess. (1982).
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
15 Id. art. III, § 1.
16 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
11 Id. art. III, § I (emphasis added).
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allocate to the federal judiciary as a whole each and every type of case
or controversy defined as part of the judicial power of the United States
by section 2, clause 1 of article III, excluding, possibly, only those cases
that Congress deemed to be so trivial that they would pose an unnecessary burden on both the federal judiciary and on the parties forced to
litigate in federal court.1 8 The intent of the framers was succinctly
summarized by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 82: "The
evident aim of the plan of the convention is that all the causes of the
specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons receive their original
or final determination in the courts of the union."1 9 The powers over
the federal judiciary that articles I and III gave to Congress thus involved authority over the distribution, organization, and implementation of the judicial power of the United States, not a license to curtail
its exercise.
This thesis, it must be noted, is not completely synonymous with
the often criticized theory advanced by Justice Story that Congress had
a constitutional obligation to create inferior federal courts,2 0 although
18 While there is little evidence that the framers at the Philadelphia Convention
intended any congressional power over the scope of jurisdiction of the entire federal
judiciary, even when the amount in controversy was trivial, the debates during the
ratification conventions suggested that Congress might exclude such trivial matters from
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See infra notes 289-94, 327-30 and
accompanying text. Since the ratification process was a part of the adoption of the
Constitution, it might be argued that such a limited congressional power was thereby
constructively engrafted onto the Constitution-a construction that serves to explain the
seemingly inconsistent omission of certain classes of jurisdiction from the cognizance of
the federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (current version codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1976)). See infra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
During the ratification debates Federalist supporters of article III also conceded that
Congress had power to curtail federal court review of facts to protect civil jury trials.
See infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text.
19 THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 556 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Cf. 3 J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

447 (1833)

("In regard to the power of constituting inferior courts of the Union, it is evidently
calculated to obviate the necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every
case of federal cognizance.").
20. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 327-39 (1816); see also
White v. Fenner, 29 F. Cas. 1015 (C.C.D.R.I. 1818) (No. 17,547); 3 J. STORY, supra
note 19, at 435-56. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 57-60; HART &
WECHSLER,

supra note 3, at 313-14.

Most of the contemporary scholars who have written on the question of congressional power over the scope of federal jurisdiction have focused on the existing case law
and the contemporary constitutional policies surrounding these questions. Few have
paid very close attention to the manner in which the debates at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention and during the ratification process should affect the interpretation of article III. But see Sager, supra note 3. The interpretations of article III offered
by Hamilton and some of the views expressed by Justice Story, which in part are
supported by the historical material contained in this Article, have gained almost no
support among contemporary writers on the subject. Indeed, the views of Hamilton and
Story are frequently rejected without proper attention to the historical material that
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elements of this thesis are similar to views advanced by Story in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee21 and elsewhere. By the same token, this thesis does
supports their conclusions. See, e.g.,
By contrast, Professor Crosskey
interpretations of article III offered
support he advanced for his reading

Redish & Woods, supra note 3, at 52-75.
did advance and attempt to support some of the
by Hamilton and Story, although the historical
of the document was seriously lacking. See I W.

CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED

STATES 610-20, 641-74 (1953). Relying mostly on his own reading of the constitutional
language and Hamilton's comments in The Federalist No. 82, Crosskey concluded:
The meaning of this requirement-that "the judicial Power shall extend to" all these "Cases," including those described in the enumeration as
"Controversies"-is that the power in question "shall extend to" all the
questions of law and fact of which these "Cases" consist. There can be no
doubt about this, because the intention unmistakably is that the courts of
the United States shall have power to decide the enumerated "Cases," and
the national courts would not have such power, unless "the judicial
Power" that is required to be "vested in" them did "extend to" the enumerated "Cases" in the complete sense just stated. Nevertheless, the view
has been held that Congress, without offending these mandatory requirements of Article III, can except, from "the judicial Power" of the United
States courts, various parts of the enumerated "Cases"; that is, various of
the questions of law and fact of which these "Cases" consist. The notion
seems to be that the Constitutional requirement is satisfied if "the judicial
Power" is "extended to" any component of the enumerated "Cases." The
words "extend to" are apparently read as "touch"; and a physical meaning is given to the words, in reference to a subject to which, it is clear,
their physical meaning has no just application. For when this meaning is
given them, the plain Constitutional intention that the national courts
shall have power to decide the enumerated "Cases," and not merely some
of the questions in them, is subverted.
The exaggerated notions that have come to be entertained of the
power of Congress to make exceptions from the required "extent" of "the
[national] judicial Power," and from the Supreme Court's Constitutionally
conferred "suprem[acy]" in the exercise of that power, have rested, to be
sure, in part, upon certain other provisions of Article III not yet noted.
But although this is true, the notions in question have also rested, in part,
upon the foregoing unwarranted views of the meaning of "extend to" in
the second section of the article, and of the meaning of the omission of
"all" in the categories of the judicial enumeration that are described as
"Controversies." And this being true, it is essential to see that these views
are unwarranted; that, so far, at least, as the provisions thus far considered are concerned, the "extension" of "the [national] judicial Power" to
all the enumerated "Cases"-meaning all the questions of law and fact of
which these "Cases" consist-was made mandatory upon Congress; and
that the Supreme Court's Constitutionally conferred "suprem[acy]," in

the exercise of the power required to have this "extent," was made
mandatory upon Congress, too.
Id. at 615 (footnote omitted). Thus, Professor Crosskey viewed what he perceived to be
the initial congressional decisions in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to withhold portions of
the jurisdiction from the federal courts as unconstitutional decisions "contrived to slow
down the process of change to [the article III] reforms." He found that such decisions
by Congress withheld "from the courts it set up, certain of the powers that the Constitution, upon a straightforward reading, plainly makes mandatory for them." Id. at 610.
21 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
The language of [article III] throughout is manifestly designed to be
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not mean that Congress was precluded from making exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court or to the
mandatory upon the legislature. Its obligatory force is so imperative, that
congress could not, without a violation of its duty, have refused to carry it
into operation. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested (not
may be vested) in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish ...
Id. at 328. The opinion continued:
If, then, it is a duty of congress to vest the judicial power of the
United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicialpower. The language,
if imperative as to one part, is imperative as to all. If it were otherwise,
this anomaly would exist, that Congress might successively refuse to vest
the jurisdiction in any one class of cases enumerated in the constitution,
and thereby defeat the jurisdiction as to all; for the constitution has not
singled out any class on which Congress are bound to act in preference to
others.
Id. at 330.
Because Justice Story assumed that Congress had no control whatsoever over the
jurisdiction of the state courts and could not mandate that they hear cases arising under
federal law, he concluded that it was also mandatory for Congress to create inferior
federal courts, id. at 330-37, and invest each article III court that it created with the
whole of the judicial power of the United States. Since Congress can require the state
courts to entertain federal causes of action, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), and
since the framers demonstrably intended to vest discretion in Congress to create inferior
federal courts and to distribute the exercise of judicial powers among them, Justice
Story's conclusion with respect to the necessity for the creation of inferior federal courts
is highly suspect. This defect in his analysis does not, however, invalidate his premise
that the language of section 1 of article III imposed a mandatory obligation on Congress to vest the entirety of the judicial power of the United States in the federal judiciary as a whole.
Story's decision in Martin v. Hunter'sLessee did not, of course, ultimately turn on
this premise, for he later addressed the issues posed in that case on the further assumption that Congress had discretion to refuse to create inferior federal courts or, if created,
to refuse to vest in them the whole of the judicial power of the United States.
Story's argument that inferior federal courts were mandatory was presaged by a
similar position taken by Gouverneur Morris, who, unlike Story, had attended the
Philadelphia Convention. In a speech on the floor of the Senate on January 14, 1802,
Morris argued that since the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction and the Constitution "said that the judicial powers shall be vested in the supreme and inferior
[federal] courts," the evident intent was that the cases would be tried in inferior federal
courts. He concluded, "This, therefore, amounts to a declaration, that the inferior
courts shall exist." 3 THE RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 391 (M.
Farrand ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as Farrand, RECORDS].
The arguments offered by Gouverneur Morris and Justice Story may have been
partially influenced, or at least anticipated, by earlier arguments offered by Alexander
Contee Hanson of Maryland, who published federalist defenses of the Constitution
under the pseudonymn Aristides during the ratification period. See Hanson, Remarks
on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 217 (P. Ford ed. 1888 & republished 1968) [hereinafter
cited as Ford, PAMPHLETS]. Not having attended the Philadelphia Convention and apparently ignorant of the Madisonian compromise, see infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text, Hanson assumed that Congress was constitutionally obligated to create the
inferior federal courts and to invest them with original jurisdiction over all classes of
cases that the Supreme Court was authorized to entertain in appellate form. Quite
contrary to Justice Story's analysis in Hunter'sLessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, how-
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original or appellate jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts. Rather,
the central proposition advanced here is that the so-called exceptions
and regulations clause and those clauses dealing with the congressional
power to create inferior federal courts were intended by the framers to
be construed in conformity with the overriding objective of the judicial
article-to ensure that some federal court would have at least a discretionary opportunity to review each class of case enumerated in section 2
of article III, in order to ensure the supremacy of federal law and the
national peace and harmony. That jurisdictional opportunity might involve either original or appellate determination in the federal courts.
The power to make exceptions was at most an allocative authority
designed to facilitate the creation of inferior federal courts.
Important to this jurisdictional scheme was the notion that the final appellate determination made by a federal court, even for a case
originally tried in state court, could be made by an inferior federal
court, rather than the Supreme Court.2" This point indicates that, from
ever, Hanson confidently asserted that an appeal could be taken to the Supreme Court
only from decisions of the inferior federal courts. See infra note 270.
2 In The Federalist,Alexander Hamilton considered whether "an appeal [could]
be made to lie from the state courts to the subordinate federal judicatories." He argued,
The plan of the convention in the first place authorises the national legislature "to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court." It declares in
the next place that, "the JUDICIAL POWER of the United States shall
be vested in one supreme court and in such inferior courts as congress
shall ordain and establish"; and it then proceeds to enumerate the cases to
which this judicial power shall extend. It afterwards divides the jurisdiction of the supreme court into original and appellate, but gives no definition of that of the subordinate courts. The only outlines described for them
are that they shall be "inferior to the supreme court" and that they shall
not exceed the specified limits of the federal judiciary. Whether their authority shall be original or appellate or both is not declared. All this seems
to be left to the discretion of the legislature. And this being the case, I
perceive at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from
the state courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many advantages attending the power of doing it may be imagined. It would diminish
the motives to the multiplication of federal courts, and would admit of
arrangements calculated to contract the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The state tribunals may then be left with a more entire
charge of federal causes; and appeals in most cases in which they may be
deemed proper instead of being carried to the supreme court, may be made
to lie from the state courts to district courts of the union.
THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 556-57 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (footnote omitted). In suggesting that permitting appeals from the state courts would make possible
the conditions necessary to curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Hamilton
again manifested his perception that the Philadelphia Convention had mandated that
the whole of the judicial power of the United States be vested in the federal judiciary,
albeit not necessarily in one particular court.
In some respects, the power now exercised by the federal district courts to entertain applications for writs of habeas corpus from state court criminal convictions functionally constitutes an exercise of the "appellate" power contemplated by Hamilton,
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the outset, the goal of assuring the supremacy of federal law and the
supremacy of the federal government in areas of concern to more than
one state was the central constitutional objective that the framers sought
to implement through article III. Specifically, the structure established
by the framers commanded that all cases raising issues of federal law or
all cases concerning more than one state receive their final determination by federal judges not beholden to the states-judges who, unlike
their state counterparts, were constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence. This structure also suggests that the objective of ensuring
uniformity of interpretation of federal law, while desired by the framers as a matter of policy, was left substantially to congressional discretion and therefore was not a matter of constitutional imperative.
In demonstrating the historical support for a theory of mandatory
federal jurisdiction, it seems most logical to present the material in its
historical sequence. Thus, part II of this Article discusses the background and debates in the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia
regarding the structure of the federal judiciary, beginning with the experience under the Articles of Confederation and focusing thereafter on
the debates at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. Part III assesses
the discussions of the federal judiciary during the process of ratification
of the Constitution by the state conventions. This chronological presentation demonstrates that the framers' positions fluctuated as the focus of
debate shifted from broad structural issues raised during the closed
Constitutional Convention to more pointed attacks on the constitutional
document raised during the open and well-publicized state ratification
process. Nevertheless, the underlying interpretation of article III as creating a federal judiciary with constitutionally vested mandatory jurisdiction remained relatively unchallenged.
II.

THE INTENT OF THE DRAFTERS OF ARTICLE

III

AT THE

PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION

A.

Background

When the Convention convened in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft
the nation's second written Constitution, the delegates were obviously
not fabricating a new government out of whole cloth. Rather, they had
the important experience of six years of formal operation under the
Articles of Confederation and more than six years of earlier experience
although such applications are not technically denominated appeals or writs of error,
but rather original applications for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254
(1976).
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of governance by the Continental Congress without a formal constitutional document. This experience enlightened their perceptions of the
need for structural change in the national governing processes. Exploring this earlier historical experience, therefore, is a prerequisite to understanding the perceptions of the drafters of the Constitution.
While the national government is sometimes thought of as lacking
executive and judicial branches under the Articles of Confederation, national judicial proceedings predated the adoption of the Constitution in
1789 and were expressly provided for in the Articles in limited cases,
such as cases adjudicating captures at sea in time of war. From the
beginning, the Continental Congress faced the problem of disposing of
such prize cases spawned by the hostilities with Great Britain. The
Congress began by entertaining appeals in such cases, a total of sixtyfour in all, through special congressional committees that heard these
cases and reported their judgments to Congress.2" Ultimately, a standing congressional committee was formed to hear the cases.24 On August
26, 1779, a committee was formed to consider establishing a more permanent court of appeal. 5 Eventually, a plan was prepared and approved that established a court of three judges for the "trial" of appeals
from state courts in cases of capture.2 6 This court, designated "The
Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture," began operation on May 24,
1780 when the cases pending before the standing committee were transferred to the court docket.27 After approval of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, the Court of Appeals continued to operate under provisions of the Articles.2"
Article 9 of the Articles of Confederation contemplated the exerIs 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, 371-75 (W. Ford
ed. 1905) [hereinafter cited as JOURNALS]; 5 id. at 747. See generally J. GOEBEL,
supra note 3, at 147-82.
24 7 JOURNALS, supra note 23, at 75.
25 The committee reported a plan for establishing "one or more supreme courts of
appeal in all maritime causes." 15 id. at 1220-23. This plan went beyond the admiralty
jurisdiction contemplated in the Articles of Confederation, which were then pending
before the states. As noted below, article 9 only provided for national jurisdiction in
"the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas" and for hearing "appeals
in all cases of captures." See infra note 29 and accompanying text. The initial plan
reported to Congress called for the establishment of four districts within the United
States, in each of which a national court of appeals was to be established to hear all
appeals from the state admiralty courts within the district. No appeal was to be allowed
when the appellant was "a subject or inhabitant" of the state where trial was held.
After debate, which centered in part on the desirability of jury trial, the initial plan
was defeated by an even division of the states. 17 JOURNALS, supra note 23, at 457-59.
26 17 JOURNALS, supra note 23, at 457-59. See generally J. GOEBEL, supra note
3, at 169-71.
27 J. GOFEL, supra note 3, at 171-82.
2S Id. at 171-73.
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cise of national judicial power both in certain maritime cases and in
certain disputes between the states, but under procedures very different
from those of the Court of Appeals. First, it provided that
[t]he united states in congress assembled, shall have the sole
and exclusive right and power of. .. appointing courts for
the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas;
and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally
appeals in all cases of captures; provided that no member of
Congress shall be appointed a judge in any of the said
courts.2

9

Second, article 9 provided that the Confederation Congress should
serve as "the last resort on appeal, in all disputes and differences now
subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever" 30 and for
"[a]ll controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under
different grants of two or more states" that antedated any settlement of
the jurisdiction and land claims between the affected states."' This article also prescribed a ponderous procedure whereby such appeals were
initiated upon petition to Congress by the legislature, governor, or lawful agent of any affected state. An ad hoc hearing tribunal was appointed by the parties or, when the parties could not agree on whom to
appoint, by lot through a complex procedure in which the Congress
chose nominees from all the states, and the parties were afforded a limited opportunity to peremptorily strike certain nominees. The judges
were "to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a
major part of the judges shall hear the cause shall agree in the determination." Their judgment was to be "final and conclusive," although
they were limited by the requirement that their judgment could not
deprive any state of territory for the benefits of the national government. The commissioners appointed under this article merely reported
their decisions to Congress. Neither they nor the Confederation Congress had any power to implement or enforce their decisions.3 2
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9, § 1.
The experience under this Court of Appeals was briefly noted by James Wilson
during the debates at the 1787 Philadelphia Convention when he suggested that the
jurisdiction of the proposed supreme court, like the Court of Appeals, should extend to
"facts as well as law & Common as well as Civil law." 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra
note 21, at 431. One problem sometimes encountered by the Court of Appeals was that
it had trouble enforcing its judgments when state courts simply ignored its reversals of
their decisions. J. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 179-81.
so ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9, § 2.
31 Id. art. 9, § 3.
2 Id. art. 9, § 2.
29

19841

FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

The judicial experience of the confederation is detailed elsewhere
and will not be retraced here."3 That experience demonstrated, however, the value of a court, like the Court of Appeals, separate from the
national legislature. The experience highlighted, among other things,
the need to avoid the ponderous delay and inconvenience created by the
ad hoc establishment of hearing tribunals, the importance of the national disposition of certain judicial cases to orderly diplomatic relations
and to the domestic harmony of the states, the need for judges who
could decide such questions independent of any obligations owed to the
states that appointed them, and the extreme difficulty of enforcing national judgments affecting important state interests. Furthermore, the
experience under these national adjudicatory procedures during the
confederation period undoubtedly shaped the attitudes of the delegates
who attended the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia during the
summer of 1787 and serves to explain the relative consensus surrounding the need for the establishment of a constitutionally created, standing, independent, national judiciary. The debate over the judiciary at
the Philadelphia Convention therefore centered not on the issue of the
creation of federal courts, but rather on the structure of those courts,
the breadth of their jurisdiction, and the nature of their relationship to
the already extant state courts.
B.

The PhiladelphiaConvention
1. Background

Spawned by concerns over regulation of commerce, international
diplomatic problems, and the need to ensure state compliance with the
leadership of the national government in areas of international and interstate relations, and aided by the convening of the abortive Annapolis
Convention,3 4 the Constitutional Convention first convened at Philadelphia on May 14, 1787, ultimately commencing work on May 25. The
Convention met irregularly through the summer of 1787, adjourning
from time to time as special committees hammered out the details of the
constitutional document they were crafting, and concluded its deliberations with the signing of the document on Monday, September 17.
Under the rules adopted at the outset, the debates of the Convention were closed and could not "be printed, or otherwise published or
33

& H.

See, e.g., J. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 182-95; Frank, supra note 3, at 7-9.
See generally J. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 196-200; A. KELLY, W. HARBISON

BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

(6th ed. 1983).

90-91
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communicated without leave." 5 By rule, a journal of the plenary proceedings was kept, listing major motions and votes. Unfortunately for
our understanding of the judicial article, no similar record was kept of
committee proceedings. Despite the rules forbidding publication of the
debates, the available knowledge of the workings of the Convention is
remarkable, consisting mainly of the journal, first published in 1819;
James Madison's extensive notes, first published after some revisions
by Madison in 1840; more fragmentary notes and accounts by Robert
Yates, Rufus King, William Paterson, Alexander Hamilton, James
McHenry, and William Pierce; and some surviving documents from the
Convention and correspondence of its members.3 0
From these materials, it is clear that the establishment of a national judiciary was assumed by all delegates and only its contours and
powers were periodically debated, although not extensively. The overall
impression conveyed by these documents in that an independent national judiciary was seen as an essential means to enforce national authority and supremacy against recalcitrant state and private interests, to
provide a neutral forum for cases that the states were individually incapable of resolving because of the perceived bias and lack of independence of their judges (referred to herein as matters of "transstate" concern), and to enforce constitutional constraints and protect individual
87
liberties against federal and state legislative and executive branches.
Initially, a number of plans for a new national government were
formulated and presented to the Convention. On May 29, Edmund
Randolph presented his so-called Virginia Plan," which proposed the
establishment of an independent national judiciary consisting of "one or
more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the
11 1 Farrand,

RECORDS,

supra note 21, at 17.

S6 Id. at xi-xxv.
37 From a review of the materials from the Philadelphia Convention, the
state
ratification conventions, and the related contemporaneous published letters dnd essays
on the proposed Constitution, the author is firmly convinced that the framers clearly
contemplated judicial review of both state and federal legislation, although the evidence
supporting judicial review of state acts is far easier to find than data demonstrating an
intent to institute judicial review of acts of Congress. The institution of judicial independence was defended on the ground that preservation of judicial autonomy was necessary if the federal courts were to perform the sensitive task of judicial review. See
infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text. Similarly, the framers feared that the intrusion on the principle of separation of powers posed by uniting the judges with the
Executive in the proposed Council of Revision would undermine the important function
of judicial review. Id. The complete presentation of that material is beyond the scope of
this piece, although some of the evidence is inextricably woven through the materials
presented here. For a thorough historical exploration of the issue that also concludes
that the framers intended judicial review of both state and federal legislation, see R.

supra note 3.
11 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 16.

BERGER,
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National Legislature." 9 As formulated by Randolph, the Virginia Plan
would have constitutionally established the jurisdiction of the federal
courts ("the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear &
determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and
determine in the dernier resort""0 ). This jurisdiction included piracies
and felonies on the high seas, capture cases, "cases in which foreigners
or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested," national revenue cases, impeachments of national officers, and
"questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.""
The Virginia Plan, which ultimately became the focus of early
Convention debate, also proposed the establishment of a Council of Revision 2 made up of the "Executive and a convenient number of the
National Judiciary," which would have exercised authority to approve
or reject statutes passed by national and state legislatures.4 3 Nowhere in
the Virginia Plan was there any suggestion of legislative control over
the jurisdiction of the national judiciary; the only proposed congressional power was limited to choosing the structure of the inferior tribunals, the existence of which were mandated by the plan.
The treatment of the judiciary in the other proposals is also illuminating. On the same day that the Randolph proposal was offered,
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina presented a plant' that called for
the mandatory creation of both a supreme court and such inferior fed-

41

Id. at 21.
Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
Id.

42

The proposal stated:

39
40

8. Resd. that the Executive and a convenient number of the National
Judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, &
every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be
final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection,
unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a
particular Legislature be again negatived by... of the members of each
branch.
Id. at 21 (ellipsis in original).
This proposal may have been drawn from the review powers of certain state councils that may in turn have originated in the dual power the English Privy Council
exercised separately through its judicial appellate jurisdiction and its veto authority
over colonial legislation. For an example of provisions for a state council, see N.Y.
CONST. art. 3 (1777), in 2 B. POOLE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTIrrTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1332-33

(1877). For a survey of the colonial experience with the Privy Council, see generally J.
SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN

(1950).

43 1 Farrand, RECORDS,supra
44 Id. at 16, 23.

note 21, at 21.
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eral courts "as shall be necessary."4' 5 Two weeks later, on Friday, June
15, after extensive debate on the Virginia Plan, William Paterson
presented the so-called New Jersey Plan, which provided for an independent national supreme court appointed by the Executive with constitutionally established jurisdiction ("the Judiciary so established shall
have authority to hear & determine") over impeachments of federal
officers, cases touching the rights of ambassadors, capture cases, piracies and felonies on the high seas, all cases in which foreigners might be
interested, and cases involving the construction of treaties or which
might arise from the national revenue or commerce laws.4 In impeachment cases the supreme court's jurisdiction was to be original; all other
cases were to be heard by the supreme court "in the dernier resort"
from the state courts.47 Like the Virginia Plan, the Paterson proposal
contained no suggestion whatsoever of any congressional control over
the jurisdiction of the supreme court. Its major distinguishing characteristics were its deliberate omission of any inferior federal courts48 and
its provision for the appointment of the judges by the Executive, rather
than by the national legislature, as in the Virginia Plan, or by the Sen4'The text of the Pinckney Plan is set forth in 3 id. at 600; see also 2 id. at 13437 (outline of Pinckney Plan).
46 1 id. at 244.
47 Id.; see also 3 id. at 611-15 (text and discussion of New Jersey Plan).
48 Paterson proposed to have the state courts try all cases except impeachments of
national officers in the first instance. In order to resolve the problem of ensuring federal
supremacy, Paterson proposed a supremacy clause:
6. Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue & in
pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of confederation vested
in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U.
States shall be the supreme law of the respective states so far forth as those
Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that
the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding ....
1 id. at 245. As amended, Paterson's suggested supremacy clause ultimately found its
way into article VI of the Constitution. The fact that the clause was first suggested
during the Convention in a plan that did not call for inferior courts and was suggested
to assure state court adherence to the principle of national supremacy helps explain
why the clause ultimately adopted refers only to state judges without mentioning the
federal judiciary. It should be noted that the idea of a supremacy clause did not originate with Paterson. Article 13 of the Articles of Confederation had provided in part:
"Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed in every State . . . ." ARTICLES
OF CONFEDERATION art. 13. As Alexander Hamilton noted, however, in The Federalist, a central problem with the confederation was that there was "no power to exact
obedience" to this provision. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 129 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke
ed. 1961). The innovation made by the Paterson plan was that it rendered the political
issue of state compliance with federal law a justiciable legal question and specifically
directed the state courts to enforce federal supremacy.
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ate, as proposed by Pinckney.
Other plans were prepared but never submitted to the Convention.
The manuscript of a plan drafted by Alexander Hamilton shows that
Hamilton favored creation of a supreme court with extensive original
jurisdiction over controversies involving the United States; the United
States and a particular state, or two or more states; and over cases affecting foreign ministers and consuls. The Supreme Court also would
have had appellate jurisdiction "both as to law and fact" in cases concerning citizens of foreign nations, questions between citizens of different states, "and in all others in which the fundamental rights of this
Constitution are involved, subject to such exceptions as are herein con'
tained and to such regulations as the Legislature shall provide." 49
Under Hamilton's plan, controversies about land rights between the
United States and any state were to be submitted to a more neutral
special hearing commission chosen in a manner vaguely reminiscent of
the commissions for disputes between the states under the Articles of
Confederation. Inferior federal courts were not expressly mentioned in
the Hamilton plan and apparently were left to congressional discretion
since the plan referred to "Judges of all Courts which may be constituted by the Legislature" and further stated that "nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the Legislature from abolishing
such [inferior] Courts themselves." 50
Thus, all of the plans for a new national government called for the
establishment of an independent national judiciary consisting of at least
one supreme court with constitutionally established jurisdiction and, in
some plans, inferior federal courts. While many of the plans assumed
the necessity for legislative implementation of a court structure, the
only suggestion of any congressional power over the judicial establishment came in the stillborn Hamilton plan that apparently left the creation of inferior federal courts to congressional control and authorized
the national legislature to make regulations, but not exceptions, governing the exercise of original and appellate jurisdiction by the supreme
court.5 1

19 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 626. The plan was apparently drafted
for a speech Hamilton delivered on June 18, 1787. While not formally presented to the
Convention, the Hamilton plan may have influenced the final document.
50 Id.
Yet another plan was found among the papers of George Nason of Virginia. The
plan called for the creation of a supreme court and lower federal courts of only admiralty jurisdiction. 2 id. at 432-33; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 3.
The Supreme Court shall have. . . an appellate jurisdiction both as to
law and fact in all cases which shall concern the Citizens of foreign nations, in all questions between the Citizens of different States, and in all
others in which the fundamental rights of this Constitution are involved,
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Not only were these plans wholly silent on the subject to legislative power over court jurisdiction, but they also uniformly evidenced an
intent on the part of the framers to assure judicial independence from
Congress and the Executive by providing that the judges of the national
courts would "hold their offices during good behaviour" and receive
fixed salaries which could not be diminished during their terms of office. The indicia contained in these plans seem to belie any suggestion
that important factions in the Philadelphia Convention favored congressional control over the powers of the national judiciary, either as a constitutional check on the judiciary or because they supported the principle of legislative supremacy. Rather, both nationalists, like Randolph
and Hamilton, and more pro-state delegates, like Paterson, initially
seem to have been united in a desire to create an independent national
judiciary consisting of at least a supreme court with constitutionally
established jurisdiction. There was even substantial agreement on the
types of cases to be overseen by the national judiciary, which is surprising since the jurisdiction envisioned was considerably greater than that
committed to national judicial attention under the Articles of Confederation. These initial proposals differed only on the need for and manner
of creation of inferior federal courts and in the manner of appointment
of federal judges.
2.

Early Deliberations and the Adoption of General
Principles Governing a Federal Judiciary

Only Randolph's Virginia Plan and Paterson's New Jersey Plan
were actually discussed by the Convention in its early deliberations as a
committee of the whole. The debates during this period reflect a broad
commitment to an independent judiciary with wide-ranging constitutionally established jurisdiction over disputes affecting national laws,
international affairs, and matters of transstate concern. In presenting
his plan on May 29, Randolph apparently urged the necessity of two
"Checks upon the Legv. and Ex. Powers"-his Council of Revision
and the national judiciary.52 His plan for a national judiciary consisting
of one supreme tribunal and one or more inferior courts was tentatively
subject to such exceptions as are herein contained and to such regulations
as the Legislature shall provide.
3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 626; see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
11 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 28 (Paterson's notes). Thus, from the
beginning of the Convention, the federal judiciary was seen as a necessary independent
check on the federal legislature, a fact that casts serious doubt on the framers' willingness to accept legislative power or control over the scope of jurisdiction of the national
courts.
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but unanimously approved without debate on June 4, but the question
of whether to add the judges to the proposed Council of Revision was
postponed at Hamilton's urging. "3
The next day, June 5, the opponents of inferior federal courts,
who consisted mostly of delegates from small states, regrouped and
launched their attack. Under their influence, the Convention first
agreed to eliminate the reference to the number of inferior courts from
the plan under consideration and then voted, eight states to two, to reject the idea of judicial appointment by the national legislature." During this debate, the provisions of Randolph's plan calling for guarantees
of judicial independence were unanimously adopted without debate. 55
After considering other matters, the Convention returned to the
proposals on the judiciary when John Rutledge of South Carolina
moved, seconded by Roger Sherman of Connecticut, to strike the reference in the plan to inferior federal courts. Rutledge argued that "the
State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the
first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being
sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts: that it
was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction [of the
States,] and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new
system."'5 The motion passed, five states (Connecticut, New Jersey, the
Carolinas, and Georgia) to four (Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
and Virginia), with two state delegations (Massachusetts and New
York) divided. 57 This unexpected turn of events prompted what has
often been described as the Madisonian compromise when James Wilson and John Madison moved, apparently at the suggestion of John
Dickinson of Delaware, that the national legislature be "empowered to
institute inferior tribunals. 5 8 Urging the importance of the ability of
the national government to create lower federal courts, they stressed
"that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them."" While Pierce Butler of South Carolina objected that,
even if such lower federal courts were useful, the states would not bear
5

Id. at 93-95, 108-09; see also id. at 104-05.

" Id. at 116. Wilson and Pinckney reserved the right to reconsider the first and
second of these decisions respectively. Madison, who disliked selection of judges by
"any numerous body," but who also distrusted the Executive, suggested selection by the
Senate. Id. at 120-21.
55 Id. at 121.
56 Id. at 124.
57 Id. at 125.
58 Id. at 125, 127.
59 Id. at 125.
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such encroachments on their sovereignty, and that their cost would be
much higher than merely providing for appeals to the supreme court,
the Madisonian compromise carried the day by a vote of seven states to
three (the compromise capturing Massachusetts from the camp of the
divided and turning around the North Carolina and Georgia delegations).60 With the rapid adoption of Madisonian compromise during
the eighth business session of the Convention, the outer parameters of
the judicial article were established in principle, though debate continued over its internal structure and arrangement.
On June 12 and 13, the Convention again turned its attention to
the judiciary article, this time focusing on the scope of jurisdiction of
the national judiciary. On the first day of this debate, the delegates
agreed to strike all references to jurisdiction over piracies, felonies on
the high seas, and capture cases,"' a somewhat surprising development
since appellate jurisdiction over the latter class of cases was at that time
exercised by a national Court of Appeals under the Articles of Confederation. It is possible that the more pro-state delegates may have decided, after the success of the Madisonian compromise, to attack the
judicial article by whittling away at the jurisdiction of the national
judiciary.
The strong federalists in the Convention, like Randolph and
Madison, must have sensed this stratagem, since they launched their
own counterattack the next day by moving to amend Randolph's original plan from a particularized to a more general statement of the jurisdiction of the proposed national judiciary. The amended plan offered
by Randolph and Madison provided "[tihat the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the
national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions
which involve the national peace and harmony." 6 This amendment
was significant not only because it thwarted the efforts to pare the more
particularized jurisdiction in the original Virginia Plan, but also because it brought the projected grant of power to the national judiciary
into conformity with the proposed grant of legislative authority to Congress. The legislative provision of the Virginia Plan, as then drafted,
granted Congress the right
to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and moreover.
to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are in60

Id.

61

Id. at 211, 220.
Id. at 223-24; see also id. at 232-33 (debate over and adoption of amendment).
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competent: or in which the harmony of the United States
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.
to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the national legislature, the articles of
union; or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the
Union[.] 8
The conformity of the two provisions suggests that the framers
were attempting to assure that the judicial power was coextensive with
the legislative power, as had often been advocated," and that two separate national bodies, the Congress and the federal courts, could each
separately deal with the major problems of the union-assuring individual state compliance in areas of international and transstate concern.
On June 13 the framers also briefly returned to the vexing problem of the manner of appointment of federal judges, ultimately voting,
at Madison's insistence, for appointment by the Senate, which was "a
less numerous & more select body, would be more competent judges,
and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in
65

them."1

Thus, as it emerged from the first round of consideration by the
committee of the whole, the portions of the Virginia Plan dealing with
the judiciary had been amended to read:
11 Resolved. that a national judiciary be established to consist of
One supreme Tribunal
The Judges of which to be appointed by the second
Branch of the National Legislature.
to hold their offices during good behaviour
to receive, punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services: in which no encrease or
diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons
actually in office at the time of such encrease or
diminution
12 Resolved. That the national legislature be empowered to
appoint
inferior Tribunals.
63

Id. at 225.

" See, e.g.,

THE FEDERALUST No. 8, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
("If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a
government being co-extensive with its legislative, may be ranked among the
number.").
15 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 233.
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13 Resolved. that the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary
shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue: impeachments of any national Officers: and
questions which involve the national peace and harmony."8
This plan, which was intended, according to Randolph, to preserve
"the security of foreigners where treaties are in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of states and that of the citizens thereof,""' only
mapped out general principles and was referred to the Committee of
Detail for a draft document effectuating its provisions.
The plan contained no suggestion whatsoever of any congressional
authority over the jurisdiction of either the supreme or inferior courts,
that jurisdiction being constitutionally established in the Randolph resolutions. Rather, the only congressional discretion explicitly countenanced was the power to decide whether to institute lower federal
courts. It seems, therefore, that the framers did not assume that with
the power to establish inferior federal courts necessarily went the
power to control their jurisdiction.
Believing it had completed its review of the Virginia Plan, the
committee of the whole was preparing to vote to report the amended
plan to the floor of the Convention when the pro-state delegates again
counterattacked on June 15, this time with Paterson's presentation of
the New Jersey Plan." This plan, as noted earlier, called for the establishment of a supreme court with a constitutionally specified jurisdiction and no inferior federal courts." The Paterson resolutions also
called for appointment of the judges by the Executive, rather than by
the whole Congress, where the votes of the representatives from the
smaller states would be far outnumbered by representatives from more
populous states.
This development extended the deliberations of the committee of
the whole for several days, until June 19, and provoked an extensive
comparison of the advantages of the two plans. On June 18, Alexander
Hamilton advanced his own ideas in an extensive speech that closely
tracked the structure of the amended Virginia Plan.7 0 The next day,
Madison rose to attack the New Jersey Plan, complaining that it was
Id. at 230-31.
Id. at 238 (Yates's notes).
Id. at 241-45.
"See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
70 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 282-311. Hamilton's own plan, which
he never presented to the Convention, was apparently prepared in contemplation of the
delivery of this speech. It might be surmised that Hamilton's decision not to present his
own plan was based on the view that the Virginia Plan, as it then stood, accomplished
most of Hamilton's objectives.
67
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"particularly defective in two of its provisions."T First, it provided for
ratification by the state legislatures and not the people, thereby perpetuating the worst features of the confederation. Second, Madison objected to the omission of inferior federal courts from the judiciary provision, reasoning that this would allow excessive opportunity for state
interference with federal supremacy. Such interference could result
from both "undue acquittals in the State tribunals" without any subsequent opportunity to appeal and the exercise of the state pardon power
by state governors. 2 On June 19, by a vote of seven states to three,
with one state divided, the committee of the whole voted to report the
amended Virginia Plan to the Convention and to disapprove of Paterson's New Jersey Plan. 3 Only Luther Martin spoke up in support of
the judiciary structure proposed in the New Jersey Plan, noting that "a
national Judiciary extended into the Stateswould be ineffectual, and
would be viewed with a jealousy consistent with its usefulness." 74
Debate on the judiciary provisions of the amended Virginia Plan
was undertaken on the floor of the Convention on July 18, and the
Convention rapidly and unanimously decided that a national judiciary
should be adopted, consisting of at least one supreme tribunal.7 5 The
judges of that tribunal would hold their offices during good behavior
and receive a fixed salary for their services. Furthermore, no decrease
could be made to affect the salaries of those then holding judicial office.7 6 After an extensive and inconclusive debate over the procedure for
appointment of federal judges,7 7 the Convention voted to further amend
the report of the committee of the whole by eliminating the proscription
against increasing judicial salaries during a judge's term of office.7 8
Gouverneur Morris of New York and Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania supported this change because of the possibility of inflation
and the likelihood that the business of the national judiciary would increase as the population of the nation grew. Morris carefully noted,
however, that such a change "would not create any improper dependence in the Judges. '1 9 While Madison recognized that "[tihe dependence will be less" with the power only to increase salaries, he nevertheless unsuccessfully opposed the motion because of its potential for
71
72
73
74

75
76
77
76
79

Id. at 317.
Id.

Id. at 322, 328.
Id. at 341.
2 id. at 37, 41.
Id. at 38, 44.

Id. at 37-38, 41-44.
Id. at 38, 44-45.
Id. at 44.
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fostering judicial reliance upon legislative largess, thereby diminishing
the independence of the national judges."' Madison stated,
Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be in
agitation in the legislature, an undue complaisance in the
former may be felt towards the latter. If at such a crisis there
should be in Court suits to which leading members of the
Legislature may be parties, the Judges will be in a situation
which ought not to [be] suffered, if it can be prevented."'
Thus, the framers again demonstrated their strong insistence upon the
independence of the national judiciary from legislative control. After
approval of this amendment, the Convention approved the judiciary
provision contained in the eleventh clause of the committee report.8 2
The Convention then moved to the controversial twelfth clause authorizing the Congress to "appoint" inferior federal courts.8 " Butler
urged that such courts were unnecessary, as the "State Tribunals might
do the business." Concurring, Martin accurately predicted that the inferior federal courts would "create jealousies & oppositions in the State
tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere."" Gorham
of Massachusetts noted that neither the states nor their courts had complained about the already extant national Court of Appeals and argued
that "[i]nferior Tribunals are essential to render the authority of the
Nail. Legislature effectual."8 5 This argument is evidence of the central
importance to the framers of enforcing national authority through the
federal judiciary. Further evidence of that concern was Randolph's
comment that "the Courts of the States can not be trusted with the
administration of the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are such
as will often place the General & local policy at variance '8 6
Gouverneur Morris, Sherman, and Mason -all spoke to support the
twelfth clause, and it was agreed to without record vote."
Thereafter, the Convention turned to the jurisdiction of the national judiciary established in the thirteenth clause of the amended Virginia Plan. After deleting the jurisdiction over impeachment of national
officers,"M it adopted without debate a resolution proposed by Madison
Id. at 45.
sI Id.
8s Id. at 38, 45; see supra text accompanying note 66.
• See supra text accompanying note 66.
s 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 45, 46 (Butler and Martin
respectively).
"' Id. at 46.
" Id. at 46.
S0

BT

Id.

s Id. at 39, 46.
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providing that "the jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under
the Natl. laws: And to such other questions as may involve the Natl.
peace & harmony." 9 Finally, after a brief discussion of other details, 90
the modified Virginia Plan was referred to the Committee of Detail on
July 26.91
At this point the Convention's directives still called for an independent national judiciary with constitutionally established jurisdiction and
a strong wall of separation from the legislative branch. 2 The only delegated congressional power over the judiciary, in addition to the power
to appoint judges, was the power to establish inferior federal courts,
and that power had emerged only as a compromise between those delegates who wanted constitutionally established lower federal courts and
those who desired to leave the trial of all cases of national magnitude to
state tribunals in the first instance. There i~s no record that even one
word supporting the general principle of congressional control over the
judiciary had been spoken in the two months of Convention debates.
Indeed, the grant of jurisdiction to the national judiciary was still contained in a separate resolution, the thirteenth, that said nothing whatsoever about congressional power. It is, thus, again evident that the framers did not entertain the idea that the legislative power to establish
inferior federal courts necessarily included congressional control over
the scope of those courts' jurisdiction.
3.

Debate over the Council of Revision

During the early deliberations on the Virginia Plan, the Convention, as a committee of the whole, transformed Randolph's proposal for
a Council of Revision-a plan that united executive and judicial officials into a reviewing body that would make the final decision accepting
or rejecting statutes adopted by Congress-solely into an executive veto
mechanism by rejecting judicial participation in the process. The now
famous debates on the Council of Revision are of vital significance because they demonstrate the contemplation by some of the important delegates of horizontal judicial review,9" that is, review by the national
courts of the constitutionality of acts of Congress or the Executive."
89 Id.

at 46.

90 Id. at 116-17, 121-26 (referral to the Committee of a proposal to require quali-

fications of property and citizenship for judges and other federal officials).
91 Id. at 128; see infra text accompanying notes 109-48.
9s 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 132-33.
93
See, e.g., I id. at 97-98 (comments of Elbridge Gerry). See generally R. BERGER, supra note 3, at 50-81, 154-65 (analysis of the framers' discussions).
"' Cf 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 298 (comments of John Mercer)
("He disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution
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The debates are also of some importance to the issue of congressional
power over federal court jurisdiction, further indicating that the framers were concerned with zealously protecting the independence of the
judiciary. On June 4, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, an opponent of
any limitation on the power of the legislature, rose to attack the Randolph Council of Revision proposal insofar as it implicated the judiciary, stating that he doubted
whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of . . . [the

Council of Revision], as they will have a sufficient check
agst. encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on
their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had [actually] set aside laws as being agst. the Cofistitution. This was
done too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from
the nature of ye. office to make them judges of the policy of
public measures.95
Rufus King observed that "the Judges ought to be able to expound the
law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation." 6 Wilson, an ardent supporter of a strong national judiciary, joined the opposition to the Council of Revision because he thought the legislative, executive, and judicial departments
"ought to be distinct & independent" and the Executive ought to exercise an absolute veto. 97 Ultimately, after extensive debate, the committee agreed to exclude the judiciary from the Council of Revision and to
give the veto power to the Executive, subject to overruling by twothirds of each house of Congress.9 8
Fearing "the great difficulty in rendering the Executive competent
to its own defence" against a democratically elected legislature,
Madison, on June 6, seconded a motion by James Wilson to reconsider
this exclusion of the judiciary from the Council of Revision.9 9 Madison
made a long plea for judicial participation, urging that "[a]n association
of the Judges in his revisionary function wd both double the advantage
and diminish the danger. It wd. also enable the Judiciary Department
the better to defend itself agst. Legislative encroachments." 10 0 Thus,
should have authority to declare a law void. He thought laws ought to be well and
cautiously made, and then to be uncontroulable.").
95 1 id. at 97-98.
" Id. at 98.
9 Id; see also id. at 100 (explanation of Wilson's rationale).
98 Id. at 94, 103-04.
" Id. at 138; see id. at 131 (record of the motion).
100 Id. at 138.
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both supporters and opponents of judicial participation in the Council
of Revision were apparently concerned with maintaining a strict separation of legislative and judicial powers and with preventing Congress
from encroaching upon the constitutionally established- powers of the
federal judiciary. While recognizing that including both the executive
and the judiciary in the proposed council violated the spirit of the Concept of separation of powers, Madison observed that this objection applied with equal weight to executive veto of acts of Congress and to
"revision of the laws" by the judiciary, namely, to horizontal judicial
review. 01 He therefore concluded that
whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain
the Legislative from encroaching on the other co-ordinate
Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from
passing laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their
form, the utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the
Judiciary to the Executive seemed incontestable.""2
While incontestable for Madison, the principal was again opposed by
Gerry, King, Pinckney, and Dickinson, in part because it "involved an
improper mixture of powers," and Wilson's motion to reconsider the
exclusion of the judiciary from the Council of Revision lost, three states
to eight.103
The effort to include the judiciary in the review and approval of
acts of Congress briefly resurfaced late in the Convention when, on
August 15, Madison moved that all laws passed by Congress be submitted to both the Executive and the Supreme Judiciary Department.
If either objected, they could be overruled by a two-thirds vote of each
house of Congress; if both objected, by a three-fourths vote of each
house.'" While this proposal seemingly obviated the objection to the
intermixture of executive and judicial powers, Pinckney nevertheless
opposed it, objecting to "the interference of the Judges in the Legislative business: it will involve them in parties, and give a previous tincture to their opinions."1 0 5 Gerry suggested that the plan was just "the
same thing" as the rejected Randolph proposal.1 0 6 Only John Mercer
101Id. at 139.
102
103

Id.
Id. at 139-40.

'o4 2 id. at 294-95, 298. The idea for this proposal may have originated in a
comment made by James Wilson during the June 4 debate in which he suggested that
"[hie was for varying the [Council of Revision] proposition in such a manner as to give
the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative." I id. at 98.
1052 id. at 298.
204Id.
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of Maryland added a new voice of support to the debate. While noting
that he "disapproved of the Doctrine that Judges as expositors of the
Constitution should have authority to declare a law void," he heartily
supported Madison's ideas because they would prevent "legislative
usurpation and oppression." 0 7 Mercer argued that it was "an axiom
that the Judiciary ought to be separate from the Legislative: but
equally so. that it ought to be independent of that department."' 0 The
concern with maintaining a separate, independent judicial department
was thus once again evidenced by both supporters and opponents of
involvement of the judiciary in the Council of Revision and by both
advocates and critics of the institution of judicial review. This striking
consensus for protecting the independence and neutrality of the federal
judiciary, makes it seem highly doubtful that the framers, at this stage
of the proceedings, would have countenanced, much less intended, any
congressional control over the jurisdiction and powers of the national
judiciary.
4. The Committee of Detail and the Drafting of a Judicial Article
On July 23, the Convention unanimously established a five member Committee of Detail to which the proceedings of the Convention
were referred "for the purpose of reporting a Constitution conformably
to the Proceedings aforesaid."' 0 9 The Committee was not charged with
presenting new structural solutions to problems, but rather, as its name
suggests, was merely directed to convert the Convention's general statements of structural principles into a draft document. Given this charge,
it would be most appropriate to interpret the skimpy records and results of this Committee's deliberations to conform to the pre-existing
deliberations and instructions of the Convention. This observation is
significant, because many of the basic and important decisions affecting
the language, if not the structure, of article III of the Constitution were
made by the Committee of Detail. While minutes or journals of the
debates of this Committee have never been located, fragmentary draft
documents permit some reconstruction of the events which culminated
in the proposed draft of the judiciary article.
The Committee of Detail may have initially encountered difficulty
in making more specific the general grant of federal court jurisdiction
approved by the Convention, i.e., jurisdiction over "cases arising under
the Natl. laws: And to such other Questions as involve the Natl. peace
Id.
108 Id.
108 Id. at 85; see also id. at 95-96 (discussion of committee's composition).
107
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& harmony."' 1 The Committee first considered and then rejected a
proposal which would have given Congress power to particularize the
jurisdiction. This proposal was the first suggestion during the Convention of any congressional control whatsoever over the federal court jurisdiction. An early draft of this proposed provision made by Edmund
Randolph, with notations by John Rutledge, stated:
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
1. to all cases, arising under laws passed by the general
[Legislature]
2. to impeachments of officers, and
3. to such other cases, as the national legislature may
assign, as involving the national peace and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue,
in disputes between citizens
of different states
[in disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of
another State]
in disputes between different
states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other
countries are concerned
[& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn]
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, except
in [Cases of Impeachmt. & (in)] those instances, in which
the legislature shall make it original. And the legislature
shall organize it
8. The whole or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid according
to the discretion of the legislature may be assigned to the
inferior tribunals, as original tribunals."'
Id. at 46.
Id. at 146-47. The document was found among George Mason's papers. The
main portion of the text is in Randolph's handwriting. The material shown in parentheses was crossed out in the original, and the material shown in brackets represents
emendations in Rutledge's handwriting. The words in italics were changed by Randolph. Id. at 137 n.6.
110
111

Amidst the documentary litter of history, another curious document has emerged
proposing to grant Congress power both to create a supreme court and such inferior
federal courts as it deemed appropriate and also to "ascertain their respective powers
and jurisdictions." This document was found among the papers of Roger Sherman of
Connecticut and contained several constitutional propositions. 3 id. at 615-16. (The full
text of the proposition is set forth in the Appendix.) Fanand notes that there is serious
doubt whether this document was prepared for or at the Philadelphia Convention, or
rather was drafted long after the Convention, while Sherman served in Congress, to
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It should be noted that this draft contained two very distinct types
of congressional power. First, it authorized congressional control over
the scope of jurisdiction of the national judiciary by allowing Congress
to "assign" to the supreme court cases within certain categories of questions involving "the national peace and harmony." It also authorized
Congress to assign to the inferior federal courts it created the "whole or
a part" of the national judicial power. Second, it empowered Congress
to structure the federal judiciary and distribute its powers. This was
accomplished first by allowing Congress to authorize the supreme court
to exercise original jurisdiction over cases which it could otherwise only
hear in appellate form, second by allowing Congress to "organize" the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court (i.e., provide rules of practice and
procedure), and third by authorizing Congress to create inferior federal
courts "as original tribunals."' 2 The draft exhibits very careful word
choice, consistently using the mandatory "shall extend" in defining the
court's jurisdiction and "shall organize" regarding the distribution between appellate and original jurisdiction of the supreme court. In contrast, the draft invoked the discretionary "may assign" or "may be assigned" where congressional discretion was clearly intended," 3 i.e., in
reflect proposed amendments he wanted to see in the constitutional scheme. Sherman's
major biographer, L.H. Boutell, treats the document as embodying amendments that
Sherman deemed appropriate in the existing government. L. BOUTELL, LIFE OF
ROGER SHERMAN 132 (1896), discussed in 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at
615. Others, including Farrand, however, disagree. Id. In light of "the disputed and
dubious origin of this document and because the document was not presented to the
Convention and, unlike the Hamilton Plan, played no evident role in the later drafting
of the Constitution, the document is not further discussed in this Article.
Even if further authentication could prove that the Sherman document originated
during the time of the Philadelphia Convention, such- evidence would probably do little
to change the conclusions of this Article, since Sherman played a minimal role in the
formation of the judicial article and because Sherman and the Connecticut delegation
generally seemed to favor, albeit unsuccessfully, the proposals for a limited judiciary
offered in Paterson's New Jersey Plan. Indeed, Farrand speculatively regards this document as "probably presenting the ideas of the Connecticut delegation in forming the
New Jersey Plan." Id. Thus, the Sherman proposals, at most, represent the views of
the losers in the debates over the formation of the judicial article.
212 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 147.
11S During the Committee deliberations, James Wilson also developed, and possibly presented, a number of fragmentary drafts of a constitutional document. One of
those drafts, bearing the unexplained title, "An Appeal for the Correction of all Errors
both in Law and Fact," called for a judiciary with constitutionally established jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over cases arising under "the Law of Nations, or general
commercial or marine Laws." Id. at 157. For other draft documents found among Wilson's papers (some of which were also in Wilson's hand), see id. at 134-37, 150-52,
152-57, 159-63. This draft authorized the national legislature to institute "in each
State a Court of Admiralty for hearing and determining maritime Causes." Id. at 159.
The draft may have been an effort by Wilson to overturn a loss he had sustained
during the confederation period as counsel for General Benedict Arnold in a capture
case involving the seizure of the British sloop, Active. While Wilson had won his case
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the limited power of Congress to particularize the cases the supreme
tribunal could hear "involving the national peace and harmony" and
the power in "the discretion of the legislature" to assign "[tihe whole or
a part of" the judicial power of the United States to inferior federal
courts.
A later Committee draft in Wilson's handwriting, with emendations by Rutledge, reflects the process of final adoption of the Committee draft." 4 This later draft and the Committee report which emerged
from it" 5 may be the two most important documents in ascertaining the
intent of the framers relative to the judiciary. In its legislative articles,
this draft authorized the Senate to appoint the judges of the Supreme
Court and empowered Congress to constitute inferior national courts."n
The judiciary article, which began, "[tihe Judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme (National) Court, and in such
(other) [inferior] Courts as shall, from Time to Time, be constituted by
the legislature of the United States. 1" 7 The draft thereafter set forth
the judicial independence provisions relating to tenure and salary and
continued, "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme (National) Court shall
extend" to a list of particularized categories of cases resembling, but not
identical to, the list ultimately adopted in article 111."18 Significantly,
the explicit reference authorizing Congress to assign such other cases to
the Supreme Court as may involve the national peace and harmony,'"
contained in the earlier Randolph-Rutledge draft, had disappeared entirely, the drafters having chosen the more mandatory phrase "shall
extend" utilized in the amended Virginia Plan.'2 0
before the congressional Court of Appeals which increased the prize money due his
client from that awarded by a jury in a Pennsylvania admiralty court, the Pennsylvania
court refused to comply with the larger award on the ground that state law forbade
appeals of facts found by a jury. See Merry, supra note 3, at 64-65. This draft therefore may help shed some light on a later important, but cryptic, remark by Wilson
suggesting that the Committee of Detail had intended the Supreme Court to review
both law and fact and to entertain both civil and common law cases. See 2 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 21, at 431; infra note 164 and accompanying text.
114 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 172-73. A copy of the judicial article
of this document is set forth in the Appendix.
15 Id. at 186-87. The judicial article of the Committee of Detail draft is also set
forth in full in the Appendix.
116

Id. at 168-69.

117

Id. at 172.

See id. At this stage of the proceedings, the draft judicial article did not include
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution or treaties of the United States,
suits in which the United States was a party, or suits between citizens of the same state
each claiming land under grants from different states. The grant of jurisdiction also
then included authority to try impeachments of national officers.
11 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
18
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This draft also contained the first emergence of the "exceptions
and regulations clause," although it will be recalled that Hamilton's
unsubmitted plan had used a variation of the same phrase.12 Thus,
this Wilson-Rutledge draft provided:
In Cases of Impeachment, (those) [cases] affecting Ambassadors (and) other public Ministers [& Consuls], and those in
which a State shall be (one of the) [a] Part(ies) [y], this Jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other Cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such Exceptions and under
such Regulations as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature may (distribute) [assign any part of] th(is)e Jurisdiction [above mentd., - except the Trial of the Executive - ],
in the Manner and under the limitations which it shall think
proper (among) [to] such (other) [inferior] Courts as it shall
1
constitute from Time to Time.

22

It is especially important that the exceptions and regulations clause
made its initial appearance in a section of a draft constitution dealing
with the distributionof federal judicial power, rather than in the clause
delineating the scope of jurisdiction that would be exercised by the federal courts.
As it eventually emerged from the Committee of Detail, the draft
article on the judiciary closely resembled the Wilson-Rutledge draft
document.12 The only major change of substance, for present purposes,
was the modification of the congressional power to establish inferior
federal courts. The draft article reported by the Committee referred to
"such inferior courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be
constituted by the Legislature of the United States."1 2 '
In sum, a number of factors strongly suggest that the introduction
of the exceptions and regulations clause was not intended to grant Congress any control over the scope of jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court. First, during the prior deliberations of the Convention,
no proposal hinting at congressional control over the scope of jurisdiction of the national judiciary had been offered, and the Committee of
Detail merely had been instructed to convert the results of those prior
proceedings into a draft constitution.
Second, the juxtaposition of the Randolph-Rutledge draft with the
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 173 (as in original).
122 Compare id. at 172-73 (Wilson-Rutledge draft) with id. at 186-87 (Report of
Committee of Detail draft).
124 Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
1
122

1984]

FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

Wilson-Rutledge draft reflects the fact that the Committee's drafters
clearly differentiated between congressional power over the scope of
federal court jurisdiction and the allocation of that jurisdiction under
the congressional authority over the structure of the federal judiciary.
Thus, in the Randolph-Rutledge draft,125 the scope of federal jurisdiction was treated in separate sentences and paragraphs or blocks of
clauses from the division of the appellate and original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, and a -congressional power was separately and explicitly granted over each. Similarly, the Randolph-Rutledge draft explicitly authorized Congress to vest "[t]he whole or a part of the jurisdiction"'126 of the Supreme Court in such inferior federal courts as the
Congress might create. The Wilson-Rutledge draft, 27 the Committee
report, 2 " and ultimately the final version of article III, preserved the
separation into different sentences or paragraphs of provisions setting
forth the scope of federal court jurisdiction from clauses dealing with
the allocation of those powers within the federal judiciary. These later
drafts omit, however, any explicit grant of congressional power over the
scope of federal court jurisdiction. This change may be explainable as
an attempt on the part of the Committee of Detail to adhere to the
mandate and spirit of the prior Convention deliberations which contained no suggestion of a congressional power over the scope of federal
jurisdiction. The Convention had already adopted the Madisonian compromise,' 29 however, and the power to make exceptions to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in favor of the exercise of such jurisdiction
by the inferiorfederal courts would be consistent with that compromise,
as would the explicit parallel statement in the Committee of Detail's
draft report authorizing Congress to assign any part of the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts.' 3 0 This construction is
further supported by the deliberate omission of the limitation that any
inferior federal courts which Congress creates must serve "as original
tribunals." This limitation was contained in the early Randolph-Rutledge draft13 ' but deleted from the Wilson-Rutledge draft, 13 2 the Committee report, 3 3 and, ultimately, article III. Thus, the members of the
Committee may have envisioned the exercise by inferior federal courts
125

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.

See supra text accompanying note 111.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
18 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 186-87.
129 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
11* 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 186-87.
"I See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
132 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
133 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 186-87.
126
121
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of appellate jurisdiction from state courts in order to assure the
supremacy of the federal government in the enforcement of national
laws and the resolution of matters of international or transstate concern. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton attributed precisely this intention to
13 4

the Convention.

So understood, the congressional power to make "exceptions" to
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, granted by the exceptions and rpgulations clause, was at most an authority to delete a class
of cases from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in favor of exercise
of power by an inferior federal court. This authority may also have
been intended to include congressional power to reallocate the constitutionally structured appellate jurisdiction by authorizing the Supreme
Court to exercise that jurisdiction in original form. Such authority had
been explicitly included in the provisions of the Randolph-Rutledge
draft"3 ' and disappeared from the document simultaneously with the
emergence of the exceptions and regulations clause. The latter observation, of course, may suggest that Chief Justice Marshall later erred in
his construction of article III when he assumed in Marbury v.
Madison1 36 that Congress could not enlarge the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court. In line with this argument, the power to make
"regulations" was the legislative authority to "organize" Supreme
Court jurisdiction, as envisioned by the Randolph-Rutledge draft, and
seems therefore to have subsumed the power to make rules of practice
and procedure for the exercise of the constitutionally vested jurisdiction
of the Court.
This construction belies the arguments of several historically oriented scholars who contend that the exceptions and regulations clause
was only intended by the framers to authorize the safeguarding of the
jury trial. According to these arguments, the clause modified the provisions authorizing Supreme Court appellate review "both as to Law and
Fact," and its meaning was obscured by an inappropriate comma after
1'
See supra notes 19 & 22 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST
No. 83, at 556-57 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
's
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-75 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall was not a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, although he was a member of the Virginia state
ratification convention. The interpretation in the text of the meaning of the exceptions
and regulations clause is based on documents which were not contained in the Journal
of the Convention, first published in 1819. In addition, since Madison's journals were
not published until 1840, four years after Marshall died, there is little way Marshall
could have known of the potential error in his construction of the exceptions and regulations clause unless he had access to the private papers of George Mason, his political
and economic rival from Virginia who had attended the Convention.
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"fact. 1 u 37 These arguments are almost surely wrong, since the exceptions and regulations clause was introduced long before the provision
relating to appellate review of law and fact was inserted into the document.'" The construction advanced here also challenges the generally
assumed interpretation of the clause, supported by dicta in numerous
cases, 3 9 as authorizing Congress to omit absolutely various classes of
cases otherwise within the judicial power of the United States from
Supreme Court jurisdiction without reference to the exercise of such
jurisdiction by inferior federal courts.
A third element suggesting that the so-called exceptions and regulations clause was not intended to grant Congress any control over the
scope of jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court is that another
potential construction exists for the word "Exceptions" in the clause
that is consistent with Hamilton's original use of the phrase. It may be
that the grant of congressional power was intended to refer only to a
power to make "Regulations" for the appellate jurisdiction that the
Constitution vested in the Supreme Court. Under this construction, the
phrase, "with such Exceptions," should not be read as part of the same
clause as that referring to regulations, but rather as a separate qualifying clause delimiting the scope of the appellate jurisdiction vested in the
Supreme Court.
As it ultimately emerged from the Committee of.Style 4 ° and as
used in the final draft of the Constitution, the phrase, "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make," contains an often overlooked comma after the word "Exceptions." Indeed,
the Supreme Court has occasionally misquoted the clause by omitting
Merry, supra note 3, at 68-69; see also Brant, supra note 3, at 6-8, 27-28.
A better argument perhaps is that the comma after "Fact" was not inappropriate, but
simply misplaced. Had the comma been placed after law-"both as to Law, and Fact
with such Exceptions"-the exceptions and regulations clause might more plausibly
have been read to apply only to Supreme Court jurisdiction over appellate review of
facts.
188 The exceptions and regulations clause first appeared in Hamilton's June 18
draft and later in the Committee of Detail draft of the judicial article written during
the last week in July or the first week in August. The clause dealing with appellate
jurisdiction "both as to Law and Fact" was not added to the draft article until August
27. See infra notes 158 & 164 and accompanying text.
'88 See infra notes 349-54 and accompanying text.
140 The Committee of Style added the comma after "exceptions" to the draft sent
to it from the Committee of Detail. Compare 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at
576 (draft received from the Committee of Detail), with id. at 600-01 (draft as revised
by the Committee of Style). Since the Committee of Style was given the limited charge
"to revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to by the House," id. at 547, it
seems most likely that the addition of the comma was an attempt to clarify an underlying understanding of the exceptions and regulations clause.
18M See
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the comma. 41 While the Committee of Detail draft did not contain this
comma, its later insertion by the Committee of Style may only have
clarified the original intended meaning of the clause. Understood in this
respect, the phrase, "with such Exceptions," would have performed
precisely the same function syntactically and been somewhat redundant
of the phrase that begins the sentence in which it appears-"In all the
other Cases beforementioned

. .

.

,"

that is, both phrases would have

served to set off original from appellate jurisdiction.
The "such Exceptions" contemplated under this construction were
the classes of cases that the first sentence of the paragraph assigned to
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Under this interpretation, the term "Exceptions" refers to a constitutionally defined omission
contained in a separate sentence or clause from an otherwise generic
category of Supreme Court jurisdiction.
The interpretation of the term "exceptions," set out above is in
accordance with the use of the word in the Hamilton draft where it
first appeared. 42 The Hamilton plan was drafted for presentation to
the Convention on June 18, after many of the major decisions on the
outlines of the federal judiciary, including the Madisonian compromise
on inferior federal courts, had already been debated and adopted. 4
While there is no evidence that the Hamilton plan was ever presented
to the Convention, it seems quite possible that the document was made
available to members of the Committee of Detail. This scenario, while
conjectural, might explain the emergence of the exceptions and regulations clause, which had no other referent in the state constitutions or
the prior Convention deliberations.
After particularizing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a
manner similar to the style adopted by the Committee of Detail, the
Hamilton plan contained the following limitations on the scope of that
jurisdiction: "subject to such exceptions as are herein contained and to
such regulations as the Legislature shall provide.' 44 The exceptions
from the jurisdiction to which Hamilton referred were constitutional,
141 Significantly, in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869), the
single most important decision interpreting the so-called exceptions and regulations
clause, Chief Justice Chase, purporting to quote from the Constitution, omits this very
important comma.
The author is highly indebted to his research assistant, Eleanor E. Lynn, for calling to his attention the potential linguistic significance of the comma in the exceptions
and regulations clause. Her careful observation seems to have caught an important
detail in the structure of article III that most of the commentators and the Supreme
Court have missed.
142 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 49, 121-22 and accompanying text.
144 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 626 (emphasis added).
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not legislative, in origin. More significantly, however, the exceptions
envisioned in the Hamilton plan were deletions from the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in favor of other federal tribunals provided for by
the national constitution. Specifically, the "exceptions as are herein
contained" seemed to refer to the -explicit exception from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over "controversies between the United
States, and a particular State, or between two or more States" of those
cases "such as relate to a claim of territory between the United States,
and one or more States. '145 The Hamilton plan provided that such
cases were to be heard under a constitutionally established commission.
The Senate was to choose one-third of the members of the commission,
the affected state was to choose another third, and the remaining positions were to be filled by the judges of the Supreme Court. In short,
under the Hamilton plan, "exceptions" were omissions from Supreme
Court jurisdiction in favor of the exercise of the same jurisdiction by
some other tribunal established under the authority of the federal
constitution.
It is not unreasonable to assume that the phrase meant precisely
the same thing in the Wilson-Rutledge draft and the final Committee
report. First, as already noted, the provisions of the Randolph-Rutledge
draft authorizing Congress to interchange the appellate and original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and to "organize it" disappeared simultaneously with the emergence of the exceptions and regulations
clause in the same position inthe final Wilson-Rutledge draft.1 46 Second, in the Wilson-Rutledge draft and the final report of the Committee of Detail, the exceptions and regulations clause was immediately
followed by a seemingly parallel clause explicitly authorizing Congress
to assign the whole or any part of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to the inferior federal courts. Read together it appears that these parallel provisions authorized an exception to be made to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court when Congress chose to assign a portion
of its powers to an inferior federal court. So construed, the exceptions
and regulations clause authored by the Committee of Detail performed
a function similar to that of the clause in the Hamilton plan.
So viewed, the framers never really drafted an exceptions and regulations clause as that term has come to be understood today. Rather,
they included a clause in the final document authorizing the Congress
to control by appropriate regulations the manner in which the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be exercised. That clause
145

146

Id.

2 id. at 186-87. See supra text accompanying note 111.
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gave Congress no power whatsoever over the scope of federal court jurisdiction. Like the other interpretation offered above, this construction
of the Constitution compels the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary was mandatory, in apparent keeping with the prior
deliberations of the Convention.
Finally, the Wilson-Rutledge draft and the Committee report retained the mandatory phrase "shall extend" when referring to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This phrase had been included in the
original Randolph plan and its various amendments during the early
portion of the Convention deliberations. The Convention and the Committee apparently invoked "shall" in its mandatory sense rather than as
future tense. The repeated consensus on the need for judicial independence and the fear of legislative encroachment on judicial powers
strongly suggest that the framers did not intend to create any congressional power to determine the scope of jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. Indeed, no suggestion of any congressional power to determine jurisdiction was voiced in the earlier Convention deliberations. When a
suggestion for congressional power over jurisdiction did briefly surface
in the Randolph-Rutledge draft, the drafters carefully used the discretionary "may assign," as they also did when referring to congressional
power to distribute judicial powers to inferior federal courts. Thus, the
drafters fully understood the difference between the mandatory "shall"
and the discretionary "may," and almost invariably used "shall" where
a mandatory obligation was intended. 4"
147 Sections 1 of articles I, II, and Ill of the Constitution all begin with a command that the legislative, executive, or judicial powers of the national government
"shall be vested" in the appropriate body. The word "shall" also occurs throughout the
Constitution in contexts that dearly constitute mandatory commands, Examples
include:

Provision
art. 1, § 2

art. I, § 3

Language
The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members. . . and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications . ...
No Person shall be a Representative who
shall not have attained to the Age . . .
and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall
be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned. . ..
No Person shall be a Senator who shall
not have attained to the Age . . . and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be
chosen.
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Separately, each of these observations suggests that the exceptions
The Vice President . .. shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote

art. I, § 4

art. I, § 5
art. I, § 6

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers ....
The Senate shall have the sole Power to
try all Impeachments ....
The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
The Congress shall assemble at least once
in every Year ....
Each House shall keep a Journal ....
The Senators and Representatives shall
receive a Compensation for their Services

art. I, § 7

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives

art.I, § 8

The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes. . . but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States ....
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended ....
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.
No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts
and Expenditures of all public Money
shall be published . ...
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two
Persons, of whom one at least shall not be
an inhabitant of the same State with
themselves.
In Case of the Removal of the President
.. . or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties . . . the Same shall devolve
on the Vice President . ...
The President shall . . . receive for his
Services, a Compensation, which shall
neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have
been elected, and he shall not receive
within that Period any other Emolument
from the United States.
Before he enter on the Execution of his
Office, he shall take the following Oath

art. I, § 9

art. II,

§I

art. II, § 2

The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy. . ..
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and regulations clause drafted by the Committee of Detail was not intended to authorize any congressional control over the scope of jurisdic-

art. II, § 3

art. II, § 4

art. IV, § 1
art. IV, § 2
art. IV, § 4

art. VI

... he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons ....
He shall ... give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend . . . such Measures as he shall
judge necessary ....
The President, Vice President and all
Civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State ....
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.
The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union- a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them against Invasion ....
All Debts contracted and Engagements
entered into . . . . shall be as valid
against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby ....

(Emphasis added.)
On some occasions, as in the supremacy clause quoted immediately above, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, the framers also used the word "shall" to designate an event that
would occur in the future. Usually, however, such references to the future occur in
clauses suggesting a mandatory obligation elsewhere in the clause. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2 ("The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years. . . in
such Manner as they shall by Law direct"). Where the framers clearly contemplated
substantial congressional or governmental discretion, they generally used the word
"may." Examples include:
Provision
Language
art. I, § 2
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be
included within this Union . ..
art. I, § 4
but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations . ...
art. I, § 5
but a smaller Number may adjourn from
day to day, and may be authorized to
compel the Attendance of absent Members . . . under such Penalties as each
House may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings . . ..
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tion of the entire federal judicial establishment. Taken together, they

art. I § 7
art. I, § 8

art. I § 9

art. I, § 10

art. II, § 1

art. II, § 2

art. II, § 3

art. IV, § 1

art. IV, § 3
aft. V

excepting such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy ....
but the Senate may propose or concur
with Amendments as on other Bills.
To provide for organizing, arming and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States
but a Tax or duty may be imposed on
such Importation ....
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.
No State shall . . . lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws ....
The Congress may determine the Time of
chusing the Electors ....
and the Congress may by Law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation
or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President ....
he may require the Opinion . . . of the
principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments ....
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses . . . and in Case of
Disagreement. . . he may adjourn them
And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union ....
as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress

(Emphasis added.)
The structure of article III, both as proposed by the Committee of Detail and as
finally adopted, also reflects this consistent usage of "shall" and "may." Section 1 provides that the "judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested" in the federal courts
but, reflecting the Madisonian compromise vesting discretion in Congress over the creation of lower federal tribunals, goes on to include in the federal judiciary "such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The next sentence, stating that the term of judicial office is to continue during good behaviour, and
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build an overwhelming case for that conclusion, particularly in light of
the almost total lack of evidence suggesting any contrary conclusion. 48
The case presented here should establish with reasonable certainty the
intent on the part of the members of the Committee of Detail to continue the mandatory federal court jurisdiction envisioned in the
amended Randolph plan and to reject congressional control over the
scope of jurisdiction of the federal judiciary.
guaranteeing the judges against diminution in their salaries, also invokes the mandatory
"shall." In section 2, the language describing the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts is again mandatory: "The judicial Power shall extend . . . ." Similarly, the
allocation of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court between original and appellate forms,
contained in the second paragraph of section 2 of article III uses the mandatory
"shall." Finally, the guarantee of jury trial in criminal cases other than impeachments,
contained in the last paragraph of section 2 of article III, and the definition of the
crime of treason, contained in section 3 of article III, both employ the mandatory
"shall."
Arguably, one of the most glaring departures from the framers' consistent use of
the word "shall" in its mandatory sense is the so-called exceptions and regulations
clause of section 2, of article III, providing for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
"with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall make." (Emphasis added.) While the term "shall" in this clause conventionally has been thought only
to connote a future tense, the word may have been used in an imperative sense. According to the thesis of this Article, Congress was obligated to invest the entirety of the
specified appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court or, at least, in inferior federal
courts. Since article III did not fully describe or structure the size or procedures of the
Supreme Court or require the creation of inferior federal courts, it was imperative for
Congress to enact regulations to carry this constitutional mandate into effect.
14 The only real suggestions during the Philadelphia Convention of any legislative control over the scope of federal court jurisdiction occurred in the Randolph-Rutledge draft, which contained a clause-which was apparently rejected-authorizing
congressional delineation of Supreme Court jurisdiction, and in an August 27 debate,
when the delegates rejected by a vote of two states to six a proposal which would have
expressly authorized the Congress to direct the manner in which the judicial power was
exercised. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. While it might be argued that
these clauses were rejected because they were redundant, that conclusion seems farfetched. First, such an argument requires one to assume that the framers intended to
accomplish by the vague and opaque language of the exceptions and regulations clause
precisely what they could have explicitly accomplished through these clear and direct
proposals which they rejected. Second, this argument ignores the etiology of the exceptions and regulations clause in the Hamilton plan and in the Randolph-Rutledge draft
in provisions dealing with the distributionof federal court jurisdiction, rather than the
scope of that authority. Third, the recorded split vote on the rejected August 27 proposal suggests that the vote was on the merits of legislative control of jurisdiction, rather
than on the less important question of semantic redundancy. See infra note 177. Finally, not one speech was recorded at any time during the Convention favoring the
principle of legislative control over the scope of jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. In
contrast, numerous statements have been pointed out suggesting strong support, and
possibly even consensus, for assuring an independent judiciary and the desire to prevent
legislative encroachments on the judicial power. Thus, to view the rejection of the Randolph-Rutledge draft and the August 27 proposal as evidence of support of the framers
for congressional control over the scope of federal court jurisdiction would inaccurately
read these statements wholly out of context.
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5.

Refining the Judiciary Article: The Concluding Debates
and the Committee of Style

The Committee of Detail reported its draft to the floor of the Convention on August 6. Thereafter, until the end of August, debate focused upon this document. The Convention approved without debate
that portion of the draft authorizing the Congress to constitute inferior
federal courts.' 9 A proposal to authorize each house of Congress, as
well as the Executive, "to require the opinions of the supreme Judicial
Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions,"
i.e., to authorize the Court to issue advisory opinions, was referred to
the Committee, where it later died a quiet death. 50 Also referred to the
Committee was a proposal by Pinckney to extend the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to "all controversies between the U.S. and an individual State, or the U.S. and the Citizens of an individual State."1 51
On August 27, a very important debate on the judiciary article
occurred. At the urging of Doctor Johnson of Connecticut, the Convention extended the judicial power to cases "in law and equity" (over
Read's objection "to vesting these powers in the same Court").15 2 Dickinson of Delaware proposed making the judges removable by the Executive upon joint application by each branch of Congress, similar to
what was done in Great Britain. This proposal provoked a flurry of
resistance. Gouverneur Morris, Rutledge, Wilson, and Randolph all
arose to defend the autonomy and independence of federal judges. Rutledge noted, "[i]f the supreme Court is to judge between the U.S. and
particular States, this alone is an insuperable objection to the motion. ' M Randolph feared "weakening too much the independence of
the Judges," and Wilson said, "[t]he Judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in
the two branches of our Govt." 1" The strength of delegate commitment
to judicial independence was evident, since the proposal lost by a vote
of one state (Connecticut) to seven, with three state delegations
absent.1 5 5
After the Convention overwhelmingly defeated several proposals to
prohibit judicial salaries from being increased by the legislature during
"' 2 Farrand,

RECORDS,supra

Id. at 334, 341-42.
151 Id. at 342.
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Id. at 428.
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Id. at 429.

155 Id.

note 21, at 313, 315.
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a judge's term of office,156 the delegates turned to the scope of federal
court jurisdiction. They first agreed to expand federal jurisdiction to
controversies in which the United States was a party, apparently picking up on Pinckney's earlier proposal.1 57 Thereafter, according to
Madison's notes, a vital debate ensued that ultimately shaped the final
structure of article III. Given the critical importance of this debate,
Madison's note on the deliberations are set forth in full:
Docr. Johnson moved to insert the words "this Constitution and the" before the word "laws"
Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far
to extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought not to be
limited to cases of a Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases not of this nature ought
not to be given to that Department.
The motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem: con:
it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was
constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature On motion of Mr. Rutlidge, the words "passed by the
Legislature" were struck out, and after the words "U.S"
were inserted nem. con: the words "and treaties made or
which shall be made under their authority" - conformably
to a preceding amendment in another place.
The clause "in cases of impeachment", was postponed.
Mr. Govr. Morris wished to know what was meant by
the words "In all the cases before mentioned it (jurisdiction)
shall be appellate with such exceptions&c," whether it extended to matters of fact as well as law-and to cases of
Common law as well as Civil law.
Mr. Wilson. The Committee he believed meant facts as
well as law & Common as well as Civil law.'The jurisdiction of the federal Court of Appeals had he said been so
construed.
Mr. Dickinson moved to add after the word "appellate"
the words "both as to law & fact which was agreed to nem:
con:
Mr. Madison & Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out
the beginning of the 3d sect. "The jurisdiction of the suat 423, 429-30.
Id. at 423, 430; see supra note 151 and accompanying text (Pinckney
proposal).
156

157

Id.
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preme Court" & to insert the words "the Judicial power"
which was agreed to nem: con:
The following motion was disagreed to, to wit to insert
"In all the other cases before mentioned the Judicial power
shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall
direct" [Del. Virga ay N. H. Con. P. M. S. C. G no]
[Ayes-2; noes-6.]
On a question for striking out the last sentence of sect.
3. "The Legislature may assign &c-"
N. H. ay-Ct ay. Pa ay. Del-ay-Md ay-Vaay-S-C. ay-Geo. ay. [Ayes-8; noes-o.]
Mr. Sherman moved to insert after the words "between
Citizens of different States" the words, "between citizens of
the same State claiming lands under grants of different
States"-according to the provision in the 9th. art: of the
Confederation-which was agreed to nem: con:
Adjourned"'
This colloquy is important to an understanding of the jurisdiction
established under article III in a number of respects. First, implementing the suggestions of judicial review made earlier during debate on the
proposed Council of Revision, the framers separately and expressly
vested in the federal judiciary the power to hear cases arising under the
Constitution. It is difficult to comprehend what cases Doctor Johnson
had in mind if he did not contemplate the exercise of judicial review.
Thus, this colloquy renders much of the debate over the legitimacy of
judicial review, at least insofar as it concerns review of the constitutionality of state actions, largely irrelevant from an historical perspective.
Second, Madison's efforts to limit the power of judicial review to
"cases of a Judiciary Nature" were apparently constructively accepted
by the Convention. This event lends historical support to the interpretation of a constitutional proscription against the federal judiciary rendering advisory opinions, enforced since Hayburn's Case,159 and validates the Court's refusal of President Washington's request for such
advice. 16° It further lends support to the constitutional dimensions of
the standing, ripeness, and mootness doctrines enforced by the national
2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 430-32.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
160 Correspondence of the Justices, Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and Assodate Justices to President George Washington (August 8, 1793) (discussed in G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 1607-11); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 64-66;
158

159

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW § 3-10, at 56-57 (1978).
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courts since Marbury v. Madison.16 1
Third, the delegates to the Convention again manifested their discomfort with assigning the trial of impeachments to the federal judiciary, possibly because of the potential that such jurisdiction might come
to interfere with judicial independence. "
Fourth, the debate represents the origin of the interjected clause
authorizing Supreme Court appellate review "both as to law & fact,"
which would prove so controversial during the later ratification debates.
Dickinson moved to add this clause to clarify what Wilson claimed was.
the underlying meaning of the phrase in the draft providing that "[in
all the cases before mentioned it [Supreme Court Jurisdiction] shall be
appellate with such exceptions and regulations as the Legislature shall

make."O6
In order to limit the asserted scope of congressional power over
Supreme Court jurisdiction, some scholars have seized upon this debate
to suggest that the exceptions and regulations clause was solely intended to modify and delimit the provisions authorizing review of fact,
in order to preserve jury trials.1 4 This argument seems wholly incorrect, however, in light of the historical context of this debate. The exceptions and regulations clause was added to the draft document by the
Committee of Detail almost a month before the insertion, during this
August 27 debate, of the clause authorizing Supreme Court review of
fact. It is therefore highly unlikely that the two clauses were intended
by the framers to be related. While certain scholars emphasize that
Wilson's remarks about review of fact were in response to questions
about the meaning of a quoted phrase which included the word "exceptions," this argument seems to take Morris's question wholly out of
context. From Madison's notes, it appears much more likely that Morris was asking what the members of the Committee of Detail meant by
"appellate" jurisdiction, not what they meant by "exceptions." That
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 423, 424, 430, 431. Later
Gouverneur Morris argued, "[a] conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the
Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President
after the trial of the impeachment." Id. at 500.
216 See id. at 431.
18 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. During the waning days of the
Convention, Madison may have considered changes in the language authorizing appellate review by the Supreme Court both as to law and fact to more precisely reflect the
intention of the Convention. In a memorandum dated September 7, 1787, he proposed
to change the word "Fact" to "Equity." 4 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 60-61.
This proposal, however, was never submitted to the Convention. Had it been adopted,
it might have avoided some of the heated and contentious debates over civil jury trial
which later occurred in the ratification conventions and the public debate. See infra
notes 185-86, 198-219 and accompanying text.
181

182
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would explain why the framers inserted the phrase "both as to law &
fact" immediately after the word "appellate" and further why the
comma following the phrase was deliberate, not misplaced, as these
scholars have argued. 16 5 The argument of these scholars also fails for
two other reasons. Wilson's response referred not only to review of
facts, but also to review of "Common as well as Civil law." If the
exceptions clause was solely intended to capture Wilson's response, it
would seem to allow exceptions to be made from the scope of legal
questions cognizable under the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction-precisely the result these scholars resist. In addition, there is not
one word in this debate about protecting the right to trial by jury or
about authorizing Congress to delimit Supreme Court appellate intrusions on this respected institution. To accept such an intent on this record is to build an original understanding out of thin air. Arguments
for original intent must rest on much firmer footing.
The fifth and most essential respect in which the August 27 debate
is important is the fact that the delegates explicitly rejected, by a vote of
six states to two, a clause providing that "the Judicial power shall be
exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall direct."16 6 A clearer
rejection of congressional authority over judicial powers is hard to imagine. While the context of this proposal does not precisely indicate
whether it was intended to grant congressional power over the scope of
federal court jurisdiction or, rather, only over its allocation, the former
by far would seem to be the more plausible interpretation, since another clause already existed in the draft of the Committee of Detail
expressly authorizing the Congress to reassign the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to such inferior federal courts as it might create. That
clause was later struck from the document during the August 27 debate. The decisive rejection of the former proposal to invest Congress
with power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts indicates that the
framers, or at least a majority of the state delegations, did not intend to
create any extensive congressional power over the jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary. This vote also renders the two limited readings of the
so-called exceptions and regulations clause offered above far more plausible than the contrary conventional explanation suggesting substantial
congressional discretion over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. It is highly doubtful that a Convention which rejected an explicit statement authorizing congressional power over the scope of jurisdiction of the federal judiciary would silently countenafice such a result
165 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
1" 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 431.

792

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:741

by more opaque and ambiguous language.
Finally, the Convention made two simultaneous changes in the
structure of the judiciary article relating to the distribution, as opposed
to scope, of federal judicial powers.16 7 Without debate, they changed
the beginning of the paragraph containing the particularization of federal jurisdiction from a description of "[tihe jurisdiction of the supreme
167 A draft document which clearly reflects these changes is set forth in I THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 280-81 (M.
Jensen ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. This document was
apparently prepared from George Washington's printed copy of the Committee of Detail draft, with amendments and changes in the hand of Washington and William
Johnson, Secretary of the Convention, reflecting the changes voted by the Convention
in its deliberations between August 7 and September 10.
In an otherwise excellent article, Professor Sager has rejected the thesis that the
exceptions clause was designed to authorize Congress to distribute the judicial power of
the United States between the Supreme Court and inferior federal courts, focusing his
argument principally upon the fact that the Committee of Detail draft contained a
separate clause authorizing Congress to assign jurisdiction to the lower federal courts.
Sager argues, "[i]f the exceptions clause had been understood simply to authorize Congress to shift jurisdiction from the Supreme Court to lower courts, this language would
have been superfluous. Indeed, because the assignment language was discretionary, the
assignment clause itself was contrary to the view that Congress must vest jurisdiction in
lower courts if Congress withholds jurisdiction from the Supreme Court." Sager, supra
note 3, at 35 n.51; see also id. at 31 n.36.
This argument has two important analytical flaws. First, it totally ignores the
overall structure and phrasing of the Committee of Detail draft. The draft's recitation
of the cases cognizable in a federal court was, as then drafted, only a description of "the
jurisdiction of the supreme court." The separate clause authorizing the assignment of
Supreme Court jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts was necessary to delimit the
scope of powers which constitutionally could be assigned to such courts, and the exceptions clause was required separately to authorize Congress to carve exceptions out of
the Supreme Court's constitutionally assigned jurisdiction. The two clauses were parallel and complementary, not redundant or superfluous. Indeed, the parallel nature of the
two clauses was evidenced by the parallel changes made by the Convention on August
27-simultaneously changing "jurisdiction of the supreme court" to "the judicial
power" and deleting the separate clause authorizing Congress to assign the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to the inferior federal courts, which was rendered superfluous by
the first change.
Second, Professor Sager's propensity to read the separate clauses of the judiciary
article in isolation, reflected in his flawed analysis of the Committee of Detail draft,
also mars his argument that the draft assignment clause was discretionary and therefore
inconsistent with a mandatory view of federal court jurisdiction. He totally ignores the
fact that the Committee draft required that the judicial power of the United States
"shall extend" to the Supreme Court and whatever federal courts, if any, Congress
chose to create. While there was no constitutional obligation to create inferior courts, in
light of the Madisoniah compromise, or to assign such courts any particular portion of
the judicial power (thereby explaining the discretionary phrasing of the assignment
clause), there was a mandatorily phrased constitutional obligation to assure that the
whole of the categories of cases cognizable in federal courts could be heard somewhere
in the federal judicial establishment either in original or appellate form. Thus, Professor Sager's analysis of this point seemingly fails because it represents the same kind of
single-sentence analytical approach criticized in the introductory section of this Article.
See infra note 177.
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Court" to a description of "the Judicial power." The latter phrase had
already been used in the first paragraph of the document to describe
the powers which "shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time be constituted by the Legislature of the United States."1 8 This change, therefore, rendered the described jurisdiction applicable to all federal courts,
not just the Supreme Court. With this simple, but very important,
change, the explicit grant of power allowing Congress to assign to in-,
ferior courts the whole or any part of the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court became redundant and was therefore unanimously stricken from
the document. It is clear that the members still intended to allow Congress to assign such powers to the inferior federal courts.
With the clause deleted, however, it might be objected that no explicit power remained in the judiciary article by which Congress could
accomplish that result. That objection is answered by the surviving exceptions and regulations clause which immediately preceded the deleted
phrase. Once the described jurisdiction was applicable to the judicial
power of the United States as a whole, rather than to the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court alone, "exceptions" from the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court could be made only by vesting jurisdiction over
the omitted class of cases in an inferior federal court. Only in this way
could "the Judicial power of the United States," described in the judiciary article, remain "vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts" as Congress may establish, as mandated by section 1 of the
article. Thus, the framers must have intended the exceptions and regulations clause to be read in conjunction and conformity with the
mandatory first paragraph of the judiciary article, rather than in isolation, as it has most often been construed since the Convention. Otherwise, the deletion of the power to assign jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts would have left Congress without any explicit grant of
authority in the judiciary article to so allocate the judicial power of the
United States. These two seemingly unimportant technical changes,
therefore, yield on close analysis further important support for the conclusion that "exceptions" contemplated under the exceptions and regulations clause were at most assignments of portions of the judicial
power from the Supreme Court to inferiorfederal courts and, possibly,
the rearrangement of the classes of cases heard in original, as opposed
to appellate, form by the Court. So read, these changes add further
evidence to compel a mandatory reading of the requirement that "the
Judicial power of the United States shall be vested" in the federal judi188 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 186.
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ciary. The congressional power countenanced by the Convention was
merely structural and distributive; it did not reach the scope of the categories of cases cognizable in the federal judiciary as a whole.
After this important August 27 debate, most of the changes in the

draft article on the judiciary made by the delegates, and later by the
Committee of Style, were technical and syntactical, rather than substantive. For example, the Committee of Style rephrased the reference
in the first paragraph to "such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United
States" to read "such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish"-a seemingly unimportant change of phrase,
capturing the same idea."6 9 The change of the word "shall" in the Convention's working draft to "may" in the Committee of Style draft also
reflects the framers' continuing sensitivity to the careful use of the
mandatory "shall."'1 7 0 The Committee also attempted to clarify the
169 Id. at 600. The amendment deleted one of the few uses of the word "shall" in
a context which was clearly intended to be discretionary. This attention to language by
the Committee of Style continues the trend by the drafters at the Convention to careful,
selective use of the word "shall" where a mandatory duty was intended. Noting this
change, Professor Goebel, however, argues:
The effect of eliminating the words "as shall, when necessary" was to
deprive Congress of power to decide upon the need for inferior courts and
so to give full imperative effect to the declaration that "The judicial power
.. . shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts
...
" That the Committee intended to convey the sense of an imperative
is apparent from the choice of the most forceful words in the contemporary
constitutional vocabulary-"ordain and establish"-to direct what Congress was to do.
J. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 247. Thus, according to Goebel, "The discretion left to
Congress was the authority to settle the institutional pattern at the lower level of judicial administration and to arrange how the jurisdiction conferred by section 2 of Article
III was there -to be disposed." Id. at 246. Goebel's claim seems insupportable insofar as
it suggests the tacit adoption by the Committee of a mandatory obligation by Congress
to establish inferior federal courts. Such a conclusion is contradicted by the almost unquestioned adherence of the Convention to the Madisonian compromise and the limited
charge of the Committee of Style "to revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed
to by the House," 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 547. Professor Bator has
dismissed Goebel's argument as "uncharacteristically thinly supported and unpersuasive," HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 13 n.46, and two other commentators have
dismissed the thesis, noting "it remains to be seen that the words 'ordain and establish'
are significantly more imperative than the phrasing of the original draft." Redish &
Woods, supra note 3, at 61; see also Sager, supra note 3, at 34 n.47.
170 In addition to the above changes, on August 28 the phrasing of the reference to
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was altered to take account of the change in
the description of the judicial powers that rendered the referent of an "it" ambiguous. 2
Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 434, 437-38. At the same time, Congress was
authorized to direct the place of trial for crimes committed outside of any state, and the
delegates, at the urgings of Pinckney, Rutledge, and Gouverneur Morris, voted to prevent the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus except when required by public safety
in time of rebellion or invasion and to approve the limitation on the reach of judgments
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meaning of the exceptions and regulations clause by inserting a comma
after the word "Exceptions."''
Thus, as reported by the Committee of Style on September 10, the
judiciary article closely resembled in major points the one reported by
the Committee of Detail and ultimately included in article 111.172
In the closing days of the Convention, few changes were made in
the draft article offered by the Committee of Style. Since the phrase
"both in law and equity" appeared in both section 1 and the first paragraph of section 2 of article III, as reported by the Committee of Style,
the delegates struck the superfluous clause in section 1 and deleted the
word "both" in section 2. 17 The issue of civil jury trial, which would
later play a major role in the ratification debates, briefly surfaced late
in the Convention when Pinckney and Gerry unsuccessfully proposed
that "a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases.' 7 4 While
no one opposed the institution of the civil jury in cases at law, the
motion was defeated because Gorham and King pointed out that "[t]he
constitution of Juries is different in different States and the trial itself is
on impeachments. Id. at 434, 438. While the suspension of habeas corpus clause ultimately found its way into section 9 of article I of the Constitution as a limitation on
congressional power, it is significant that it was first raised in conjunction with a discussion of the judiciary article. The desire to limit congressional power over the habeas
corpus remedy further supports the view that the framers sought to limit, not create,
congressional power over the scope of federal court authority. It also suggests that the
writ of habeas corpus envisioned was a writ issued by a federal court. It might be
argued that the perceived necessity to expressly limit congressional power to suspend
the Great Writ implied a latent legislative power over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. This argument, however, would misstate the effect of a suspension of the writ
by confusing jurisdiction with the availability of a remedy. When the writ of habeas
corpus is lawfully suspended, it is not the jurisdiction of the court that is suspended, but
rather the actual enforcement of the remedial writ issued by the court. See, e.g., Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130-31 (18'66); cf. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174
F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ex parte Zimmerman, 132 F.2d 442, 444-46 (9th Cir. 1942)
(both cases suggesting that neither Congress nor the executive has any power to deprive
the courts of jurisdiction to entertain applications for writs of habeas corpus). Thus,
while the distinction is a fine one, the suspension clause should properly be viewed as a
substantive limitation on congressional legislative power, rather than as a protection of
federal court jurisdiction. This distinction may help explain why the Committee of
Style chose to include the clause in section 9 of article I, dealing with limitations on
congressional power, rather than in the judiciary article as originally proposed.
A proposal to allow the Supreme Court to adjudicate the claims of the United
States or individual states to the western territories was tabled on August 30 and ultimately defeated. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 458-59, 465-66. These pro,
posals were part of a package of amendments, some of which were accepted by the
Convention, designed to preserve state autonomy from the exercise of federal legislative
and judicial power. Id. at 457-69.
1 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
1-2 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 575-76.
173
174

Id. at 621.
Id. at 628.
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usual in different cases in different States."1 75 Therefore, Pinckney
maintained that "such a clause in the Constitution would be pregnant
with embarrassments." ' Evidently, the framers, while not opposed to
the institution of the civil jury trial at law, were more concerned with
assuring uniformity of federal judicial practice. Nevertheless, the lack
of such a protection in the final document gave birth to harsh and particularly troublesome attacks on the document by antifederalists during
the ratification debates. With this and several other last-minute matters
resolved, the Cbnvention signed and reported out the Constitution in its
final form on September 17.
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that substantial evidence
from the records of the Convention supports a construction of the judicial article of the Constitution which mandatorily vests the whole of the
judicial power of the United States in the federal judicial establishment.
The extent of the congressional power over the judiciary envisioned by
the framers was the power to structure and organize the Supreme
Court and the inferior federal courts, and to distribute the constitutionally mandated jurisdiction among these national courts. There is little
evidence suggesting any strong sentiment in favor of broader congressional control; the repeated statements by various delegates stressing the
desire to protect the judiciary from legislative encroachment arid the
votes of the Convention favoring judicial independence seem to preclude
any such intention. Indeed, the clear defeat on August 27 of the one
proposal offered to the whole Convention that called for some measure
of legislative control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the
rejection by the Committee of Detail of a similar proposal in the Randolph-Rutledge draft, would seem to refute any intention on the part of
the Convention to create anything other than a mandatory, constitutionally established jurisdiction for the federal courts.' 7 7
175
176

Id.
Id.

177 Professor Sager has argued that too much stress should not be placed on the
August 27 vote, which he partially confuses with the proposal to grant limited legislative control over Supreme Court jurisdiction set forth in the Randolph-Rutledge draft
and rejected by the Committee of Detail. See Sager, supra note 3, at 49-50 n.95. By
contrast, Attorney General William French Smith relies heavily on this vote in his
letter opinion questioning the constitutionality of certain recent jurisdictional curtailment proposals, concliding that "[t]he Convention thus rejected a clear statement of
plenary congressional power over the Court's appellate jurisdiction." Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on Judiciary 6-7 (May 6, 1982) (copy on file with University of Pennsylvania

Law Review).
Sager, building upon the work of other commentators, argues that the proposal to
give Congress power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was "nothing
more than an aesthetic alteration." Sager, supra note 3, at 49-50 n.95 (citing HART &
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THE RATIFICATION DEBATES: DEFENDING THE DOCUMENT

The ratification of the Constitution through state conventions, as
supra note 3, at 12 n.46; Ratner, Power, supra note 3, at 164 n.34). Like
the authors of HART & WECHSLER, Sager believes, without apparent support, that the
rejected proposal was part of a largely rhetorical change, which also included the striking of the clause authorizing the Congress to assign Supreme Court jurisdiction to the
lower federal courts and the change in the language of the Committee of Detail draft
from "jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" to the "Judicial Power." Thus, most of the
attention devoted by Sager, the authors of HART & WECHSLER, and Ratner to this vote
actually focuses upon the proposed clause authorizing Congress to assign Supreme
Court jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts. Sager concludes this somewhat confused
argument by stating, "[t]he argument that the power to 'assign' the Court's jurisdiction
entails the power to deprive the Court of jurisdiction is further undercut by the fact
that the assignment provision in the Committee of Detail's final draft was accompanied
by the exceptions clause,. . . which itse/f apparently authorizes Congress to curtail the
Court's jurisdiction." Sager, supra note 3, at 49-50. Oddly, at another point in his
article, Sager appears to take an inconsistent position, arguing that the Committee of
Detail's rejection of the congressional power over Supreme Court jurisdiction proposed
in the Randolph-Rutledge draft "strongly suggests that the Committee intended the
Court to derive jurisdiction from the Constitution itself." Id. at 24 n.18.
Sager's argument, like that in HART & WECHSLER and that of Ratner, is somewhat flawed because it gives inadequate separate attention to the rejection of the August 27 proposal explicitly to vest Congress with plenary power over Supreme Court
jurisdiction. This proposal does not appear merely to have been a minor part of a
larger package of rhetorical changes, as Sager and others seem to suggest. While the
evidence on this point is not conclusive, based in part on Madison's uncharacteristically
skimpy notes of the August 27 debate, the fact that the proposal for a grant of legislative power over the Court's jurisdiction was overwhelmingly rejected, while the other
semantic changes proposed during the debate were unanimously accepted, suggests that
the problem with the August 27 proposal was substantive, not rhetorical. Furthermore,
Sager's analytical confusion of the provisions of the rejected assignment clause with the
proposal to vest Congress with plenary power over Supreme Court jurisdiction and his
ready willingness to assume that the exceptions clause authorized the curtailment of
federal court jurisdiction, rather than the distribution of the judicial power of the
United States, reflects the tendency of many commentators and courts, criticized above,
to read clauses in article III out of context and in isolation. See supra note 167.
With all of the confusion manifest in his treatment of the historical record, Professor Sager nevertheless comes to a conclusion that closely approximates the original understanding of the framers, suggesting that the Constitution neither empowers Congress
to enact court-stripping statutes to overturn unpopular constitutional decisions nor disables the Court from declaring such legislation unconstitutional. Sager, supra note 3, at
89. He nevertheless arrives at this conclusion only partially as a result of a confused
historical analysis, relying additionally on important constitutional policy considerations
of preserving the independence of the federal judiciary and the essential functions of the
Supreme Court.
Raoul Berger has published a vituperative attack on what he considers Professor
Sager's "polemic" challenging congressional authority over federal court jurisdiction.
See Berger, Insulation of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's
"Court-Stripping" Polemic, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 611 (1983). Berger has not in any way
attacked the accuracy of Sager's history of the Philadelphia Convention or ratification
debates. Rather his attack focuses principally on Sager's alleged cavalier treatment of
the case law interpreting article III. Since Sager's argument is in part grounded on the
original purposes of article III, one would think that a careful exploration of the historical record would have been appropriate from Berger whose work focuses primarily on
WECHSLER,
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prescribed by the document, produced a very different focus and type of
ferreting out the "legislative record" of the history surrounding various constitutional
provisions. Berger's almost total failure to cite to Farrand's collection of records of
debates at the Philadelphia convention or Elliot's compilation of the ratification debate
materials, therefore, is very difficult to explain. Berger has repeatedly argued that the
appropriate issue for constitutional inquiry is the original intent of the framers since
"[ijf the Court may substitute its own meaning for that of the Framers it may, as Story
cautioned, rewrite the Constitution without limit." R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 370.
Berger has also insisted that prior case law inconsistent with the original understanding
of the framers should be ignored since "the Constitution itself, stripped of judicial incrustations, [is] the index of constitutional law." Id. at 297. Thus, Berger's failure
seriously and exhaustively to consider the primary historical record of the Philadelphia
and the ratification debates seems totally inconsistent with his often stated legal philosophy. This failure is even more surprising from a scholar who has probed these historical sources in his earlier scholarship and therefore should be intimately familiar with
these primary historical materials. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 3.
Even in those few instances in which Berger does refer to the historical record of
the Philadelphia Convention and the ratification debates, his treatment of the historical
data is inaccurate or misleading.
For example, in his attack on Sager's position, Berger fails to note the deletion by
the Committee of Detail of the Randolph-Rutledge draft proposal to authorize limited
congressional power over the scope of federal jurisdiction, and the only notice Berger
apparently takes of the overwhelming August 27 defeat of an explicit proposal to give
Congress authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts is a brief reference to
the fact that Sager made a confused reference to it. Berger, supra, at 622 n.106. While
Sager's reference is indeed confused, Berger's failure to clarify or discuss the matter is
inexplicable. Rather, Berger relies, in part, on statements Hamilton made defending
the limited nature of federal jurisdiction to suggest that Congress should be able to
assure that the jurisdiction is kept within appropriate boundaries. Id. at 616, 627, 628.
These statements, however, had nothing to do with congressional power. Instead they
constituted part of Hamilton's defense of the limited jurisdiction constitutionally committed to the federal courts. As this Article demonstrates, when Hamilton directly addressed the meaning of the article, he concluded that the framers meant to assure constitutionally that all cases within the judicial power of the United States received either
their original or final decision by an independent article III tribunal-a position very
similar to that adopted by Sager and precisely the conclusion Berger is attacking. See
supra note 19 and accompanying text; infra notes 299-323 and accompanying text.
Berger ignores this portion of Hamilton's writings, just as he completely fails to note
the manner in which the term "exceptions" was used in the Hamilton draft of the
exceptions and regulations clause.
Similarly, in one of Berger's only references to the ratification debates, he approvingly cites the comments of William Grayson of Virginia, a leading antifederalistopponent of the adoption of article III who also voted against the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789 while in the Senate. The context of Berger's reference to Grayson
seems to suggest that Grayson was one of "[tihe states' rights advocates at the Constitutional Convention." Berger, supra, at 616. Grayson, however, did not attend the Philadelphia Convention and as a vociferous opponent of article III clearly cannot be taken
as an authoritative reflection of the framers' intent.
Berger also relies extensively on the allegation that the 1789 Judiciary Act did not
confer complete jurisdiction over all cases enumerated as within the judicial power of
the United States, without noting that there is significant evidence in the legislative
debates over the Act that some of the supporters of the Act believed both that they were
constitutionally obligated to commit all of the judicial power of the United States to
federal court cognizance and that they had done so. Compare id. at 614, 632-33 with
infra note 357 and accompanying text. Even if the First Congress had intended to limit
the constitutionally vested jurisdiction of the federal courts, such evidence should not be
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debate from that generated at the Philadelphia Convention. The members of the Philadelphia Convention had met throughout the summer in
closed session and had devoted much of their time to discussions and
debate of general structural principles governing the new Union. It was
not until the Committee of Detail reported its draft on August 6, nearly
two and one-half months after the start of the Convention, that the
framers even began debating the actual language of a draft Constitution. This slow, deliberate process was no doubt aided by the secrecy
surrounding their proceedings, which left the delegates free from direct
political pressures and criticisms.
In contrast, the ratification process was wide-open and well publicized. Much of the political debate over the adoption of the draft document took place in the press and in printed broadsides.1 7' The speeches
of candidates seeking seats in state ratification conventions were widely
reported, as were the debates in many of the state conventions. Thus,
the ratification process was less a deliberative procedure and more a
political forum in which prominent state politicians could advance their
own interests and hinder those of their opponents.17 9 Furthermore, the
considered persuasive under Berger's view of the importance of original understanding.
If that intent was inconsistent with the meaning of article III derived from the Philadelphia Convention and the ratification debates, the First Congress presumably had no
more authority to revise the Constitution than does the Supreme Court.
At one point in Berger's discussion, he protests Sager's reliance on original understanding arguments to support what Berger regards as judicial activist positions. He
states that "resort to legislative history must be evenhanded." Id. at 615. Berger has
that point precisely right, but he cannot very well attack others for ignoring or manipulating legal history or original understanding arguments when he appears to have done
precisely the same thing. An unsupportable diatribe aimed at what Berger regards as a
polemic is no substitute for solid historical scholarship. Berger simply cannot say, as he
does, that "[tihe legislative history lends [Sager] cold comfort," id. at 632, when he has
hardly probed the historical data and has certainly failed to examine that record in the
level of detail offered here or by Professor Sager. As this Article and Sager's efforts
indicate, the "legislative record" of the true framers, the federalist supporters of the
Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention and during the ratification debates, is
plainly inconsistent with Berger's position. Resort to original understanding must indeed be evenhanded!
178 See generally I, II DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 167; Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 21; ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (P.
Ford ed. 1892) [hereinafter cited as Ford, EsSAYS].
179 Far from constituting a scholarly, dispassionate study of the work of the Philadelphia Convention, the ratification debates were really a political conflict in which
both sides operated in substantial ignorance of the proceedings that led to the adoption
of the various provisions of the document. As one of the leading historians of the ratification process put it, "[tihe Constitution was debated, for the most part, in ignorance of
the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention." I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 167, at 26. Thus, certain political diatribes against the document, often containing
inaccurate characterizations, were widely circulated. The objections of George Mason,
Luther Martin, Elbridge Gerry, Robert Yates, and John Lansing, Jr. probably received the widest publication. Id.
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ratification process focused on the language of a single document, the
draft Constitution. This helped steer much of the debate away from
wide-ranging inquiries into general principles of appropriate government for the Union, 80 and toward a more focused, often politicized
debate over particular clauses in the draft document.
In this atmosphere the general issue of legislative control over the
jurisdiction of the national judiciary received almost no direct attention.
Rather, when the issue arose at all, it did so only in passing, during
debates over other facets of the proposed judiciary article. Thus, one
finds almost no direct debate over the meaning of the requirement that
"the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and. in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish" or the exceptions, and regulations clause.
Even the debate over the congressional power to create inferior federal
courts focused mostly on the desirability of such courts, paying almost
no attention to the desirability or breadth of the legislative power in
question.
Furthermore, when supporters or opponents of the Constitution
referred to the jurisdiction of the federal courts they often seemed to
assume that the Constitution itself invested those courts with the jurisdiction prescribed in the first paragraph of section 2 of article III. For
example, Luther Martin criticized the judiciary article because it removed from the state courts the jurisdiction to enforce national revenue
laws and "confined" it to the courts of the United States.1 81 Pendleton
of Virginia referred to the jurisdiction "given" to the Supreme Court by
the Constitution. 8 ' Randolph 8 8 stated that the jurisdiction conferred
upon federal courts under the document "extends to all cases in law
and equity arising under the Constitution."' ' In contrast, there were
very few direct suggestions of complete congressional power to delimit
the classes of cases which could be heard in federal courts, especially
180 The principal exception to this generalization was The Federalist, discussed
infra notes 299-323 and accompanying text.
'OI 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 204.

182

3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION

OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUMON 549 (J. Elliot ed. 1901) [hereinafter cited as Elliot,
DEBATES].
183 Randolph played a curiously inconsistent role by proposing the Virginia
Plan,
refusing to sign the Constitution in part because of the breadth and vagueness of the
judiciary article, and ultimately grudgingly supporting the document and the judiciary
article in the Virginia Convention. In a letter Randolph wrote to the speaker of the
Virginia House of Delegates dated October 10, 1787, just after the close of the Philadelphia Convention, he explained his reasons for refusing to sign the Constitution and
listed its deficiencies "[iln limiting and defining the judicial power." 3 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 21, at 127.
1" 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 572 (emphasis added).
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the Supreme Court.
The debate over the judiciary during the ratification process focused principally, indeed almost exclusively, on the objections raised by
the antifederalists. These objections were similar from state to state and
included a number of closely related points, to which this Article now
turns.
A.

Antifederalist Arguments Against Adoption of Article III

First, and foremost, the antifederalists repeatedly argued that the
Constitution not only inadequately protected the right to jury trial,1 85
but in fact positively infringed upon it in civil cases by providing for
appellate review both as to law and fact. For example, during the long
and very heated debates over the judiciary during the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry argued that "[n]othing can be more clear and incontestable. This will, in its operation, destroy the trial by jury. The
will be reversed by judges unacquainted
verdict of an impartial jury
6
with the circumstances.

1

1

Second, the antifederalists expressed a number of interrelated but
distinct concerns about the breadth of the potential federal judiciary
and its potential to annihilate the state courts and unsettle legal expectations created under state law. Specifically, they directly attacked the
breadth of federal court jurisdiction established in the constitutional
draft, singling out for special attack the diversity jurisdiction and cases
in which states may be parties, especially cases involving citizens of
other states.' 87 Some, like Grayson of Virginia, also feared the breadth
of federal question jurisdiction, arguing that it was "of stupendous
magnitude" and that it was "so vaguely and indefinitely expressed"
that it was "impossible for human nature to trace its extent."'"
Additionally, the antifederalists were concerned about the relationship which would exist between the newly created federal judiciary and
185 See, e.g., 1 id. at 381-82 (letter of Luther Martin); 2 id. at 550 (concerns
expressed by committee in Maryland convention); 3 id. at 528 (comments of George
Mason); 3 id. at 540-42 (comments of Patrick Henry); 4 id. at 143 (comments of J.
M'Dowall); id. at 151 (comments of Bloodworth).
186 3 id. at 540.
187 See, e.g., id. at 523, 526 (comments of George Mason); id. at 566 (comments
of Grayson); II DOcUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 167, at 308-09; Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 21, at 306-08 (Letters of the Federal Farmer [Richard Henry Lee
of Virginia] No. III); Ford, ESSAYS, supra note 178, at 66-67 (Letters of Agrippa No.
V), 96-97 (Letters of Agrippa, No. XIII).
1" 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 565.
Grayson also led antifederalist grumbling about the propriety of joining admiralty,
equity, criminal, and common law jurisdiction in one over-powerful national court. Id.
at 564; see infra note 227.
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the already extant state courts. Some antifederalists, like Luther Martin, based much of their argument on the assumption that the exercise
of the judicial power of the United States was exclusively confined to
the federal courts1 89 and might therefore "swallow up the state jurisdictions."'1 90 Such antifederalists argued that the ratification of the Constitution would leave no residual judicial business for the local courts;
they feared that the national courts would soon "utterly annihilate...
state courts."' '
Closely related was the antifederalist attack on the congressional
power to create inferior federal courts, the antifederalists arguing that
the state courts were more than adequate to entertain such cases in the
first instance.1 2 Thus, others, like Grayson of Virginia, while conceding concurrent federal and state jurisdiction,' feared that the federal
courts would necessarily come into conflict with the local judiciaries.
He said, "[t]he interference of the federal judiciary and the state courts
will involve the most serious and even ludicrous consequences. Both
courts are to act on the same persons and things, and cannot possibly
avoid interference."1 '
In attacking the breadth of the federal judicial establishment, the
antifederalists also pointed out the expense, both to the government and
to the parties, which the new federal courts would create. Focusing
upon the great inconveniences, delays, and costs in traveling to and producing witnesses at a far distant court, especially if located in the national capitol, the antifederalists argued that the existing state judicial
machinery was more convenient -and less costly and that the proposed
national judiciary would merely increase expense and unnecessarily
multiply appeals.'" This argument was buttressed by the potential
need to produce witnesses again in the Supreme Court if that court
was, indeed, to review facts as well as law.195
189 1 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 551.
190 2 id. at 551.
191 Id. at 528 (George Mason).
19' Spencer of North Carolina, for example, said,
There does not appear to me to be any kind of necessity that the federal
court should have jurisdiction in the body of the country. I am ready to
give up that, in the cases expressly enumerated, an appellate jurisdiction
(except in one or two instances) might be given .... But in the body of a
state, the jurisdiction of the courts in that state might extend to carrying
into execution the laws of Congress. It must be unnecessary for the federal
courts to do it, and would create trouble and expense which might be
avoided.
4 id. at 155.
19S
194

3 id. at 569.
4 id. at 155.

"' See, e.g., I id. at 382 (letter of Luther Martin); 3 id. at 524 (comments of
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On occasion, antifederalists also candidly expressed fears that the
retroactive nature of the proposed national judicial establishment would
result in injustice and personal inconvenience by unsettling legal expectations created under state law. Especially strong was the fear that such
retroactivity might affect Revolutionary War debts and unsettle land
titles, particularly the titles involving Lord Fairfax's former estate in
the Northern Neck of Virginia.19 As later events would prove, the lat1 97
ter concern was particularly well founded.
B. FederalistArguments Favoring Adoption of Article Ifi
1. Jury Trial Issues
Federalist responses to the antifederalist concerns reflect the political nature of much of the ratification debates. One finds supporters of
the Constitution, sometimes even members of the Philadelphia Convention, using the language of the document in ways unanticipated at the
Philadelphia Convention in order to respond to critics of ratification. 9 8
The ratification debate over the protection of jury trial in civil cases
most severely tested the political acumen of the federalists and provided
the springboard for most of the important comments on congressional
power over the judiciary. If the antifederalists could prove that the document attacked as basic an institution as civil jury trial, they could successfully taint the entire enterprise and doom it to failure. As noted
George Mason); 4 id. at 143 (comments of J. M'Dowall).
I" See, e.g., 3 id. at 579-81 (comments of Patrick Henry and George Nicholas);
see also infra notes 281 & 284. Henry of Virginia felt that such retroactivity of federal
jurisdiction would be "as odious as an ex post facto law." 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra
note 182, at 542.
In Virginia, where the dispute over title to the Northern Neck had raged since
1782 when the Commonwealth had purported to confiscate the title of Lord Fairfax to
the area, this concern was particularly acute. George Mason, a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention who had refused to sign the Constitution, argued against adoption of
the document in the Virginia ratification convention in part because he was "personally
endangered as an inhabitant of the Northern Neck." 3 id. at 528-29. He argued:
As Lord Fairfax's title was indisputably good, and as treaties are to be the
supreme law of the land, will not his representatives be able to recover all
in the federal court? How will gentlemen like to pay an additional tax on
lands in the Northern Neck? This the operation of this system will compel
them to do. They now are subject to the same tax as other citizens are;
and if the quitrents be recovered in the federal court, they are doubly
taxed. . . . How will a poor man, who is injured or dispossessed unjustly,
get a remedy? Is he to go to the federal court, seven or eight hundred
miles? He might as well give his claim up. He may grumble, but, finding
no relief, he will be contented.
Id. at 529.
197 See infra note 276.
See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
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above, the antifederalist argument turned on what Randolph called the
"unfortunate" clause authorizing appellate jurisdiction both as to law
and fact,'" a phrase Pendleton wished "had been buried in oblivion."200 In the Virginia convention antifederalists led by Patrick Henry
and George Mason enlarged their attack by arguing that there was no
way for Congress to protect the civil jury trial under the proposed document. After explaining that the constitutionally vested appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court included review of facts under the Constitution, Patrick Henry referred to the exceptions and regulations clause
and argued,
Congress cannot, by any act of theirs, alter this jurisdiction
as established. It appears to me that no law of Congress can
alter or arrange it. It is subject to be regulated, but is it subject to be abolished? If Congress alter this part, they will
repeal the Constitution. Does it give them power to repeal
itself? What is meant by such words in common parlance? If
you are obliged to do certain business, you are to do it under
such modifications as were originally designed. . . . When
Congress, by virtue of this sweeping clause, will organize
these courts, they cannot depart from the Constitution; and
their laws in opposition to the Constitution would be void.20 1
Henry went on to suggest that if Congress sought to limit the appellate
review of the Supreme Court over facts, "the federal judges, if they
spoke the sentiments of independent men, would declare their prohibition nugatory and void."2 2 Thus, for Patrick Henry, the jurisdiction of
the federal courts was mandatorily set forth by the Constitution, not
only as to the classes of cases comprising the judicial power of the
United States, but also as to the scope of review. To Henry, the congressional power seemed merely distributive.
Had such strong arguments for mandatory federal court jurisdiction been made by federalists who had supported the Constitution at
the Philadelphia Convention, they would probably have been accepted
and applauded. That they came from antifederalists and in the context
of an effort to prove that the proposed Constitution infringed upon the
right to civil jury trial called for a different sort of response from the
federalist supporters of the document. The federalists argued that the
review of fact language of article III stemmed from the desire to pre1

3 Elliot, DEBATrs, supra note 182, at 572.
at 519.
Id. at 540-41.
Id. at 541.

200 Id.
201
202
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serve the traditional broader review powers of an appellate court in
equity and admiralty cases, and not from any antipathy to civil jury
trial in common law cases. 203 This argument, while no doubt historically accurate, failed to satisfy the antifederalists, who pointed out first,
that the language of the clause also reached Supreme Court review of
facts in common law cases, and second, that the document expressly
protected the institution of jury trial in criminal cases,' 4 but was silent
on jury trial for civil causes. In part, the federalists responded to these
concerns by correctly arguing that protection of civil jury trial was
omitted because of the wide disparity in civil jury practice among the
states.20 5 James Wilson explained in the Pennsylvania convention:
By the Constitution of the different states, it will be found
that no particular mode of trial by jury could be discovered
that would suit them all. The manner 6f summoning jurors,
their qualifications, of whom they should consist, and the
course of their proceedings, are all different in the different
states; and I presume it will be allowed a good general principle, that, in carrying into effect the laws of the general government by the judicial department, it will be proper to
make the regulations as agreeable to the habits and wishes of
the particular states as possible; and it is easily discovered
that it would have been impracticable, by any general regulation, to give satisfaction to all. We must have thwarted the
custom of eleven or twelve to have accommodated any one.
Why do this when there was no danger to be apprehended
from the omission? We could not go into a particular detail
of the manner that would have suited each state.2
1OS See, e.g., id. at 519 (comments of Pendleton); id. at 557-60 (comments of John
Marshall); 4 id. at 162-63 (comments of Maclaine).
'" See, e.g., 4 id. at 143 (comments of Bloodworth of North Carolina); id. at 154
(comments of Spencer of North Carolina).
"5 See, e.g., 2 id. at 488 (comments of James Wilson); 4 id. at 144 (comments of
Spaight of North Carolina); id. at 1.44-45 (comments of Iredell of North Carolina); see
also suJra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
V2 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 488. Wilson did, however, seek to justify the Supreme Court's power to review facts on appeal, noting:
We find it essentially necessary from the ample experience we have had in
the courts of admiralty with regard to captures. Those gentlemen who,
during the late war, had their vessels retaken, know well what a poor
chance they would have had when those vessels were taken in their states
and tried by juries, and in what a situation they would have been if the
Court of Appeals had not been possessed of authority to reconsider and set
aside the verdicts of those juries. Attempts were made by some of the states
to destroy this power; but it has been confirmed in every instance.
2 id. at 493-94. Wilson's reference to the experience under the confederation Court of
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The federalist response, as Wilson's comments suggest, also focused on the asserted congressional power to protect jury trials under
the exceptions and regulations clause. Indeed, most of the important
comments on the issue of congressional power over federal court powers
emerged in the context of the concern over jury trials, particularly in
the Virginia convention where the judiciary article was most thoroughly and heatedly debated. Since it is demonstrably clear that the
exceptions and regulations clause was not drafted at the Philadelphia
Convention to modify the review of law and fact language in article
111,20 7 comments such as Wilson's constitute post-Convention revisionism of the meaning and purpose of that clause. When made by federalists, like John Marshall, who had not attended the Philadelphia Convention and who apparently had no access to the then unpublished
notes and documents from the Convention, such revisionism is understandable. Some of the comments came, however, from delegates like
Wilson, Madison, and Randolph who had attended and even played
major roles in the drafting of the judicial article. For them such revisionism is best explained by the political context in which the statements were made. Successful ratification of the document was more important than historical accuracy or intellectual consistency, and these
framers seized upon all plausible constructions of clauses in the document which met their need to respond to antifederalist concerns.20 8
While revisionist, some of the federalist comments suggesting congressional power to limit Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
facts were generally carefully couched and limited. It is almost as if the
speaker sensed the potential which such a concession might have for
encroachment on the powers of the federal courts, and sought to limit
the breadth of their claims. Madison, for example, seemed to confine
the congressional power to making regulations as to review of facts,
Appeals may have been a pointed attack on his unsuccessful venture in litigating the
case involving the capture of the sloop Active. See supra note 113. Thus, for Wilson,
more so than for other federalists, the power of the Supreme Court to review fact, as
well as law, may have been seen as essential for assuring federal supremacy. Such
review power would frustrate state efforts to block the enforcement of federal law by
finding facts contrary to the vindication of the federal right. Elsewhere Wilson argued
that many of the cases cognizable in federal courts should not be tried to a jury since
they depended on the law of nations, marine law, or "the general law of mercantile
countries," all areas where uniformity was sought. 2 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182,
at 516-17.
'07 See supra notes 137-39 & 164 and accompanying text.
'"8 Nevertheless, the comments of these framers represent the strongest support
for the view that the exceptions and regulations clause should be read as solely modifying the clause authorizing Supreme Court appellate review "both as to law and fact."
Oddly, the scholars who have advanced this view have almost wholly ignored these
debates. See supra note 137.
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saying nothing about issues of law:
But if gentlemen should contend that appeals, as to fact, can
be extended to jury cases, I contend that, by the word regulations, it is in the power of Congress to prevent it, or prescribe such a mode as will secure the privilege of jury trial.
They may make a regulation to prevent such appeals entirely; or they may remand the fact, or send it to an inferior
contiguous court, to be tried; or otherwise preserve that ancient and important trial.2" 9
Alexander Hanson, a member of the Maryland ratification convention, published remarks which defended the provisions for review of
fact, noting, "in regard to appeals, it is very material to remark, that
congress is to make such regulations and exceptions, as upon mature
deliberation, it shall think proper. And indeed, before such regulations
and exceptions shall be made, the manner of appeal will not be ascertained." 210 Hanson, therefore, seemingly understood the congressional
power as one of prescribing the mode of review, but not necessarily the
class of cases which could be appealed. He added, "Now every man,
who would establish over his cause a jurisdiction in a federal court,
must shew, that such cause comes under the description of the constitution.1211 Yet he nowhere suggested any additional requirement of congressional authorization for the exercise of jurisdiction.
Some of the responses to the antifederalist civil jury trial arguments were not, however, as carefully couched. Randolph, whose fears
of the breadth of federal judicial power had caused him to withhold
support for the final document in Philadelphia, 1 2 disagreed with
Henry's suggestion that Congress had no power to delimit the power of
the Supreme Court to review facts. He argued that broad congressional
power did indeed exist:
It was insisted on by [Henry] that these words [the exceptions and regulations clause] could not extend to law and
fact, and that they could not separate the fact from the law.
209

3 Elliot,

DEBATES,

supra note 182, at 534.

Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 21, at 238.
Iredell of North Carolina explained that the Convention could "fix upon no permanent rule [for civil jury trials] that was not liable to great objections and difficulties"
and the delegates therefore "thought it better to leave all such regulations to the legislature itself, conceiving there could be no real danger, in this case, from a body composed
of our own representatives, who could have no temptation to undermine this excellent
mode of trial in civil cases . . . ." 4 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 166.
2 4 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 240.
212 See supra note 183.
210
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This construction is irrational; for, if they cannot separate
the law from the fact, and if the exceptions are prevented
from applying to law and fact, these words have no force at
all. It would be proper here to refer to any thing that could
be understood in the federal court. They may except generally both as to law and fact, or they may except as to law
only, or fact only."13
Taken out of context, this statement was probably the baldest, most
sweeping assertion of congressionhl power over federal court jurisdiction to appear anywhere in the course of the adoption of the Constitution. 1 ' It is, however, ambiguous. Since Randolph was only referring
to appellate review by the Supreme Court, it is somewhat unclear
whether the envisioned exceptions "as to law" from Supreme Court
jurisdiction were absolute withdrawals of classes of cases from the cognizance of the federal courts or, rather, merely exceptions from Supreme Court jurisdiction in favor of distributing the judicial power of
the United States to inferior federal courts.
There may, however, be good reason to believe that Randolph did
in fact deliberately intend to ignore the distributive purposes of the
clause in favor of engrafting onto it a more far-reaching congressional
power. Randolph's suggestion that under Henry's construction the
clause had no force whatsoever seems wholly to ignore the distributive
purposes of the clause intended by the framers. Having refused to sign
the Constitution, in part because he felt that the judicial power needed
further "limiting and defining,"2'15 Randolph ultimately, but reluctantly, joined the federalist cause. He may. nevertheless have sought to
accomplish his purpose of limiting the judiciary by imposing an unintended meaning on the exceptions and regulations clause. This inter*'*3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 572.
114 See also infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. One is tempted to speculate that Randolph may have deliberately attempted to engraft onto the document an
unintended congressional power over the scope of federal court jurisdiction in the hopes
that Congress might later ameliorate the jurisdictional problems that concerned him.
Whatever Randolph's intent, however, the evidence suggests that his position gained
very few converts during the ratification debates. For example, the proposals to curtail
the jurisdiction of the national courts were almost invariably offered as constitutional
amendments, neither partisans nor opponents of the document suggesting that the same
result could be as easily accomplished by legislative enactment. See infra notes 277-84
and accompanying text.
In a published "Letter of a Citizen of New Haven," dated December 4, 1788,
Roger Sherman, however, did venture the suggestion that "[tihe judiciary department is
perhaps the most difficult to be precisely limited by the constitution, but congress have
full power to regulate it by law, and it may be found necessary to vary the regulations
at different times as circumstances may differ." Ford, ESSAYS, supra note 178, at 235.
" See supra note 183.
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pretation would be consistent with the congressional power over federal
jurisdiction contained in the draft Randolph wrote for the Committee of
Detail, but which the Committee had rejected.2 1 Randolph's draft had
at least made mandatory the federal court jurisdiction over cases arising
under national laws and impeachments of federal officers. His misrepresentation of the exceptions and regulations clause in the Virginia
Convention, however, made all Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
subject to congressional control. While one cannot lightly dismiss this
interpretation of the exceptions and regulations clause offered by as important a personage as Edmond Randolph, there are sound historical
reasons to suspect that it may not accurately reflect the true intent of
the framers who drafted and ardently supported the Constitution.
More troublesome to this Article's thesis are John Marshall's
comments during the Virginia ratification convention. It will be
recalled that Marshall, a strong federalist and supporter of the Constitution, had not attended the Philadelphia Convention and, therefore,was left to respond to antifederalist attacks from the naked text of the
document, unaided by any notes or personal recollections of the Convention's deliberations. Marshall answered Henry's attack on the absence of congressional power to protect civil jury trial, as follows:
The honorable gentleman says that no law of Congress can
make any exception to the federal appellate jurisdiction of
facts as well as law. He has frequently spoken of technical
terms, and the meaning of them. What is the meaning of the
term exception? Does it not mean an alteration and diminution? Congress is empowered to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, of the Supreme Court.
These exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature may
think proper for the interest and liberty of the people. Who
can understand this word, exception, to extend to one case as
well as the other? I am persuaded that a reconsideration of
this case will convince the gentleman that he was mistaken.
This may go to the cure of the mischief apprehended. Gentlemen must be satisfied that this power will not be so much
abused as they have said. 17
Marshall evidently construed the exceptions and regulations power to
modify the phrase "both as to law and fact," which is a demonstrable
historical error.21 8 It is also evident that Marshall was contending for a
217

See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 134, at 559-60.

218

See supra notes 137-39 & 164 and accompanying text.
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sweeping congressional power to make alterations and diminutions in
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
It is difficult to understand how Marshall, who as Chief Justice
was to become so instrumental in establishing a strong federal judiciary
19
as a bulwark of constitutional government and federal supremacy,
could support and argue for so sweeping a congressional control over
the national judiciary. Part of the answer may lie in the context of his
statements, which were a response to antifederalist arguments which he
believed must imperatively be laid to rest. He may therefore have overstated his case to pound the last nail into the coffin of the antifederalists. We might also conjecture that he was misled by Randolph, who
had attended the Philadelphia Convention. Whatever the reason, Marshall indirectly advanced one of the stronger statements in support of
congressional control over the jurisdiction of the national courts.
2.

Concerns over the Scope of the Judicial Power of the United States

While the civil jury trial issue produced extensive comment on the
congressional power to delimit Supreme Court review of facts, the antifederalist attacks on the breadth of the judicial power of the United
States prescribed by the Constitution and on the costs, inconvenience,
and potential threat to state courts posed by article III produced almost
no suggestions by federalists that Congress could delimit the sphere of
federal court jurisdiction.2 20 The startling absence of such suggestions,
219 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This history also may
help explain the tortured reasoning process that Chief Justice Marshall later adopted
when cases touching upon issues of congressional power over the federal courts reached
the Court for review. See infra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
"I Madison did offer a somewhat interesting comment in attempting to defend the
grant of diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts. He said:
Let me observe that, so far as the judicial power may extend to controversies between citizens of different states, and so far as it gives them
power to correct, by another trial, a verdict obtained by local prejudices, it
is favorable to those states which carry on commerce. There are a number
of commercial states which carry on trade for other states. Should the
states in debt to them make unjust regulations, the justice that would be
obtained by the creditors might be merely imaginary and nominal. It
might be either entirely denied, or partially granted. This is no imaginary
evil. Before the war, New York was to a great amount a creditor of Connecticut. While it depended on the laws and regulations of Connecticut,
she might withhold payment. If I be not misinformed, there were reasons
to complain. These illiberal regulations and causes of complaint obstruct
commerce. So far as this power may be exercised, Virginia will be benefited by it. It appears to me, from the most correct view, that by the word
regulations, authority is given them to provide against the inconveniences;
and so far as it is exceptionable, they can remedy it.
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of course, suggests that a broad congressional power over the breadth of
federal court jurisdiction was not widely assumed by federalist supporters of the document. Rather, the federalists generally met antifederalist
attacks on the scope of federal court jurisdiction by stressing the necessity of conferring the cases enumerated as the judicial power of the
United States on national courts staffed with judges who were not dependent for appointment, salary, or continuance in office on the legislature of any state. The need for a neutral forum and neutral laws
shaped the justifications offered by many federalists for committing
many of the eleven classes of cases comprising the judicial power of the
United States to the federal courts.
In regard to the breadth of the class of cases given to the federal
courts, Pendleton of Virginia argued that all eleven classes of controversies set forth as part of the judicial power of the United States were "of
general and not local concern."2'21 Madison argued that "it is so necessary and expedient that the judicial power should correspond with the
legislative, that it has not been objected to," 22 2 adding that the subjects
of federal court jurisdiction were "mostly of great importance, and indispensably necessary. "223
In more specific terms, federalists expounded on the desirability of
federal tribunals in a broad variety of contexts. Yet none of them, even
when offering only a lukewarm defense of a particular type of jurisdiction, ever suggested the existence of congressional power to curtail the
federal court authority. Many federalists supported the scope of federal
court jurisdiction as necessary to guarantee to supremacy of federal
law. In the North Carolina convention William Davie, a member of
the Philadelphia Convention, stressed the importance of national courts
in assuring adherence to federal law, arguing: "Every member will
3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 534-35. While Madison's comments are somewhat ambiguous, it appears that he may have viewed the congressional power to make
regulations governing the exercise of Supreme Court jurisdiction merely to refer to the
substantive laws which Congress might pass, rather than regulations prescribing the
means of execution of the judicial power of the United States or limiting the scope or
operation of those powers. So read, the exceptions and regulations clause would be
viewed merely as a command for federal courts to apply congressionally enacted substantive law, just as the supremacy clause of article VI requires state courts to apply
federal law. Under such a construction, the clause would not operate to authorize Congress to control or limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts in any manner. This construction would have important contrary implications for any argument that there was
a constitutional dimension to the Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)), or Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
221 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 518.
22 Id. at 532.
223 Id. at 534.
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agree that the positive regulations ought to be carried into execution,
and that the negative restrictions ought not to be disregarded or violated. Without a judiciary, the injunctions of the Constitution may be
2' 24
disobeyed, and the positive regulations neglected or contravened.
Citing the limitations on state government contained in section 10 of
article I, he stated:
These restrictions ought to supersede the laws of particular
states. With respect to the prohibitory provision-that no
duty or impost shall be laid by any particular state-which
is so highly in favor of us and the other non-importing states,
the importing states might make laws laying duties notwithstanding, and the Constitution might be violated with impunity, if there were no power in the general government to
correct and counteract such laws. This great object can only
be safely and completely obtained by the instrumentality of
the federal judiciary.2
Maclaine succinctly stated the need for finally committing the resolution of such issues to federal, rather than state, judges, noting that
the problem was not the competence of state judges, but rather their
dependence on and allegiance to state governments:
[Mr. Locke] supposes that the idea of cognizance of the laws
of the Union to federal courts, must have arisen from suspicions of partiality and want of common integrity of our state
judges. The worthy gentleman is mistaken in his construction of what I said. I did not personally reflect on the members of our state judiciary; nor did I impute the impropriety
of vesting the state judiciaries with exclusive jurisdiction over
the laws of the Union, and cases arising under the Constitution, to any want of probity in the judges. But if they be the
judges of the local or state laws, and receive emoluments for
acting in that capacity, they will be improper persons to
judge the laws of the Union. A federal judge ought to be
solely governed by the laws of the United States, and receive
his salary from the treasury of the United States. It is impossible for any judges, receiving pay from a single state, to be
impartial in cases where the local laws or interests of that
state clash with the laws of the Union, or the general inter22
225

4 id. at 156.
Id. at 156-57.
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ests of America.22
Marshall, too, stressed the importance of the federal courts to assuring federal supremacy, arguing, "[t]o what quarter will you look for
protection from an infringement on the Constitution, if you will not
give the power to the judiciary? There is no other body that can afford
such a protection. 2127 Responding to the concerns expressed by antifederalists that the federal courts might screen federal officers from punishments for injuries they perpetrated, Marshall suggested that "[t]here
is no clause in the Constitution which bars the individual member in'
jured from applying to the state courts to give him redress." 228
This
response, while constitutionally correct, ultimately proved inaccurate in
light of the removal jurisdiction which Congress later afforded in such
cases.

22 9

Randolph evidenced his continuing ambivalence over the reach of
the federal judiciary, stating, "I do not concur with the honorable gentleman that the judiciary is so formidable, yet I candidly admit that
there are defects in its construction, among which may be objected too
great an extension of jurisdiction."23 0 Nevertheless, he argued that if
Virginia ratified the document with the reservation "that all authority
given is retained by the people, and may be resumed when perverted to
their oppression; and that no right can be cancelled, abridged, or restrained, by the Congress, or any officer of the United States," there
21
would be sufficient protections from judicial overreaching.
Pendelton echoed the concern with enforcing federal supremacy by
rejecting the idea that federal question cases could be finally relegated
to the state courts, arguing, "[m]ust not the judicial powers extend to
enforce the federal laws, govern its own officers, and confine them to
the line of their duty? Must it not protect them, in the proper exercise
226

27

Id. at 172.
3 id. at 554.

Regarding the antifederalist concern over the combination of common law, equity,
and admiralty powers in one national court, see supra note 188, Marshall failed to see
"the necessity of discriminating between the three classes. . . ." 3 Elliot, DEBATES,
supra note 182, at 555.
1"s 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 554.
229 The removal jurisdiction for suits against federal officers, now codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1442-1442a (1976), evolved gradually from a series of statutes, the first of
which was enacted in 1815. See Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198-99.
For a collection of the relevant statutes, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at
1335-38. See generally Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880) (upholding constitutionality of statute allowing for removal from state court of civil suit or criminal prosecution against an officer of the United States); Redish & Woods, supra note 3, at 8192.
230 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 571.
211 Id. at 576.
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of duty, against all opposition, whether from individuals or state
laws?" 2 ' Like many other federalists, Pendelton apparently doubted
the ability of state judges, appointed by state governments often for
fixed terms of office and sometimes dependent on state legislatures for
their salaries, to enforce federal interests even when sworn and bound
233
to do so under the commands of the supremacy clause.

232

Id. at 548.

See infra text accompanying notes 305-10, discussing The FederalistNo. 78,
in which Hamilton defends the necessity of judicial independence for the exercise of the
function of judicial review. These arguments by supporters of the Constitution suggest
that certain current members of the United States Supreme Court may be historically
mistaken in suggesting that state judges should be assumed to be as competent and as
qualified as federal judges finally to resolve federal question cases.
For example, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), Justice Powell said:
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of the
view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate the
Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair
and competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights.
The argument is that state courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth
Amendment values through fair application of the rule, and the oversight
jurisdiction of this Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The
principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the
respective institutional settings within which federal judges and state
judges operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges
in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general
lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, like federal courts, have a
constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.
Id. at 493-94 n.35. Justice Powell's comments ignore the point stressed by many of the
framers-the lack of complete judicial independence of many state judges due to limited
terms of office, dependency on appointment or election, and, in some cases, legislative
control of state judicial salaries. While these problems may be less serious today than
they were in 1789, the lack of complete judicial independence of state judges remains a
problem which Justice Powell's comments misstate. Concern is not so much with the
veracity or professional competency of state judges, but rather with their survivability,
given their institutional setting, if they vigorously enforce the supremacy of federal law
and federal constitutional rights against recalcitrant state legislators or executive
officials.
One federalist supporter of the Constitution put the point quite nicely in his anonymous Letter from a Landholder, No. 5, published in the Connecticut Courant and
other New England newspapers on December 3, 1787. He wrote:
State judges may be corrupt, and juries may be prejudiced and ignorant,
but these instances are not common; and why shall we suppose that they
will be more frequent under a national appointment and influence, when
the eyes of a whole empire are watching for their detection.
Their courts are not to intermeddle with your internal policy and will
have cognizance only of those subjects which are placed under the control
of a national legislature. It is as necessary there should be courts of law
and executive officers, to carry into effect the laws of the nation, as that
there be courts and officers to execute the laws made by your state assemblies. There are many reasons why their decisions ought not to be left to
223
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These federalist comments defending the judicial article as necessary to enforce federal supremacy are significant because they evidence
the reasons for federalist distrust of state courts in enforcing national
courts instituted by particular states.
A perfect uniformity must be observed thro the whole Union, or jealousy and unrighteousness will take place; and for a uniformity, one judiciary must pervade the whole. The inhabitants of one state will not have
confidence in judges appointed by the legislature of another state, in which
they have no voice. Judges who owe their appointment and support to one
state will be unduly influenced and not reverence the laws of the Union. It
will at any time be in the power of the smallest state, by interdicting their
own judiciary, to defeat the measures, defraud the revenue, and annul the
most sacred laws of the whole empire. A legislative power without a judicial and executive under their own control is in the nature of things a
nullity. Congress under the old Confederation had power to ordain and
resolve, but having no judicial or executive of their own, their most solemn
resolves were totally disregarded.
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 167, at 476, 483-84; see also infra note 317
and accompanying text.
Similarly, in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), Chief Justice
Marshall echoed these sentiments:
In many states, the judges are dependent for office and for salary on the
will of the legislature . . . . When we observe the importance which that
constitution attaches to the independence of judges, we are the less inclined
to suppose that it can have intended to leave these constitutional questions
to tribunals where this independence may not exist, in all cases where a
state shall prosecute an individual who claims the protection of an act of
congress . . . . [A] constitution is framed for ages to come . . . . Its
course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tempests,
and its framers must be unwise statesmen indeed, if they have not provided it, so far as its nature will permit, with the means of self-preservation from the perils it may be destined to encounter. No government ought
to be so defective in its organization, as not to contain within itself, the
means of securing the execution of its own laws against other dangers than
those which occur every day.
Id. at 386-87.
Most recently, in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50 (1982), the Supreme Court relied heavily on the necessity for judicial independence to strike down portions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 that committed the final
determination of certain state created claims in federal bankruptcy proceedings to article I bankruptcy judges who lacked judicial independence. Speaking for four members
of the Court, Justice Brennan briefly traced the history of the emphasis on judicial
independence by the framers. He noted that one of the declared grievances against the
king contained in the Declaration of Independence was that he had "made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment
of their salaries." Id. at 60 (citation omitted). Brennan concluded, "[in sum, our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial Power
of the United States' must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that
the independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that independence." Id. Prior to Northern Pipeline, Justice Powell was not alone in asserting the fungibility of article III and non-article III courts and
judges. See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389 (1973). Northern Pipeline may therefore mark a renaissance in the legal
significance of the judicial independence that the framers so highly prized.
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law and explain why the framers sought to vest mandatorily the judicial power of the United States in the federal judiciary. While the
framers had no quarrel with allowing state judges initially to decide
federal questions, state judges were not trusted sufficiently, due to their
dependence on and allegiance to state governments, to have what
Maclaine called the "exclusive jurisdiction"' " over cases of federal
magnitude. Since the Constitution did not require Congress to create
inferior federal courts, 2 ' 5 the only way to assure that the state courts
were not left with exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was to provide
an opportunity for each and every case within the judicial power of the
United States to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Furthermore,
should Congress choose to create inferior federal courts, the only way to
assure that the state courts were not left with "exclusive jurisdiction"
over the judicial power of the United States was to provide either for
appellate review of state cases in the Supreme Court or for appeals or
removal of such cases to inferior federal courts. While either course
would be constitutionally permissible, one or the other avenue of federal court review was required. Thus, the federalist distrust of dependent state judges explains why the framers gave no power to Congress
to adjust the powers of the national judiciary in any way other than by
distributing the judicial power among various federal courts. Lack of
confidence in the independence of state judges might further explain the
desire of some federalists to assure that the Supreme Court had the
power to review facts as well as law. 3 8
The federalist responses to the attacks on the diversity jurisdiction
were somewhat varied, although none suggested that Congress could
simply curtail such authority. In the Pennsylvania convention, James
Wilson, a leading figure in the drafting of article III, offered an important and detailed defense of the breadth of federal jurisdiction. He relied heavily on the view that jurisdiction over certain sensitive areas
affecting international or transstate relationships must be vested in "the
General Court, where the unequal and partial laws of a particular
state would have had no force. ' 28 7 His defense of the national courts'
jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states, and
between a state, or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subI ' See supra note 226.

238 See supra notes 56-60 & 169 and accompanying text.
2" See supra note 206. Alexander Contee Hanson of Maryland, for example, belittled the vaunted value of the jury trial, while defending the power of the Supreme
Court to review facts. He noted that jurors whose only qualifications are "property and
ripe age, may more probably incur the importation of weakness, partiality, or undue
influence." Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 21, at 238.
237 2 Elliot, DEBATEs, supra note 182, at 495.
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jects, indicated that he not only sought a neutral forum, but also anticipated that federal courts would apply impartial national laws rather
than state law in such cases:2 38
[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either public or
private credit, that foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a
just and impartial tribunal to which they may resort? I
would ask how a merchant must feel to have his property lie
at the mercy of the laws of Rhode Island. I ask, further,
How will a creditor feel who had his debts at the mercy of
tender laws in other states? It is true that, under this Constitution, these particular iniquities may be restrained in future; but, sir, there are other ways of avoiding payment of
debts. There have been installment acts, and other acts of a
similar effect. Such things, sir, destroy the very sources of
credit.2 3
With similar attention to economic concerns, Pendleton of Virginia also
defended the diversity jurisdiction on the ground that federal adjudication would avoid hostile anticreditor laws which delayed repayment
through unanticipated installments or moratoriums or forced creditors
to accept paper money or other forms of repayment worth less than the
amount owed.2 4 °
Offering a lukewarm defense of diversity jurisdiction, Madison
said, "I will not say it is a matter of much importance" and thought
that it might safely have been left to state courts.2 1 He argued, however, that "a strong prejudice may arise, in some states, against the
citizens of others," that the administration of justice was "tardy, and
even defective" in some states and therefore "[a] citizen of another state
might not chance to get justice in a state court, and at all events he
might think himself injured. '242 Marshall also only mildly defended
diversity jurisdiction, which he said might not be "absolutely necessary" but which allowed "the citizen of another state [to] obtain justice
. See supra notes 220 & 240. This evidence casts considerable doubt on the
constitutional dimensions of the Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)), and Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). Such statements may in fact indicate that Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), was correctly decided insofar as it suggested that the federal courts had the
power and, indeed, perhaps the duty, to apply federal law to a case within their jurisdiction in the absence of a controlling federal statute, like the Rules of Decision Act, to
the contrary.
"0 2 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 491-92.
"0 3 id. at 549; see also 2 id. at 491-92 (comments of James Wilson).
241 3 id. at 533.
242 Id.
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'
without applying to our state courts."24
Indeed, he curiously suggested
that diversity jurisdiction "may be necessary with respect to the laws
244
and regulations of commerce, which Congress may make.
Responding to fears of infringements of state sovereign immunity
from the clause authorizing federal jurisdiction "in controversies between a state and citizens of another state," Madison said the objection
was "without reason" since "[tihe only operation it can have, is that, if
a state should wish to bring suit against a citizen, it must be brought
before the federal court,"' 24 5 a construction contradicted by statements of
other framers during the ratification debates.2 46 Marshall also defended
the grant of federal court jurisdiction over suits against states. He said,
"It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of
individuals residing in other states."2 47 By contrast, Wilson thought
that the grant of such authority properly abrogated the sovereign immunity of the states in actions governed by the grant of jurisdiction.
In addition to attacking the breadth of jurisdiction committed by
article III to the federal courts, antifederalists, like Grayson of Virginia, feared that the federal courts would necessarily come into conflict
with the local judiciaries.2 4 8 He said, "The interference of the federal
judiciary and the state courts will involve the most serious and even
ludicrous consequences. Both courts are to act on the same persons and
things, and cannot possibly avoid interference."' 9 Some antifederalists,
like Luther Martin, predicated much of their argument upon the assumption that the exercise of the judicial power of the United States
was exclusively confined to federal courts2 50 and might therefore "swallow up the state jurisdiction. 25 1 Most of the antifederalist argument
was aimed at the congressional power to create inferior federal courts,
an attack that was truly ironic since this congressional power was
shaped in the Madisonian compromise at the Philadelphia Convention
principally to respond to state autonomy concerns.2
Federalist supporters of the Constitution responded that the authority granted Congress to create inferior federal courts would not an214Id. at 556.
244
245
246
247

248
249
150
151
"2

Id.
Id. at 533.

See, e.g., 2 id. at 491-93 (comments of James Wilson).
3 id. at 555.
See supra note 193.
See id.
See supra note 189.
See supra note 190.
See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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nihilate the state courts, as the antifederalists argued.25 Pendleton argued that if the Constitution had set or confined the number of inferior
federal courts, "there it would remain; nor could it be increased or diminished, as circumstances would render it necessary." 2 He noted
that continuing population movements westward might create the necessity of establishing federal courts for new federal territories, thereby
"prov[ing] that it is better to leave them unsettled, than fixed in the
Constitution.

255

Madison stressed that the jurisdiction of the federal courts was
limited to a small category of cases of important national concern and
therefore would not operate to destroy the state courts. He said:
in the ordinary state of things, I believe that any gentleman
will think that the far greater number of causes-ninetynine out of a hundred-will remain with the state judiciaries. All controversies directly between citizen and citizen will
remain with the local courts. The number of cases within the
jurisdiction of these [national] courts is very small when
compared to those in which the local tribunals will have
cognizance.25 8
Marshall, too, noted the continuing jurisdiction of the state courts
over the cases already within their cognizance and their concurrent jurisdiction over the controversies comprising the judicial power of the
United States. He asked, "does the gentleman think that the state
courts will have no cognizance of cases not mentioned here? Are there
any words in this Constitution which exclude the courts of the states
from those cases which they now possess?"'2 5 Answering his own questions, he continued, "the case is so clear, that to prove it would be a
useless waste of time. The state courts will not lose the jurisdiction of
the causes they now decide. They have a concurrence of jurisdiction
with the federal courts in those cases in which the latter have cognizance."'2 " In the North Carolina convention, Maclaine argued that he
could not "see how the states are to be consolidated" 25 9 by the establishment of a federal judiciary. He believed that "[tihe laws can, in
general, be executed by the officers of the states. State courts and state
I" See, e.g., 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 521 (comments of George
Mason).
25
255
2"

257
2M
2'

Id. at 547.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 553.

Id. at 554.
4 id. at 139.
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officers will, for the most part, probably answer the purpose of Congress as well as any other. 26 0 Governor Johnson of North Carolina
also stated the prevailing federalist assumption that the federal courts
would "have concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts, and not exclusive jurisdiction."2 1 Thus, he could "see nothing in this Constitution
which hinders a man from bringing suit wherever he thinks he can
26 2
have justice done him.
Pendleton of Virginia, noting the congressional power over the
structure of the inferior federal courts, attempted to ameliorate antifederalist concerns by inaccurately predicting that "it [was] highly probable that their first experiment [would] be, to appoint the state courts to
have the inferior federal jurisdiction, because it would be best calculated to give general satisfaction, and answer economical purposes;
since a small additional salary may in that case suffice, instead of competent provision for the judges."2 6 '
The antifederalist argument regarding the expense and inconvenience of a federal judiciary was really a two-edged sword. If the national judiciary remained small and centered in the nation's capitol, it
would be distant from the people and expensive and inconvenient for
parties and witnesses. Such expense and inconvenience, of course,
would be exacerbated if the Supreme Court's review of facts required
witnesses to travel long distances to the seat of government. 2 On the
other hand, if the Congress chose to increase the convenience and accessibility of federal courts by establishing a sizable number of dispersed
inferior courts, the expense of the federal judiciary to the taxpayers
would, it was argued, outstrip its utility. Not surprisingly, few federalists addressed both prongs of the argument simultaneously, preferring
instead to deal with one or the other of these arguments or finding
some way out of the dilemma they created. Pendleton's idea of having
Congress appoint state judges as federal judges with a small supplemental salary 265 may be seen as an example of the search for a way out
of this logical quagmire.
Most leading federalists viewed the fears of expense and inconvenience as exaggerated and subject to amelioration by the power of Congress to create inferior federal courts, a power curiously also opposed
by the antifederalists. Some suggested that the Congress could avoid
260 Id. at 140.
261 Id. at 141.
262

Id.

263

3 id. at 517.

"

See supra notes 194-95.

265 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 517.
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costs and inconveniences by having the Supreme Court, rather than the
litigants, travel-in effect suggesting that the justices ride circuit.
Madison, for example, noted the congressional power to create inferior
federal courts and suggested that, as in the trials of piracies and felonies
on the high seas under the Confederation, the Congress might vest the
initial trial and appeals of such cases in the state courts if they are "on
2
a good footing" without necessarily multiplying the federal courts. "
He pointed out that while the admiralty Court of Appeals under the
Confederation was "at first stationary," "it soon became a regulation
that this court should be held in different parts of America, and it was
held accordingly." '
The power to create inferior courts was, however, also opposed by
the antifederalists. Marshall noted the inconsistency in this antifederalist position, stating:
I had an apprehension that those gentlemen who placed no
confidence in Congress would object that there might be no
inferior courts. I own that I thought those gentlemen would
think there would be no inferior courts, as it depended on
the will of Congress, but that we should be dragged to the
centre of the Union. But I did not conceive that the power of
increasing the number of courts could be objected to by any
gentlemen, as it would remove the inconvenience of being
dragged to the centre of the United States. I own that the
power of creating a number of courts is, in my estimation, so
far from being a defect, that it seems necessary to the perfection of this system."
Marshall's comments reflect not only his lack of fear of expense
generated by the proposed federal judicial establishment but also, possibly, an underlying assumption about the mandatory nature of federal
jurisdiction. If Congress had complete control and discretion over the
scope of jurisdiction of the federal courts and could leave thefinal resolution of any matter within the judicial power of the United States to
the state courts, the power to create inferior federal courts would not
have been necessary to avoid the inconvenience of being dragged to the
Supreme Court in the "centre of the United States." Rather, Congress
could avoid such inconvenience by leaving many or most matters to be
resolved finally by the state courts. The fact that Marshall only indicates that such inconvenience can be avoided by creating inferior federal
S3 Id. at 536.

s$ Id.
2"
Id. at 552-53.
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courts may indicate that at the time of the Virginia convention he regarded jurisdiction of the federal courts as vested and mandatory under
the Constitution, notwithstanding his somewhat more expansive comments in the context of the discussion of the civil jury trial issues.26 9 If
this reading of Marshall's views is accurate, his comment on congressional power to protect civil jury trial by excepting Supreme Court appellate review both as to law and fact may have referred only to exceptions made in favor of inferior federal courts.
It is evident from this discussion that the congressional discretion
over whether to create inferior federal courts and, if created, the power
over the scope of their jurisdiction was almost universally assumed and
applauded by the federalists."' This fact further demonstrates the error
69 This observation would add further weight to the view that Marshall's comments on the exceptions and regulations clause (construing that clause to allow Congress to make alterations and diminutions in the jurisdiction of the federal courts) were
in fact overstated in order to respond to antifederalist critics of the judicial article. See
supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
270 See, e.g., 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 552-53 (comments of John
Marshall); Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 21, at 342-44 (comments of James Iredell of
North Carolina, writing as Marcus).
Alexander Contee Hanson of Maryland did, however, venture a different opinion.
Writing under the pseudonym Aristides, Hanson said,
I am however fully persuaded, that, as the article speaks of an original
and appellate jurisdiction, of a supreme court, and inferior courts; and, as
there is no intention of appeals from the several state tribunals, the inferior federal courts are intended to have original jurisdiction in all cases,
wherein the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction; and the appeal lies
only from them. I can, almost, with confidence, maintain, that, as there is
no express clause, or necessary implication, to oust the jurisdiction of the
state courts, an action, after the adoption of the plan, may be instituted in
any court, having, at this time, a jurisdiction. And if an action be brought
in a state court, I do not, at present, perceive, that it can, in any manner,
be transferred to the supreme or inferior federal court.

Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 21, at 236. Hanson, who had not attended the Philadelphia Convention, but who would later serve as a delegate to the Maryland ratification
convention, obviously erred in his understanding of the document. The Madisonian
compromise clearly contemplated both congressional discretion over the existence and
structure of inferior federal courts and also envisioned the appeal of cases originating in
the state courts to the United States Supreme Court. Hanson was, however, in good
company in his misconceptions, since Justice Story would later echo some of the very
same arguments offered by Hanson. See supra notes 19-20.
In THE FEDERAUST No. 81, at 546 (A. Hamilton) (J.Cooke ed. 1961), Hamilton
stated:
This power has been absurdly represented as intended to abolish all the
county courts in the several states, which are commonly called inferior
courts. But the expressions of the constitution are to constitute "tribunals
INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT," and the evident design of
the provision is to enable the institution of local courts subordinate to the
supreme, either in states or larger districts. It is ridiculous to imagine that
county courts were in contemplation.
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of the arguments respectively offered by Justice Story27 1 and, later,
Professor Goebel,2 72 either that jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts
constitutionally must comprise the entire judicial power of the United
States or, at least, that the creation of such courts was constitutionally
mandated.
For the most part, the federalists rapidly disposed of or dismissed
antifederalist concerns about the retroactivity of federal jurisdiction,
seemingly unimpressed by these concerns. Referring to Mason's concerns about unsettling land titles to the Northern Neck of Virginia and
elsewhere, Randolph dismissed the argument, saying, "I ask the Convention of the free people of Virginia if there can be honesty in rejecting the government because justice is to be done by it? . . . Are we
to say that we shall discard this government because it would make us
all honest?"217 Marshall noted that Mason had "acknowledged that
there was no complete title" and that in light of the independence of
federal judges and their sworn obligation to do justice, Mason had no
reason "to apprehend partiality or injustice. "274 Marshall did suggest
during the debate that if the descendants of Lord Fairfax should use
the federal courts the dispute would be resolved according to the laws
of the state of Virginia, 75 a particularly ironic statement in light of
later developments in the dispute.27 6
Despite federalist arguments, some state conventions were sufficiently concerned about the potential breadth of federal court jurisdiction that they proposed to limit it by constitutional amendment. Many
271 See supra notes 20-21.
172 See supra note 169.
178

3 Elliot,

274
27
276

Id. at 559.

DEBATES,

supra note 182, at 575.

Id.

In Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), the
Supreme Court reversed a ruling of the Virginia Court of Appeals which had held that
Lord Fairfax's lands had been validly confiscated under Virginia law prior to the Peace
Treaty of 1783 and the Jay Treaty of 1794, each of which contained guarantees against
future confiscations of the property of British subjects. In reversing, the Supreme Court
seemed to ignore the Virginia court's determination on the crucial issue of the time of
confiscation of the Fairfax lands, apparently applying an independent federal law test
to the question, since it involved the enforcement of federal treaty rights. Even then, the
Court's decision seemed to ignore the language of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 which provided that "no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a grounds of
revershl in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the fact of the record,
and immediately respects the before mentioned questions of the validity or construction
of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 86 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1976)). This case set up the classic confrontation between the Virginia Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court which produced Justice Story's famous
opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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states proposed an express protection of civil jury trial,277 a proposal
that culminated in the adoption of the seventh amendment by the First
Congress.27 8 Massachusetts proposed to limit diversity jurisdiction by a
jurisdictional amount, while New Hampshire's convention proposed
that all diversity cases should be brought exclusively in state courts
with an appeal to the Supreme Court only in common law actions
where the amount in controversy was three thousand dollars or
more.' 79 New York sought an amendment which would have limited
federal jurisdiction over land controversies solely to claims of territory
or jurisdiction between states and to disputes between individuals
claiming under grants of different states.28 Both Rhode Island"8 1 and
Virginia2 82 proposed amendments to the document to prevent retroactive application of the judicial power of the United States to disputes
which arose prior to the ratification of the Constitution except as to
disputes between states or between individuals concerning lands
claimed by or under grants from different states and suits for debts
owed to the United States. Virginia proposed a revision of the breadth
of the judicial power which would have limited federal court jurisdiction to cases arising under federal treaties, cases affecting ambassadors,
other foreign ministers, and consuls; admiralty and maritime cases; and
controversies involving the United States, or between two or more
states, or between individuals claiming lands under grants from different states.' 83 That these states felt constitutional amendments, rather
than merely statutes enacted by Congress, were necessary to limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts is, like the later adoption of the eleventh amendment,"8 ' some evidence that the members of the state con1' See, e.g., 1 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 134, at 323 (proposal of Massachusetts).
17 U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("the right of trial by jury shall be preserved").
I Elliot, DEBATES,supra note 182, at 323, 326. A similar proposal applicable
to all cases cognizable in the federal courts was proposed by committee during the
Maryland convention. 2 id. at 550.
'" Id. at 331. New York also ratified with explicit understandings that federal
court jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of the same state claiming lands
under grants from different states was exclusively limited to the land title question, that
review in common law actions was limited to writs of error which precluded review of
facts, and that the jurisdiction of the federal courts could "not in any case . . .be
increased, enlarged or extended, by any faction, collusion, or mere suggestion; and that
no treaty is to be construed so as to operate as to alter the Constitution of any state." 1
id. at 329.
231

Id. at 336.

id. at 660-61.
Id.

2 3
283

21
The eleventh amendment was ratified in 1798, after being proposed by Congress in 1794, in order to overturn the holding of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793) (holding that the state of Georgia was amenable to suit brought by a citizen
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ventions did not readily assume the existence of congressional power
over the scope of jurisdiction of the federal courts.
While this demand for amendment, rather than statutory enactment, may have sprung from a distrust of other states or Congress,
there is a startling absence of significant suggestions that antifederalist
objections to the breadth of federal court jurisdiction could be cured by
congressional exceptions or regulations; the very few comments that
might be found hinting at such an authority are vague and inconclusive.
One somewhat inconclusive opinion to this effect was ventured by Wilson in his discussion of the power to regulate review of facts by the
Supreme Court:
There are other cases in which it [regulation] will be necessary; and will not Congress better regulate them, as they rise
from time to time, than could have been done by the Convention? Besides, if the regulations shall be attended with
inconvenience, the Congress can alter them as soon as discovered. But any thing done in Convention, must remain unalterable but by the [amendment] power of the citizens of the
United States at large.
I think these reasons will show that the powers given to
the Supreme Court are not only safe, but constitute a wise
and valuable part of the system.28 5
Tench Coxe, an influential Pennsylvanian who supported the Constitution, but who attended neither the Philadelphia Convention nor his
state ratification convention, was the only federalist who ventured a less
ambiguous view. He said that "the sphere of jurisdiction for the
faederal courts is limited, and that sphere only is subject to the regulation of our faederal government." ' His view should be discounted
somewhat, however, given the fact that his writing was informed solely
by the naked text of the document unenlightened by participation in the
debates at Philadelphia or any ratification convention. In arguing
against adoption of the Constitution, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia,
writing as "the Federal Farmer," resorted to a similar argument to
of another state in the federal courts without its consent). Nowhere in the legislative
history of the amendment is there any suggestion that Congress could accomplish the
same result and curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts over such cases by mere
legislative enactment. See generally C. JAcoBS, THE ELEVExTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVaEIGN IMMUNITY 64-74 (1972) (legislative history of the eleventh amendment
following Chisholm). Apparently, Congress simply assumed that the jurisdiction of the
federal courts had been vested in the national judiciary by the Constitution and could
be curtailed only by constitutional amendment.
"5 2 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 494 (emphasis added).
286 Ford, PAMPHLETS, supra note 21, at 150.
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exaggerate the defects of the judicial article:
By art. 3, sect. 2, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction as to law and facts with such exceptions, & c. to
what extent is it intended the exceptions shall be car-'
ried-Congress may carry them so far as to annihilate substantially the appellate jurisdiction, and the clause be ren2 87
dered of very little importance.
Phrased this boldly, it is evident why federalist supporters of the
Constitution had not generally assumed or embraced the idea of congressional power over the scope of jurisdiction of the federal judicial
establishment. The federalists intended to create a more powerful federal government, including a federal judiciary, with constitutionally assured powers which would be safe from encroachment from any hostile
source. The power of Congress anticipated by the federalists was one of
distributing judicial power, not controlling its exercise. Indeed, Noah
Webster, a noted Pennsylvania attorney who vigorously supported the
Constitution, nicely captured the distributive purposes of the congressional power in published remarks written within a month after adjournment of the Philadelphia Convention:
[T]he truth is, the creation of all inferior courts is in the
power of Congress; and the constitution provides that Congress may make such exceptions from the right of appeals as
they shall judge proper. When these courts are erected, their
jurisdictions will be ascertained, and in small actions, Congress will doubtless direct that a sentence in a subordinate
court shall, to a certain amount, be definite and final. All
objection therefore to the judicial power of the federal courts
2
appear to me as trifling as any of the preceding. "
As Noah Webster's statement suggests, the federalists generally responded to antifederalist concerns about the potentiality of the national
judiciary to supersede and annihilate the state courts by suggesting that
such fears were unfounded and premature, rather than by suggesting
any congressional power to cure the problem by curtailing the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
One aspect of the antifederalists' expense argument-the concern
over the multiplication of appeals in insignificant cases-did, however,
prompt some concessions from the federalists. A case could presumably
be insignificant either because a trifling amount was in controversy or
287
288

Id. at 311.
Id. at 53-54.
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because the issues were somehow of minimal federal concern, as, for
example, where the state courts had honored federal supremacy and
enforced national law, rather than conflicting state law. More often
than not, the discussion of such problems during the ratification process
focused on insignificance in terms of amount in controversy.'" Later, a
few federalists ventured the view that Congress might limit appeals in
insignificant cases by its power of making exceptions and regulations
for the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This suggestion was inconsistent with the distributive purposes of the clause, although such comments may have been made against an unarticulated assumption that
less significant cases could be relegated to the inferior federal courts-a
position perfectly consistent with the original distributive purposes of
the exceptions and regulations clause.
Randolph in this context again evidenced his desire further to limit
and define the judicial article by suggesting that under the exceptions
and regulations clause "the sum on which appeals will be allowed may
be limited to a considerable amount, in order to prevent vexatious and
oppressive appeals."29 0 Pendleton suggested that the congressional
power to regulate amounts in controversy under the exceptions and regulations clause even extended to the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. While he argued, possibly erroneously,"9 1 that the enumeration of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction "excludes its original jurisdiction in all other cases," he nevertheless indicated that the original jurisdiction "will not restrain Congress from regulating even these, so as to
permit foreign ambassadors to sue in the inferior courts, or even to
compel them to do so, where their causes may be trivial, or they have
no reason to expect a partial trial." 9 ' Later he remarked:
The appeals may be limited to a certain sum. I make no
doubt it will be so. You cannot prevent appeals without great
inconveniences; but Congress can prevent that dreadful oppression which would enable many men to have a trial in the
federal court, which is ruinous. There is a power which may
be considered as a great security. The power of making what
regulations and exceptions in appeals they may think proper
289 For example, New Hampshire's convention proposed limiting appeals to the
Supreme Court in common law actions to cases involving three thousand dollars or
more, a considerable sum in 1787 dollars. I Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 326.
Massachusetts proposed limiting diversity jurisdiction to matters in which the dispute
exceeded three thousand dollars for the Supreme Court and fifteen hundred dollars for
the inferior federal courts. Id. at 323.
290 3 id. at 576.
2"1 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
292 3 Elliot, DEBATES, supra note 182, at 518 (emphasis added).
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may be so contrived as to render appeals, as to law and fact,
proper, and perfectly inoffensive.29
Pendleton, noting the distances of some of the eastern and southern states from the nation's center, assured antifederalists that when
Congress organized the Supreme Court "they will regulate it [the appellate jurisdiction] so as to exclude this danger." 94 While Pendleton's
comments may only suggest the limitation of appeals in insignificant
cases infavor of decision by inferiorfederalcourts-a position perfectly
consistent with the original distributive purposes of the exceptions and
regulations clause-some of his broader comments, like those of Randolph, might not be so limited.
3.

Some Illuminating Comments from the Sidelines

Some of the more provocative, yet almost wholly ignored, evidence
of the disposition of leading federalists to protect the powers of the judiciary from absolute control by the legislature, is found in comments
made by Madison on a constitutional plan drafted by Jefferson for the
proposed state of Kentucky. While these statements are not directly addressed to the national Constitution, they evidence Madison's concern
with preventing the legislature from exercising unfettered control over
the jurisdiction of the courts. They must be read, however, in light of
the fact that they were addressed to a state court system intended to
have broad plenary jurisdiction, unlike the deliberately limited jurisdiction given to the federal courts under article III. Madison wrote that
"[m]uch detail ought to [be] avoided in the constitutional regulation of
[the judicial] department, that there may be room for changes which
may be demanded by the progressive changes in the state of our population. 129 5 From the context, it is apparent that Madison wanted flexibility in the structural features of the state courts so that the number of
judges and courts could be altered as experience and necessity directed.
He then continued: "It is at least doubtful whether . . . even the

boundaries of Jurisdiction ought to be made unalterable but by a revisal of the Constitution. 29 6 He explained his greater concerns about
protecting jurisdiction in the following terms:
The precaution [of constitutional vesting of jurisdiction]
seems no otherwise necessary than as it may prevent sudden
293

294

Id. at 520.

Id.

295

11

2"

Id.

THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON

290 (A. Rutland ed. 1977).
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modifications of the establishment, or additions of obsequious
Judges, for the purpose of evad[in]g the checks of the Constn. & giv[in]g effect to some similar policy of the Legiere.
But might not the same object be any innovations in those
particulars without the annual sanction of two or three successive assemblies; over & above the other pre-requisites to
the passage of a law. 9 "
This comment is remarkable. First, it anticipates by nearly two centuries Franklin Delano Roosevelt's court-packing plan and the proposals
during the twentieth century to curtail federal court jurisdiction. 8 Second, it evidences Madison's unwillingness to allow the legislature to
evade the constitutional checks on its power by the simple expedient of
legislatively divesting the courts of jurisdiction. Third, Madison does
suggest that it might be possible to devise extraordinary structural
means short of constitutional amendment to protect the jurisdictional
autonomy of the judiciary while simultaneously affording the flexibility
of change by legislative control. No such extraordinary structural devices, however, were built into the federal Constitution. This observation makes it unlikely that Madison, probably the single most important figure in the framing of the Constitution, would have sat quietly
through both the Philadelphia Convention and the Virginia ratification
convention without raising a question or objection if he believed that
the Constitution vested in Congress legislative control over the scope of
jurisdiction of the federal courts. While rather indirect, these comments
by Madison add further weight to the observation that the framers understood article III to vest the federal judicial establishment
mandatorily and constitutionally with the whole of the judicial power
of the United States.
4.

The Federalist Papers: Vital Commentary from the Framers

The FederalistPapers99 were the longest and most detailed examination of the Constitution during the ratification process. Written
principally for the purpose of influencing the New York ratification
process, The FederalistPapers did not, unlike most of the contemporaneous debate over ratification, confine their discourse to pointed rejoin2
298

Id.

See generally J. ALsop & T.

CATLEDGE, THE

168 DAYS (1938); J. BURNS,
supra note 4, at

ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox ch. 15 (1956); G. GUNTHER,

150-52; Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'Court-PackingPlan,'
1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347.
299

THE FEDERALIST (U. Cooke

ed. 1961).
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ders to antifederalist attacks on the document. Rather, The Federalist
Papers ventured into lengthy and erudite discussions of political theory
and structure, and coherent presentations of the meaning and interrelationship of the various sections of the Constitution. Such breadth of
vision not only accounts for their length, but also explains the reason
they have become an invaluable primer to American political thought,
and the classic exposition on the meaning of the Constitution."'
The FederalistPapers paint an organized and structured picture
of the meaning of and justification for the provisions of article III.
Madison, for example, evidenced his dislike for legislative encroachments on court jurisdiction. In The FederalistNo. 48, he defended the
importance of a degree of separation of powers, noting the invasion of
liberty that had occurred in the states when the principle had been
violated.30 1 The task of exploring and defending the judiciary provisions, however, fell principally to Alexander Hamilton of New York,
who had attended the Philadelphia Convention and who would later
actively support the document in the New York convention. In The
Federalist No. 22 he lamented:
A circumstance, which crowns the defects of the confederation, remains yet to be mentioned-the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound
and define their true meaning and operation. The treaties of
the United States to have any force at all, must be considered
as part of the law of the land. Their true import as far as
respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained
800 In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), Chief Justice Marshall
remarked:

The opinion of the Federalist has always being [sic] considered as of great
authority. It is a complete commentary on our constitution; and is appealed to by all parties, in the questions to which that instrument has
given birth. Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank; and the part
two of its authors performed in framing the constitution, put it very much
in their power to explain the views with which it was framed. These essays having being [sic] published, while the constitution was before the
nation for adoption or rejection, and having been written in answer to
objections founded entirely on the extent of its powers, and on its diminution of state sovereignty, are entitled to the more consideration, where they
frankly avow that the power objected to is given, and defend it.
Id. at 418-19; see also Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 280 (1878)
("[The Federalist]has ever l~een regarded as entitled to weight in any discussion as to
the true intent and meaning of the provisions of our fundamental law.").
301 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 337 (J. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961). Such
violations occurred by varying judicial salaries, despite constitutional guarantees explicitly fixing them, and by the fact that "cases belonging to the judiciary department,
[were] frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and determination." Id.
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by judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these
determinations, they ought to be submitted in the last resort,
to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to
be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable. If
there is in each State, a court of final jurisdiction, there may
be as many different final determinations on the same point,
as there are courts. There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not only different courts, but the
Judges of the same court differing from each other. To avoid
the confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicatories,
all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to the rest-possessing a general superintendance,
and authorised to settle and declare in the last resort, an uniform rule of civil justice.
This is more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded, that the laws of the whole are in
danger of being contravened by the laws of the parts. In this
case if the particular tribunals are invested with a right of
ultimate jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion, there will be much to fear
from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from the
interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there would be reason to apprehend,
that the provisions of the particular laws might be preferred
to those of the general laws; for nothing is more natural to
men in office, than to look with peculiar deference towards
that authority to which they owe their official existence.
The treaties of the United States, under the present
constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different
Legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under authority of those Legislatures. . . . Is it
possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in
such a government? Is it possible that the People of America
will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness,
their safety, on so precarious a foundation?3 2
Thus, Hamilton offered the now classic dual justifications for the establishment of a federal judiciary-assuring uniformity of federal law, and
national supremacy in areas of international, national, and transstate
so

Id. No. 22, at 143-44 (A. Hamilton).
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concern. Significantly, while most of the federalists had emphasized the
necessity of an independent federal judiciary to assure national
supremacy, Hamilton was one of the few to assert the necessity of assuring uniformity of federal law. The overall lack of concern with uniformity of federal law explains why the framers at Philadelphia authorized Congress to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in favor of the exercise of the judicial power by inferior
federal courts. The creation of those courts would preserve the
supremacy of national law in areas of international and transstate concern, while posing the possibility of divergent opinions on the meaning
of that law. Thus, despite Hamilton's pleas, it appears that the framers
made the preservation of national supremacy a matter of constitutional
imperative, while leaving the means of assuring uniformity of federal
law to congressional prerogative. 30 3
Most of Hamilton's explanation and defense of the federal judiciary is found in his five classic essays, numbers 78 through 82 in The
Federalist.s" While detailed explanation of Hamilton's arguments is
unnecessary here, a brief summary of his position and some of his more
important comments will further indicate the importance he placed on
the need for a strong, independent national judiciary and his understanding that the judicial article not only created such an institution but
constitutionally invested it with all the jurisdiction set forth in section 2
of article III.
In The FederalistNos. 78 and 79, Hamilton focused on the need
to assure judicial independence. Arguing that the judiciary was "the
weakest of the three departments of power," possessing neither the
powers of the legislature to control the purse nor the enforcement authority of the Executive ("the sword of the community"), Hamilton asserted "that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself
against their attacks."' 5 He then proceeded to argue that complete independence of the judiciary was necessary, since that department exercised the check of judicial review on the other branches of government,
and "the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a
limited constitution against legislative encroachments." ' 0 6 In the course
of his explanation Hamilton made many of the same arguments to deSo See supra text accompanying note 134; see also notes 19 & 22 and accompanying text. But see supra note 233 (comments of "Landholder"). After rejecting some of
the important historical materials, Professor Sager, nevertheless, comes to a similar conclusion by a rather nonhistorical mode of analysis. See Sager, supra nqte 3, at 55-57,
67-68.
304 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-82, at 521-57 (A. Hamilton) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
305 Id. No. 78, at 522-23.
306 Id. at 526.
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fend the institution of judicial review that Chief Justice Marshall
07
Hamilton also noted that
would later parrot in Marbury v. Madison.1
while the people can always alter or abolish the established Constitution, "yet it is not to be inferred from this principle, that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay
hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions
in the existing constitution, would on that account be justifiable in a
violation of those provisions." 8 " Thus, "[u]ntil the people have by some
solemn and authoritative act annulled or changed the established form,
it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and
no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant
their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act." 309
These views not only demonstrate Hamilton's recognition of the potential anti-majoritarian impacts of judicial reyiew,310 they also evidence
the unlikelihood that he would have quietly settled for or supported a
Constitution which left the scope of federal jurisdiction to the discretion
of transient legislative majorities in Congress.
In The Federalist No. 80 Hamilton defended the extent of the
judicial power set forth in section 2 of article III. He argued that the
judicial power would be divided into six categories of cases: (1) those
that arise under federal laws, (2) those "which concern the execution of
the provisions expressly contained in the articles of union," (3) those to
which the United States is a party, (4) "those which involve the
PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States themselves," (5) those which originate on the high seas
or are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, and (6) "those in which
the state tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial or unbiassed."' 11
307
303
309

5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
Cooke ed. 1961).
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 527 (A. Hamilton) (J.
Id. at 527-28.

Hamilton, however, tended to dismiss the dangers inherent in judicial review.
In The Federalist he commented:
It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary
encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been upon many
occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom. Particular misconstructions
and contraventions of the will of the legislature may now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience,
or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the political system. This
may be inferred with certainty from the general nature of the judicial
power; from the objects to which it relates; from the manner in which it is
exercised; from its comparative weakness, and from its total incapacity to
support its usurpations by force.
Id. No. 81, at 545. See generally Clinton, supra note 11, at 711, 723-25.
311THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534 (A. Hamilton) U. Cooke ed. 1961).
310
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He then separately defended the commitment of each class of cases to
federal cognizance. Nowhere in his description is there any hint of legislative control over the scope of this jurisdiction, despite the fact that
this would have been the logical place to discuss such powers if they
had been contemplated.
In The FederalistNos. 81 and 82, Hamilton dealt with the "partition of the judiciary authority between different courts." ' He noted
that independence of the judicial department was better assured in the
proposed Constitution, since that department was "composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of the branches of legislature, as in the government of Great-Britain, and in that of this state
[New York]." ' He applauded such separation because, under the contrary system, "the natural propensity of su6h [legislative] bodies to
party divisions" would create "no less reason to fear, that the pestilen3
tial breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice" s"-words
not
exactly favorable to legislative control of judicial powers. Indeed, he
rejected the argument that an independent judiciary might encroach
upon legislative authority, stating that the legislative power of impeachment (not control of judicial powers) could keep the judges from usurping the powers of other branches of government.3 1 5
It was only in connection with the distribution of powers among
federal courts that Hamilton discussed any congressional control over
the courts. He explained and justified the power of Congress to create
inferior federal courts by stating that it "is evidently calculated to obviate the necessity of having recourse to the supreme court, in every case
of federal cognizance. "3 ' This comment is clear evidence of Hamilton's
Id. No. 81, at 541.
Id. at 543.
314 Id. at 544.
315 Id. at 545-46.
3'" Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
At the end of The FederalistNo. 82, Hamilton concluded his defense of the power
312

313

of the Supreme Court to review both law and fact by noting that the appellate jurisdic-

tion of the Supreme Court to review law and fact was "subject to any exceptions and
regulationswhich might be thought advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction does in no
case abolish the trial by jury, and that an ordinary degree of prudence and integrity in
the national councils will insure us solid advantages from the establishment of the proposed judiciary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences which have been
predicted from that source." Id. No. 82, at 552. Taken out of context, the first portion
of this statement might be thought to suggest a broader congressional power over the
scope of the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. That construction would be inconsistent with Hamilton's other explanations of the judicial article, particularly his discussion in The FederalistNo. 82. Read in context, moreover, it appears that Hamilton
was making no broader claim than that Congress had the authority to protect the institution of trial by jury by curtailing the power of the Court to review facts on appeal in
common law actions-a claim offered by many federalists during the ratification
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understanding of the distributive nature of the congressional power over
the federal court jurisdiction. If federal court jurisdiction were subject
to the complete plenary power of Congress, as dicta in some cases suggest, then there would be no "necessity" of resorting to the Supreme
Court. The final decision in such cases might simply be left to state
tribunals by Congress. Such a result would not, however, necessarily
assure either uniformity or the supremacy of the national government
in areas of international or transstate concern. That Hamilton thought
there was such "necessity" indicates that he believed the federal court
jurisdiction to be mandatory and the congressional power to be limited
to distributing the judicial power of the United States among national
courts-a result consistent with Hamilton's concern with assuring national supremacy.
Indeed, while arguing against the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction, Hamilton rejected the notion that the final resolution of cases
within the judicial power of the United States should be left to state
courts. He wrote:
But why, it is asked, might not the same purpose have
been accomplished by the instrumentality of the state courts?
This admits of different answers. Though the fitness and
competency of those courts should be allowed in the utmost
latitude; yet the substance of the power in question [to create
inferior federal courts], may still be regarded as a necessary
part of the plan, if it were only to empower the national
legislature to commit to them the cognizance of causes arising out of the national constitution. To confer the power of
determining such causes upon the existing courts of the several states, would perhaps be as much "to constitute tribunals," as to create new courts with the like powers. But
ought not a more direct and explicit provision to have been
made in favour of the state courts? There are, in my opinion,
substantial reasons against such a provision: The most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local
spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the
jurisdiction of national causes; whilst every man may discover that courts constituted like those of some of the states,
would be improper channels of the judicial authority of the
union. State judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or
from year to year, will be too little independent to be relied
upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws. And if
period.
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there was a necessity for confiding the original cognizance of
causes arising under those laws to them, there would be a
correspondent necessity for leaving the door of appeal as
wide as possible. 17
It would be hard to find a clearer argument justifying the reasons that
the judicial power was mandatorily vested in the federal courts.318 In a
like vein, Hamilton later argued:
Here another question occurs-what relation would
subsist between the national and state courts in these instances of concurrent jurisdiction? I answer that an appeal
would certainly lie from the latter to the supreme court of
the United States. The constitution in direct terms, gives an
appellate jurisdiction to the supreme court in all the enumerated cases of federal cognizance, in 'which it is not to
have an original one; without a single expression to confine
its operation to the inferior federal courts. 1 '
317

Id. No. 81, at 546-47.

One perplexing comment was offered by Hamilton in the context of explaining
that state courts would exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the categories of cases comprising the judicial power of the United States. Hamilton said:
318

The only thing in the proposed constitution, which wears the appearance of confining the causes of federal cognizance to the federal courts is
contained in this passage-"The JUDICIAL POWER of the United
States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as
congress shall from time to time ordain and establish." This might either
be construed to signify, that the supreme and subordinate courts of the
union should alone have the power of deciding those causes, to which their
authority is to extend; or simply to denote that the organs of the national
judiciary should be one supreme court and as many subordinate courts as
congress should think proper to appoint, or in other words, that the
United States should exercise the judicial power with which they are to be
invested through one supreme tribunal and a certain number of inferior
ones to be instituted by them. The first excludes, the last admits the concurrent jurisdiction of the state tribunals: And as the first would amount
to an alienation of state power by implication, the last appears to me the
most natural and the most defensible construction.
Id. No. 82, at 554 (emphasis added). Hamilton's comment that the federal courts
"should exercise the judicial power with which they are to be invested" might suggest
that Hamilton contemplated some future congressional action to invest the federal
courts with jurisdiction. This construction of Hamilton's words, however, seems incorrect. Hamilton, rather, may have used the future tense in order to indicate that the
constitutionally vested jurisdiction of the federal courts would not take effect until the
ratification of the Constitution. This latter construction of Hamilton's language is supported by Hamilton's use of the future tense earlier in the paragraph to refer to "the
power of deciding those causes, to which their authority is to extend" and from Hamilton's other comments discussed in this section.
$19 Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, Hamilton voiced the argument offered by other federalists that the exceptions and regulations clause authorized Congress to
prevent Supreme Court review of facts in common law cases tried to a
jury. He rejected the antifederalist assumption that Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to review both law and fact authorized it to review
facts tried to a jury, since "[tihe mode of [review] may depend on ancient custom or legislative provision, (in a new government it must depend on the latter)" and concluded that "it does not follow that the reexamination of a fact once ascertained by a jury, will be permitted in
the supreme court." 2 ' Nevertheless, he urged that any such review was
subject to "such exceptions and regulations as the national legislature
may prescribe" and "[t]his will enable the government to modify [Supreme Court review of facts] in such a manner as will best answer the
ends of public justice and security." 2 1 Even then, Hamilton thought
the legislative power limited: "it should [not] be thought too extensive,
it might be qualified with a limitation to such causes only as are deter3 22
minable at common law in that mode of trial.
In short, Hamilton's explanations and defense of the judiciary article in The Federalistdemonstrate his understanding of the mandatory
nature of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Hamilton summed up
this conclusion in an important sentence which appeared in the debates
over the judiciary article: "The evident aim of the plan of the convention is that all the causes of the specified classes, shall for weighty public reasons receive their original or final determination in the courts of
the union."32"
C.

The Role of the Ratification Process in Ascertaining Original
Understanding

While ascertaining the intent of a multimember body is always a
perilous task due in part to the possibility of multiple, divergent views
and the difficulty of explaining the votes of all members on a particular
issue merely from the outcome, 2 ascertaining the original intent behind any clause of the Constitution is particularly difficult. Not only
must the investigation survey the debates and votes at the Philadelphia
Convention, but it must also ascertain the understanding of the vast
number of delegates to the state ratification conventions who supported

31

Id. No. 81, at 550.
Id. at 552.

322

Id.

320

Id. No. 82, at 556.
See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60
B.U.L. REv. 204, 212-17 (1980).
323
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the document. Where the evidence suggests a convergence of viewpoint
between the drafters at Philadelphia and the delegates to the state conventions, the process is, of course, simplified. Where, however, one
finds a divergence of viewpoints at these two stages, the question
emerges as to which original understanding is legally significant-the
original intent of the delegates at Philadelphia or the understanding of
the members of the state conventions that ratified the document.
Fortunately, for most of the issues raised in this Article, this dilemma is avoided, since there seemed to be a general understanding
throughout both stages that the entirety of the federal jurisdiction must
be vested, as a matter of constitutional imperative, in the federal judicial establishment. In Philadelphia this understanding seemed to undergird almost all the debates over the judiciary article and was manifested
in the rejection by the Committee of Detail of the Randolph proposal
for limited legislative control and in the overwhelming vote on August
27 to reject congressional control. In the state conventions, it appears
that the federal court's mandatory jurisdiction was widely assumed. No
direct suggestion was ever offered clearly indicating that Congress could
delimit the classes of controversies which could be heard in both the
Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts. Rather, the debates reflected an assumption that the Constitution specified the classes of cases
which the federal courts would hear, and the congressional power over
jurisdiction was limited primarily to giving definition to the organization of the federal courts and distributing the judicial power of the
United States among the federal judicial establishment. While the
members of the state ratification conventions clearly recognized the
powers of Congress to decide upon the structure of the federal judiciary
by regulating the procedural mode of review of the Supreme Court and
by creating inferior federal courts, this congressional power over jurisdiction appeared only to have been viewed as a corollary power to distribute, rather than delimit, the judicial power in order to fulfill the
congressional authority over the shape and contours of the national
courts. This view was most directly stated by Alexander Hamilton and
Noah Webster, as already described.325 It was also nicely captured by
Pendleton of Virginia, who in responding to antifederalist concerns
about civil jury trial, urged that these concerns could be resolved under
Congress's exceptions and regulations power. He noted that in construing "general words of this sort" the delegates should "give them that
distributive interpretation, and liberal explication, which will not make
"I See supra notes 288, 302-23 and accompanying text.
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them mischievous."$2" In short, neither the federalist supporters of the
Constitution at the state conventions nor the drafters of the document at
Philadelphia intended to subvert the powers of the federal judiciary by
giving Congress authority to limit the jurisdiction of the federal judicial
establishment. Those powers were mandatorily vested by the Constitution itself in the combination of the Supreme Court and whatever inferior federal courts Congress chose to create. The congressional authority
over the national courts under article III and section 8 of article I was
merely the power to structure the federal courts and distribute the constitutionally vested powers among the federal courts which were
created.
While the framers at Philadelphia and the leading federalist
figures in the ratification debates seemingly agreed upon general principles, there were, in fact, two areas of divergence concerning, first, congressional power to limit review of facts, and second, congressional
power to limit resort to federal tribunals in trivial or insignificant cases.
The framers at Philadelphia clearly did not intend the congressional
power under the exceptions and regulations clause to modify or apply
to the Supreme Court review of law and fact3 27 and said nothing whatsoever about congressional power to limit appeals in trivial cases. Federalist supporters of the Constitution, however, assured doubters during
the ratification process that the power to limit review of fact and to
limit appeals in trivial cases existed and could be used to remedy their
concerns. Both of these powers could, on the one hand, be viewed
merely as a corollary to the assumed congressional power to distribute
federal jurisdiction among federal courts-regulating decisions of facts
and judgments in trivial cases to inferior federal courts with civil juries.
This interpretation is tenuous, however, since the federalist proponents
of such powers did not clearly discriminate between cases appealed to
the Supreme Court from the inferior federal courts and those appealed
from state courts. On the other hand, if the statements are read as applicable to state court cases as well as to appeals from inferior federal
courts, they provide some evidence of a limited federalist willingness to
concede a modicum of congressional power oVer the scope of jurisdiction of the federal courts in these two limited contexts.
These statements of congressional power do not suggest the broad
authority to carve a category of issues or controversies out of the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of the federal courts. Rather, they represent concessions of congressional power to limit the mode of review
supra note 182, at 550 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 137-38, 164 and accompanying text.

SB 3 Elliot, DEBATES,
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(i.e., review of facts) or to prevent misuse of federal judicial resources
by limiting trivial, insignificant, or vexatious appeals. Such limited inroads on the constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of the national
courts could be accepted without serious damage to the independence
and autonomy of the federal courts. No broader suggestion of congressional power over national court jurisdiction is consistent with the federalist fears of a subservient national judiciary dependent for its powers
on congressional support. Such dependent national courts would have
had difficulty serving as the check the framers intended upon legislative
excesses.32 8 Consequently, no such suggestion emerged either in Philadelphia or during the ratification debates. Thus, the federalists' concessions of congressional power to prevent review of facts and to prevent
appeals in trivial or insignificant cases must be seen, at most, as limited
departures during the ratification debates from the assumed principle of
federal judicial power independent of congressional control.
The important question is whether these two limited departures
should be read as having engrafted two additional congressional powers
onto the document not envisioned or intended by the Philadelphia
framers. While the question is surely open to serious dispute, it should
be answered in the affirmative. The concern over the protection of civil
jury trial was the single most controversial aspect of the judiciary article. Repeated assurances by federalists that the jury trial could be protected by Congress's ability to except review of facts from Supreme
Court jurisdiction in common law cases were undoubtedly a sine qua
non of the approval of the article, despite the fact that the civil jury
trial was later adequately protected by the adoption of the seventh
amendment. 29 While the concern with limiting appeals in trivial or
insignificant cases was far less widespread, and the federalists' comments on the scope of congressional power in this area were somewhat
ambiguous, the First Congress, when it adopted the Judiciary Act of
1789,80 ignored this ambiguity and seems to have acted on the assumption that such power did in fact exist.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Writing in 1814, Gouverneur Morris offered the following observations on the necessity for a history of the deliberations of the Philadelphia Convention:
See, e.g., supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
3" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11-13, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 78-81, 85-86
(1789) (current version codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1976)).

1984]

FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

[W]hat can a history of the Constitution avail towards interpreting its provisions. This must be done by comparing the

plain import of the words, with the general tenor and object
of the instrument. That instrument was written by the fin-

gers, which write this letter. Having rejected redundant and
equivocal terms, I believed it to be as clear as our language
would permit; excepting, nevertheless, a part of what relates
to the judiciary. On that subject, conflicting opinions had
been maintained with so much professional astuteness, that it

became necessary to select phrases, which expressing my
own notions would not alarm others, nor shock their selflove,
and to the best of my recollection, this was the only part

which passed without cavil."3 1
Thus, while rejecting for other articles of the Constitution the importance of the type of historical analysis offered here, Morris recognized
that the compromises that produced the provisions of the judiciary article called for more intensive historical inquiry to ascertain their meaning. Although he suggested that only "a part" of the article was written
in the ambiguities of compromise, he unfortunately failed to inform us

of which part. Only an intensive review of the history of the adoption
of the article, such as that offered here, can unlock Morris's riddle.
In contrast, Justice Frankfurter found the language of article III
to be "explicit and specific," with little of the imprecision that so characterizes the other clauses of the Constitution. 3 ' In one sense, there is a
great deal to Frankfurter's portrayal of- article III. The ambiguities of
which Morris spoke seem not apparent in the major contours of the
constitutional scheme for the judiciary, but rather emerge in the details
of the plan. In its overall structure, article III reflects the precision and
clarity which Frankfurter claimed to have found and upon which
Gouverneur Morris prided himself. What is remarkable about the subsequent history of the development of the federal courts is that the pristine clarity of the original language and the initial understandings of
the framers of the document have become so encrusted with a series of
judicial and scholarly misconstructions that we hardly recall or understand that original intent. In this sense there is very little truth to
Frankfurter's assertion of clarity and simplicity.
Article III begins with the ringing command that the judicial
power of the United States "shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
331 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at 420 (letter to Timothy Pickering, December 22, 1814).
" See supra text accompanying note 1.
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in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." ' In mandating that the entirety of the judicial power
be vested in the federal judicial establishment, the framers virtually
tracked the self-executing commands of articles I and II, both of which
begin with a constitutional mandate providing that the legislative and
executive powers of the United States "shall be vested" in Congress and
the President, respectively. 3 4 Surely, no one would suggest that in articles I and II, the words "shall be vested" only refer to some future time
and permit the legislature to decide whether to commit the whole of the
affected powers to these respective branches of government. When the
Constitution provides that the executive powers of the United States
"shall be vested" in the President, the constitutional mandate is understood as self-executing, leaving no discretion whatsoever to Congress to
curtail the President's powers." 5
83 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives." (Emphasis added.) Id. art. II, § 1 provides that "[tihe executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." (Emphasis
added.)
"' An illustration of the lack of congressional power over the powers exclusively
vested in the President can be found in United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128
(1872), a case that also suggests limitations on congressional power to alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In 1868, President Johnson issued a general pardon to former
supporters of the Confederacy. As a result, these supporters were eligible to receive
compensation from the federal government, under a statute authorizing loyal citizens to
recover damages for property abandoned to federal troops during the Civil War. Congress objected to this possibility and enacted legislation withdrawing jurisdiction and
ordering the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court to treat the acceptance of a pardon as conclusive evidence of disloyalty. Moreover, the courts were to dismiss summarily any such case on proof of the acceptance of a pardon. The Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Chase, declared the statute unconstitutional, finding a twofold
violation of the principle of separation of powers. First, Justice Chase said that in
directing the federal courts to construe evidence in a specific fashion, contrary to its
natural effect, the Congress had "inadvertently passed the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power." Id. at 147. Second, Chase noted that the legislation
infringed on the President's constitutional power to grant pardons. Id.
It might be suggested that congressional power to limit the powers of other
branches stems from the necessary and proper clause of article I, section 8, clause 18 of
the Constitution. Under that clause, Congress may enact all laws necessary and proper
for the implementation of "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." This power does
not, however, authorize Congress to enact legislation curtailing the powers of other
branches of government, particularly in those contexts where Congress shares no overlapping independent authority. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining President's power to act contrary to the congressional will). Thus, the power that Congress may exercise under the
necessary and proper clause over the actions of coordinate branches of government is a
power to regulate, structure, and organize the implementation of the coordinate
branch's authority; it is not a power to frustrate its exercise. While the line between
these two forms of authority may in individual cases appear hazy, the distinction is,
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Similarly, this Article's exploration of the early history of article
III demonstrates that when the members of the Philadelphia Convention drafted the judicial article, they intended to vest the power to hear
all of the categories of cases comprising "the judicial Power of the
United States"38' in a national judicial branch of government. That
branch of the national government was to be composed of at least a
Supreme Court, of yet indeterminate size and procedures, but not of
indeterminate power, since the scope of its authority was deliberately
spelled out and vested in the Court through the language of article III.
Additionally, the framers at Philadelphia contemplated that Congress
could create inferior federal courts to assist the national judiciary in
implementing its constitutionally assigned powers. Obviously, with the
power to create such courts went the power to prescribe the scope of
their jurisdiction, as long as the powers of such inferior article III
courts did not exceed the scope of "the judicial Power of the United
States" that section 1 of article III vested in the federal judiciary. 3 ' To
say that Congress was given power to determine which categories of
cases would be heard by the inferior federal courts is not to say that the
Congress was invested with power to determine the scope of jurisdiction
of the entire federal judiciary. That jurisdiction was invested in the federal courts by the Constitution and was understood by the members of
the Philadelphia Convention to be beyond curtailment by the Congress.
Indeed, the Philadelphia Convention twice rejected proposals calling for
the creation of such a congressional authority-in the Committee of
Detail"'3 and in the Convention's August 27 debate over the judicial
article.33 9
The adoption of any proposal to give Congress power to curtail
the scope of the jurisdiction exercised by the federal courts would have
been unthinkable for most of the nationalist supporters of the Constitution. They were determined to insulate the federal judiciary from legislative attack by assuring the judges independence to perform their role
nevertheless, important. It prevents Congress from wholly undermining the independent authority of the coordinate branches of the federal government. The congressional
power authorized under the necessary and proper clause is, thus, very much like the
congressional power that this Article suggests article III and article I, section 8, clause
9 contemplated over the federal courts-a power over organization, structure, and procedures, not power over the scope of jurisdiction.
336 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
337 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty v. Phillips,
319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30
(1938); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). Contra the views of Justice Story discussed supra note 21
and accompanying text.
338 See supra notes 111-48 and accompanying
text.
339 See supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
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of guardians of the Constitution, at least with reference to reviewing
state legislation and actions to assure conformity with the Constitution
and federal law.3' 0 The debates indicate rather vividly that the foremost
concern of the framers was to adopt a plan that would assure the
supremacy, rather than necessarily the uniformity, of federal law andinterests. 41 At the heart of that concern was a demand that all cases
involving federal law questions or matters of transstate concern have an
opportunity to receive at least their final determination in courts created under the authority of the national government and staffed by
judges with constitutionally established guarantees of judicial
independence.
While the members of the Philadelphia Convention surely contemplated the exercise of congressional powers that would affect the structure of the judiciary, the powers they granted to Congress were those of
organization and implementation, not powers over the scope of federal
court authority. Thus, in article III Congress was not given discretion
over whether to create a federal judiciary or authority over its powers;
rather, it was given power to decide whether inferior courts were necessary and, if so, to structure and organize them. The drafters of article
II surely additionally contemplated that Congress would determine the
size of the Supreme Court, the pay of its justices (subject, of course, to
the prohibition contained in section 1 of article III, against diminishing
judicial compensation), and the procedures and regulations by which
the Court would exercise its authority. The framers even contemplated
that Congress might, if it chose to create inferior federal courts, distribute the exercise of federal judicial authority among the inferior federal courts so as to leave the final decision on federal matters to such
courts. That may have been the original intended function of the exceptions and regulations clause of article III, section 2, clause 2 (that is, if
the framers did in fact intend that portion of the judicial article to constitute a single clause). 4" At most, then, the reference to exceptions in
the so-called exceptions and regulations clause was designed to facilitate
implementation of the Madisonian compromise authorizing Congress to
create inferior federal courts. These congressional powers, while intimately affecting the operation of the federal courts, did not involve the
scope of power or jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. In short, the
original understanding of the grants of congressional authority involving the federal courts was that they included powers of implementation
340

141

text.

See generally supra notes 93-108, 305-10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53-60, 153-61, 232-33, 224-26, 302-03 and accompanying
But see supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
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and distribution of judicial authority, similar to the grant of legislative
authority under the necessary and proper clause to implement the powers granted to the legislative and executive branches of government.-Is
Like the evidence from the Convention, the evidence from the ratification debates negates the existence of any broad congressional powers
over the scope of the jurisdiction committed to the federal judiciary.
The antifederalists generally took the position that article III of the
Constitution was self-executing and mandatory. In this way they could
justify their attacks on the breadth of authority committed to the federal
judiciary. 44 Although in the Virginia ratification convention debates a
few comments to the contrary were made by John Marshall," 5 whose
subsequent judicial comments may form the origins of the myth of congressional power to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary,"'
and by Randolph who had refused to sign the Constitution due to the
structure of article III, most of the federalists seemingly agreed with the
antifederalists that the jurisdiction of the federal courts was vested in
the federal judiciary by the Constitution and not subject to legislative
manipulation. There were, however, two limited types of congressional
authority that the federalist supporters of the Constitution were willing
to concede during the ratification debates: the power to set jurisdictional
amount limitations to avoid burdensome and vexatious cases or appeals
involving small sums that would force litigants to distant federal courts,
and the power to limit the Supreme Court's appellate powers to review
facts in order to preserve the common law institution of the jury trial.
Since these concessions were needed to ratify the Constitution, they
probably should be viewed as having been constructively engrafted onto
the document, although nowhere expressly contemplated by the framers
during the Philadelphia Convention.
While the observation that article III does not grant any broad
congressional authority over federal jurisdiction is not historically startling and, indeed, was offered rather early in our history by Alexander
Hamilton31 7 and, in part, by Justice Story and Gouverneur Morris,-"'
it is nevertheless today a remarkable rediscovery in light of the current
historical and legal view of article III. Relying in great part on the fact
3

See supra note 335.

See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
35 See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 212-16
and accompanying text (comments of Randolph).
346 See infra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
M See supra notes 19, 312-23 and accompanying text.
348 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
34
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that the Judiciary Act of 1789"l' purportedly did not invest the whole
of "the judicial Power of the United States" in the federal, courts, many
3 50
Simiargue that such was never .the original intent of the framers.
larly, while early decisions of the Supreme Court occasionally debated
the legal question of congressional authority over the scope of the federal judicial power, 51 the subsequent position taken by the Court sub49

(1976)).

1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.

350 See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (Chase, C.J.);
Redish & Woods, supra note 3, at 56-61.
"" As a Justice of the Supreme Court, James Wilson offered the view that the
appellatejurisdiction of the Supreme Court was vested in that Court by the Constitution and was not subject to diminishment by Congress. In Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 321 (1796), Wilson wrote in dissent:
For my part, I concur in the opinion, that, notwithstanding the provisions
of the judicial act, an appeal is the natural and proper mode of removing
an admiralty cause, and, in that case, there can be no doubt, that all the
testimony which was produced in the court below, should also be"produced
in this court. Such an appeal its expressly sanctioned by the constitution; it
may, therefore, clearly in the first view of the subject, be considered as the
most regular process; and as there are not any words in the judicial act
restricting the power of proceeding by appeal, it must be regarded as still
permitted and approved. Even, indeed, ifa positive restrictionexisted by
law, it would, in my judgment, be superseded by the superiorauthority of
the constitutional provision.
Id. at 325 (emphasis added). Since Wilson sat on the Committee of Detail that was
instrumental, as we have seen, in formulating the judicial article, his views on the
question of the constitutional authority of the Congress to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be lightly dismissed. It should also be noted that
Wilson's concern with presenting the full factual record to the Supreme Court for review is consistent with the position that he took during the Convention, defending the
power of the Supreme Court to review facts in appeals cases. See supra notes 162-64
and accompanying text.
Wilson's comments in Wiscart did not go unanswered, however. Justice Oliver
Ellsworth, who drafted and led the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789, responded by
stating, "[tihe question, therefore, on the constitutional point of an appellate jurisdiction, is simply, whether Congress has established any rule for regulating its exercise?"
Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Doll.) at 327. While Ellsworth had attended the Philadelphia Convention, he was not a member of the Committee of Detail, and he left the convention
prior to the debate of August 27, 1789, during which many of the crucial issues relating
to the judicial article, including the issue of legislative control over the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, were debated and resolved.
Additionally, Justice Story ventured th view in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), that
[t]he judicial power must, therefore, be vested in some court, by congress;
and to suppose that it was not an obligation binding on them, but might,
at their pleasure, be omitted or declined, is to suppose, that, under the
sanction of the constitution, they might defeat the constitution itself; a construction which would lead to such a result cannot be sound.
Id. at 329.
In Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 202 (1831), Justice Baldwin said in
dissent that "the courts of the United States are capable of exercising the whole judicial
power as conferred by the constitution; and though congress are bound to provide by
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stantially rejected the idea that article III invesfed the federal judiciary
with mandatory jurisdiction subject to neither congressional alteration
nor curtailment.3 52 The Court's current doctrinal assumptions rest primarily on the uninformed views of Chief Justice Marshall,3 53 who has
law for its exercise, in all cases to which that judicial power extends; yet it has not been
done. . . ." (emphasis added). Baldwin conceded, however, possibly as a result of the
influence of Chief Justice Marshall, that an act of Congress was necessary to give effect
to the jurisdiction contemplated in article III and that in default of such enactment, the
federal courts were powerless, albeit possibly unconstitutionally so.
At least with respect to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Justice
Johnson's early comments indicate that he believed that the powers of the Court were

derived from article III and not subject to legislative diminishment. In United States v.
Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), he wrote:
The powers of the general Governiment are made up of concessions from
the several states-whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter
expressly reserve. The judicial power of the United States is a constituent
part of those concessions-that power is to be exercised by Courts organized for the purpose, and brought into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the Courts which the United States may,

under their general powers, constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possessesjurisdiction derived imnediatelyfron the constitution, and of which

the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts created by the
general Government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the
power that creates them, and can be vested with none but what the power
ceded to the general Government will authorize them to confer.
Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
"s See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); Barry v. Mercein, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 103, 120-21 (1847); United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 113
(1848); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850); In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 103, 120 (1852); Daniels v. Chicago & R.I. R.R., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254
(1865); Merchants Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 541, 543 (1866); City of
Nashville v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1867); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1869); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 98-99 (1869); Murdock v.
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 620 (1874); The "Francis Wright," 105
U.S. 381, 386 (1881); St. Louis & I.M. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 292 (1908); see
also supra notes 337, 350; infra note 304. But see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 605 n.11 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "[tihere is a serious
question whether the McCardle case could command a majority view today").
"I Chief Justice Marshall's classic judicial statement of his position is contained
in Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810):
It is contended, that the words of the constitution vest an appellate jurisdiction in this court, which extends to every case not excepted by congress;
and that if the court had been created, without any express definition or
limitation of its powers, a full and complete appellate jurisdiction would
have vested in it, which must have been exercised in all cases whatever.
The force of this argument is perceived and admitted. Had the judicial act
created the supreme court, without defining or limiting its jurisdiction, it
must have been considered as possessing all the jurisdiction which the constitution assigns to it. The legislature would have exercised the power it
possessed of creating a supreme court, as ordained by the constitution; and
in omitting to exercise the right of excepting from its constitutional powers, would have necessarily left those powers undiminished.
The appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial act.
They are given by the constitution. But they are limited and regulated by
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neither attended the Convention nor, so far as we can tell, seen
the judicial act, and by such other acts as have been passed on the subject.
When the first legislature of the Union proceeded to carry the third article
of the constitution into effect, they must. be understood as intending to
execute the power they possessed of making exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court. They have not, indeed, made these exceptions in express terms. They have not declared, that the appellate
power of the court shall not extend to certain cases; but they have described affirmatively its jurisdiction, and this affirmative description has
been understood to imply a negative on the exercise of such appellate
power as is not comprehended within it.
Id. at 313-14. Marshall's argument actually appears to represent a synthesis of two
opposing positions, those of Wilson and Ellsworth. See supra note 351. Like Wilson,
Marshall advanced the view that the powers of the Supreme Court were invested in a
self-executing manner in the Court by virtue of article III. Thus, the powers of the
Court do not technically derive from the Judiciary Act of 1789; rather, they are given
by the Constitution. Wilson thought that such powers were not subject to congressional
diminishment, since they represented constitutional imperatives. Marshall, however,
advanced the view that Congress would invoke the exceptions and regulations clause to
diminish the constitutionally prescribed appellate jurisdiction of the Court. This position obviously aligned Marshall with Ellsworth's view that Congress held the complete
power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court. In placing such broad reliance on the exceptions and regulations clause, Marshall misstated
the historical intention of the framers. Moreover, he merely echoed an argument he had
previously made during the Virginia ratification convention that even then was not
embraced by other federalist supporters of the document. See supra notes 217-19 and
accompanying text. It might be speculated that Marshall's position in Durousseau was
dictated by his prior statements during the Virginia ratification convention. In this
sense Marshall, as a jurist, may have been a captive of his own prior political statements made during the ratification debates. Finally, it must be recalled that Marshall's
comments, even when made, were relatively aberrational insofar as they indicated the
existence of congressional power to curtail the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court over issues of law within the judicial power of the United States.
Durousseau is an important decision because Chief Justice Chase later relied
upon it in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). Durousseau was not,
however, Marshall's only pronouncement on the subject of congressional authority over
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In fact, the Durousseau opinion was probably
presaged by Marshall's opinion in United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159
(1805).There Marshall wrote:
[W]hen the constitution has given congress power to limit the exercise of
our jurisdiction, and to make regulations respecting its exercise; and congress under that power, has proceeded to erect inferior courts, and has said
in what cases a writ of error or appeal shall lie, an exception of all other
cases is implied. And this court is as much bound by an implied as an
express exception.
This argument would be unanswerable, if the supreme court had
been created by law, without describing its jurisdiction. The constitution
would then have been the only standard by which its powers could be
tested, since there would be clearly no congressional regulation or exception on the subject. But as the jurisdiction of the court has been described,
it has been regulated by congress, and an affirmative description of its
powers must be understood as a regulation, under the constitution, prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those described.
Id. at 171-73.
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Madison's notes of the debates.'"
Insofar as the current doctrinal assumptions about the constitutional scope of the power of the federal courts derive from the allegedly
limited jurisdiction granted to the national judiciary under the Judiciary Act of 1789, a1" such arguments may be misguided. While detailed
consideration of these arguments is beyond the scope of this piece, such
arguments grossly oversimplify the post-1789 history of the implementation of the judicial article.
There is considerable evidence that nationalist supporters of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 were confronted with the same antifederalist sentiments that animated the debate over the adoption of the Constitution
and were forced to refight the same battles that they had won during
the Philadelphia Convention and the ratification debates a'3 sometimes
with somewhat different results. Thus, it may be that the Judiciary Act
of 1789 should be viewed more as a continuation of a pre-existing political debate than as a principled and conscientious effort on the part of

'" Madison's notes were not published until 1840. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra
note 21, at xv. While the Journal of the Convention was first published in 1819 by
order of Congress, the Journal was sufficiently sketchy that it provided little information from which to attempt to ascertain the original understanding of constitutional
clauses, and it was hardly used for that purpose by the courts during this period. Id. at
xi-xiv. The Journal contained neither references to debates during the Convention nor
to the deliberations of various important committees. The only Virginian known to
have attended the Philadelphia Convention and kept any notes was Marshall's political
enemy in the ratification struggle, George Mason. It is rather doubtful that Marshall
would have received notes from that source. Furthermore, the actual deliberations of
the Convention on the judicial article were not referred to by Marshall or anyone else
during the Virginia ratification convention, further suggesting the unavailability of that
material.
'" The primary limitations on the exercise of federal court jurisdiction contained
in the Judiciary Act of 1789 were jurisdictional amount limitations, prohibitions on
review of fact, limitations on Supreme Court review of state law questions in cases
decided by state courts unless they were plainly related to the resolution of the federal
question posed by the case, and limitations on Supreme Court review of state court
decisions sustaining a federal constitutional, statutory, or treaty claim against contrary
state law. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11-13, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 78-81, 8586 (1789) (current version codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1976)).
'" In this classic article on the history of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Professor
Warren said:
[Tihe final form of the Act and its subsequent history cannot be properly
understood, unless it is realized that it was a compromise measure, so
framed as to secure the votes of those who, while willing to see the experiment of a Federal Constitution tried, were insistent that the Federal
Courts should be given the minimum powers and jurisdiction. Its provisions completely satisfied no one, though they pleased the Anti-Federalists
more than the Federalists.
Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REv. 49, 53 (1923) (footnote omitted). See generally J. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 457508.
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Congress to implement the constitutional plan prescribed in article III.
In any event, it is reasonably clear that the federalist supporters of the
Judiciary Act believed that Congress had a duty to effectuate the mandates of article III and had no discretion to decide whether to invest the
federal courts with the entirety of the judicial power of the United
States. For example, in the House of Representatives, William Smith
of South Carolina, a federalist supporter of the Judiciary Act, said the
following during debate on the bill:
There is another important consideration; that is, how
far the constitution stands in the way of this motion [to limit
the federal courts to entertaining admiralty and maritime
cases]. It is declared by that instrument that the judicial
power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme,
and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from time to
time establish. Here is no discretion, then, in Congress to
vest the judicial power of the United States in any other tribunal than in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts of
the United States. . . . What is the object of the motion? To
assign the [final] jurisdiction of some of these very cases to
the State courts, to judges, who, in many instances, hold
their places for a limited period; whereas, the constitution,
for the greater security of the citizen, and to insure the independence of the federal judges, has expressly declared that
they shall hold their commissions during good behaviour. To
judges who are exposed every year to a diminution of salary
by the State Legislatures; whereas, the constitution, to remove from the federal judges all dependence on the Legislative or Executive, has protected them from any diminution in
their compensation. Whether the expediency or the unconstitutionality of the motion be considered, there are more than
3 57
sufficient reasons to oppose it.
Indeed, since the primary limitations, often by way of omission, contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789 on the exercise by any federal court
of the judicial power of the United States relate to jurisdictional
amount limitations, appellate review of facts, and appellate review of
federal question cases decided by state courts involving federal claims
that were sustained by the state tribunals (i.e., cases involving a trivial
federal supremacy interest),3 58 the federalist supporters of the Judiciary
37
3"

1 Annals of Congress 831-32 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
See supra note 355.
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Act of 1789 may well have believed that they had granted to the federal
courts the whole of the judicial power of the United States, at least the
whole of that power as it was understood during the ratification
process."' 9
Thus, it appears that the notion of congressional power over the
scope of jurisdiction of the federal courts was decidedly not part of the
initial constitutional plan. Instead it emerged gradually in contravention to the original understanding of the framers through the judicial
construction, or misconstruction, of the language of the instrument.3 60
359 Recall, that in the ratification debates the federalists conceded that Congress
had authority to banish trivial matters from federal court dockets and to protect the
right to jury trial by curtailing the power of the Supreme Court to review fact as well
as law. See generally supra text accompanying notes 327-30. It may well be that the
supporters of the Judiciary Act of 1789 understood the jurisdictional amount limitations and the lack of federal review of state court decisions sustaining a federal claim
against contrary state law as examples of the exercise of authority to keep unnecessary,
trivial cases, i.e., those in which there is no serious matter of national or transstate
concern, out of the federal courts. Similarly, the curtailment of Supreme Court authority to review fact as well as law was also expressly contemplated during the ratification
debates and, therefore, marked no new departure in the adoption in the Judiciary Act
of 1789. Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1789 may be reconciled with the idea that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts is vested in the national judiciary by the Constitution
and is not subject to congressional diminishment except in these two limited classes of
cases discussed during the ratification debates. Such an explanation would surely help
clarify how Representative Smith and other federalist supporters of the bill could simultaneously argue that the antifederalists had no power to curtail the authority of the
federal courts prescribed by the Constitution, while supporting a judiciary bill that
seemingly did not grant to the federal courts all of the potential jurisdiction contained
in "the judicial Power of the United States" prescribed by section 2 of article III.
360 After some initial disputes within the Court over the meaning of article III, see
supra note 351, Chief Justice Marshall's initially aberrant position gained currency on
the Court. See supra note 353. Thus, by the time the Court decided Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), Chief Justice Chase could cite Marshall's opinions
and say:
[T]he principle that the affirmation of appellate jurisdiction implies
the negation of all such jurisdiction not affirmed having been thus established [in Durousseau, it was an almost necessary consequence that acts
of Congress, providing for the exercise of jurisdiction, should come to be
spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts making exceptions
to the constitutional grant of it.

Id. at 513.
None of the major early cases explored the historical information discussed in this
Article, since most of the data were then unpublished and unavailable. Even after the
publication of Madison's notes in 1840, subsequent cases like McCardle relied on judicial precedent, rather than original historical research, to explicate the meaning of article III. Significantly, most of the early cases almost uniformly ignored the imperative
language of section 1 of article III commanding that the "judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested" in the federal courts. In the only case that seriously considered
this language, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), Justice Story
arrived at a conclusion precisely opposite to that offered in McCardle, finding the language of article III to be mandatory. See supra notes 10-11.
Possibly, the best example of the Court's lack of attention to language and detail is
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The modern significance of this observation is a subject beyond the
purview of this Article. The historical conclusions of this piece, however, should have important implications for the manner in which a
number of important modern federal jurisdiction questions are resolved,
at least if the "original understanding" is to have any role in our approach to interpreting the judicial article, notwithstanding the existence
of contrary precedent."" 1
While at least one eminent legal scholar has written that efforts to
suggest that Congress lacks complete power over the scope of jurisdiction of the federal courts might be dismissed as "absurd" or "may reflect wishful thinking, '3 62 there is substantial historical support for a
contrary conclusion. Even those who argue for significant limitations on
congressional power over the judiciary generally have conceded the existence of congressional power to curtail the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. These scholars and jurists rely principally on important constitutional policy considerations, rather than history, to support their conthe failure of Chief Justice Chase to include the important comma in his quotation of
the exceptions and regulations clause in McCardle, a bit of punctuation of potentially
powerful significance. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
361 In the area of constitutional interpretation, the doctrine of stare decisis surely
plays an important role. Cf., e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 93 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). Contra Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("But in cases
involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions."). See generally
Monaghan, Taking Supreme CourtDecisions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. 1 (1979). The
decisions on the scope of congressional power over federal court jurisdiction are based
on shaky precedent. Most of the cases trace their doctrinal origins to the early decisions
of the Court authored by Chief Justice Marshall. See supra notes 351-54. For example, in the classic case of Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869), the
Court relied significantly on Chief Justice Marshall's dicta in Durousseau v. United
States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 307 (1810), to suggest that the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, while technically granted by article III of the Constitution, may be limited and
regulated by acts of Congress under the so-called exceptions and regulations clause.
Chief Justice Marshall did not have available to him Madison's notes or the other
journals detailing the history of the Philadelphia Convention. In this context, where the
existing judicial precedents are based substantially on inadequate or inaccurate data
and assumptions, prior precedent arguably should play a diminished role in the process
of constitutional interpretation.
On the other hand, immediate adoption by the federal courts of the original understanding of article III offered in this Article might cause serious dislocation in the existing judicial structure and raise difficult questions about certain existing jurisdictional
statutes. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42 (1976). Thus, the perspectives offered in this
Article may be more relevant to judicial review of future jurisdictional curtailment statutes, whether addressing issues like abortion or school prayer or classes of jurisdiction
like proposals to abolish diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The interpretations offered
here would also be pertinent to efforts to extend the existing precedents affording broad
congressional discretion over the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
"2 Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court 1789-1801, 48 U. Cm. L.
REv. 819, 848 (1981).
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clusions. 6 3 Perhaps the best example of such an approach was the plea
of former Justice Roberts in 1949 for the adoption of a constitutional
amendment protecting against congressional curtailment of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain cases arising under
the Constitution and to review both law and fact.'" Roberts, who had
witnessed the debate over President Franklin Roosevelt's Court-packing
plan from the perspective of the Supreme Court bench, argued that
such an amendment was a necessary "core of the Court's fulfilling its
independent functions in our system of government." 6 5 Yet, relying on
Ex parte McCardle 6' and the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall,
Roberts conceded the existence of extensive congressional power over
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, even to the point of "taking
away, bit by bit, all the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States. ' 367 He attempted to explain this seeming inconsistency on the part of the framers as follows:
Why did [the framers] then leave it to Congress to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Court? I think they did
not envisage any such large federal judiciary as we have toSee, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 1364-65; Ratner, Power,
supra note 3, at 161; Redish & Woods, supra note 3, at 52-75; Sager, supra note 3, at
30-36. The question of the existence of congressional power to curtail federal court
jurisdiction is important not only to scholars interested in study of federal jurisdiction,
but also to those who debate the legitimacy of noninterpretive judicial review. Among
the checks on the federal judiciary usually offered by the defenders of broad judicial
powers is the assumed congressional authority to curtail federal court jurisdiction. See,
e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 52-55 (1980); M. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 125-39 (1982). Indeed, Professor Perry seems to rely almost exclusively on the existence of the congressional
power to curtail federal court jurisdiction to resolve the tensions he perceives between
majoritarian theory and noninterpretive judicial review. Yet, when it comes to defending the existence of the congressional power, Perry offers little justification. At one
point he states, "no one denies the existence of national legislative power over the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, including the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court." Id. at 130. Yet elsewhere he admits a personal reluctance to concede to Congress the power to curtail federal court jurisdiction and invites "attempts to avoid a
concession to Congress of a broad jurisdiction-limiting power." Id. at 138. Perry, however, never clearly indicates whether the success of such attempts would require a total
reevaluation of his theory of the legitimacy of noninterpretive judicial review. The conclusions of this Article may represent the beginnings of the theory that Perry invited.
At a minimum, they surely belie Perry's suggestion that "no one" denies the existence
of congressional jurisdictional curtailment powers. These conclusions are, however, arrived at through an interpretivist approach, thereby suggesting that Perry might feel
freer to dismiss or criticize them.
MS

3"

Roberts, Now is the Time: Fortifying the Supreme Court's Independence, 35

A.B.A. J. 1 (1949).
"I' Id. at 4.
866 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
"7 Id.
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day. The federal judiciary was rather in the background-that is, the lower judiciary. The theory was that
constitutional questions would arise in state courts and then
an appeal would come to the Supreme Court from a decision
of a state court on a constitutional question. 6s
This Article indicates that Roberts and others have paid insufficient attention to the overall language, structure, and history of article
III. Rather than ignoring lower federal courts, as Roberts suggests, the
federalist supporters of the Constitution fought hard for their creation,
seeking first to establish the lower courts by constitutional mandate
and, after that was unsuccessful, granting constitutional authorization
for Congress to create them. Similarly, the framers did not leave the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to congressional whim, but
rather, invested it in the Supreme Court and specifically spelled out its
content. The reason in both instances was to assure that cases within
the judicial power of the United States received at least the opportunity
for a final resolution by an independent, presumably neutral, federal
tribunal. On this point the federalists were adamant, mandating the
existence of such jurisdiction in article III. Thus, the arguments, like
those offered by Justice Roberts or Professors Hart, Ratner, and Sager,
for safeguarding the jurisdiction of the federal courts from congressional curtailment are not only sound as a matter of constitutional policy, they are also well grounded in the history of the origins of article
III. It is, indeed, a remarkable reflection on how far modern judicial
doctrine has departed from the original intention of the framers that
Justice Roberts should propose a constitutional amendment to accomplish precisely what the Philadelphia Convention originally
intended. 6 '
The quote from Justice Frankfurter that began this Article is indicative of a career dedicated to seeking simplicity and clarity in the
exercise of federal court jurisdiction. Frankfurter saw article III as a
relatively simple and precise instrument that only needed appropriate
implementation. 7 0 Unfortunately, he viewed article III through the
8 Id. at 3.
The historical conclusions of this Article obviously suggest certain avenues of
response to recurrent congressional proposals to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. For examples of congressional proposals to curtail federal jurisdiction, see supra
notes 3-10. Additionally, the conclusions of this Article may raise serious questions
about the constitutionality of congressional efforts completely to dispense with diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction.
370 See supra note 1. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & H. SHULMAN, CASES
AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1937); F.
FRANKFURTER & W. KATZ, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON FEDERAL JURIS369
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cloud of misinterpretation contained in the scholarship and decisions

that had preceded him. Ironically, the original understanding of the
framers who drafted and ratified article III was very simple. It involved
investing the federal courts with the whole of a described set of powers
called the "judicial Powers of the United States," and allowing Congress merely to work out the structures and procedure by which those
powers would be exercised and to distribute the constitutionally defined
powers among the various federal courts it structured. The scope of the
federal judicial power was neither left in doubt nor committed to con-

gressional discretion. The extent of federal jurisdiction was precisely
spelled out in article III and nowhere left to congressional curtailment.
Article III was, indeed, clear and precise; it meant exactly what it
71
said-a point Justice Frankfurter made, but misunderstood.

DICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931); F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF
THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928).
371 See, e.g., National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582,
655 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Congress need not give this Court any appel-

late power; it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once conferred and it may do so even
while a case is sub judice. Ex parte McCardle. ....
).
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APPENDIX

Proposals,Plans, and Drafts of the
Judicial Article Considered at
or Preparedfor the
Constitutional Convention*
A. Randolph's Virginia Plan [1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21,
at 21-22]
9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist
of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals
to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices
during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated
times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons
actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.
That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear
& determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies
& felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases
in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to
such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the
collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and questions which may involve the national
peace and harmony.
B. Paterson'sNew Jersey Plan [1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21,
at 244]
5. Resd. that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a
supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by
the Executive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour,
to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for
their services in which no increase or diminution shall be
made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time
of such increase or diminution; that the Judiciary so estab* This appendix reflects the major drafts of the judiciary article as they are set
forth in full in 1-4 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21. Many changes were made during the debates over the judicial article at the Philadelphia Convention that are not
reflected'in these drafts, since the changes were not reported as part of a complete draft
or plan. These drafts are, however, set forth as major guideposts that are essential to
understanding the significance of those debates.
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lished shall have authority to hear & determine in the first
instance on all impeachments of federal officers, & by way of
appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of
Ambassadors, in all cases captures from an enemy, in all
cases of piracies & felonies on the high seas, in all cases in
which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of
any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts
for regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they
remain in Office be capable of receiving or holding any other
office or appointment during their time of service, or for
thereafter.
C. Pinckney Plan (outline) [2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at
136]
15. S. & H.D. in C. ass. shall institute Offices and appoint
Officers for the Departments of for. Affairs, War, Treasury
and Admiralty They shall have the exclusive Power of declaring what
shall be Treason & Misp. of Treason agt. U.S.-and of instituting a federal judicial Court, to which an Appeal shall
be allowed from the judicial Courts of the several States in
all Causes wherein Questions shall arise on the Construction
of Treaties made by U.S.-or on the Law of Nations-or on
the Regulations of U.S. concerning Trade & Revenue-or
wherein U.S. shall be a Party-The Court shall consist of
Judges to be appointed during good Behaviour-S. & H.D.
in C. ass shall have the exclusive Right of instituting in each
State a Court of Admiralty, and appointing the Judges &c of
.the same for all maritime Causes which may arise therein
respectively.
D.

Hamilton Plan [3 Farrand,

RECORDS,

supra note 21, at 625-27]

Article V
§I. There shall be a chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who
together with the other Judges thereof, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, removeable only by conviction
on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanor-Each
Judge shall have a competent Salary to be paid to him at
stated times, and not to be diminished during his continuance
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in office.
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in
all causes in which the United States shall be a party, in all
controversies between the United States, and a particular
State, or between two or more States, except such as relate to
a claim of territory between the United States, and one or
more States, which shall be determined in the mode prescribed-in the VI article; in all cases affecting foreign Ministers, Consuls and Agents; and an appellate jurisdiction both
as to law and fact in all cases which shall concern the Citizens of foreign nations, in all questions between the Citizens
of different States, and in all others in which the fundamental rights of this Constitution are involved, subject to such
exceptions as are herein contained and to such regulations as
the Legislature shall provide.
The Judges of all Courts which may be constituted by
the Legislature shall also hold their places during good behaviour, removeable only by conviction on impeachment for
some crime or misdemeanor, and shall have competent salaries to be paid at stated times and not to be diminished during their continuance in office; but nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the Legislature from abolishing
such Courts themselves.
All crimes, except upon impeachment, shall be tried by
a Jury of twelve men; and if they shall have been committed
within any State, shall be tried within such State; and all
civil causes arising under this Constitution of the like kind
with those which have been heretofore triable by Jury in the
respective States, shall in like manner be tried by jury; unless in special cases the Legislature shall think proper to
make different provision, to which provision the concurrence
of two thirds of both Houses shall be necessary.
§ Impeachments of the President and and Vice President of the U- States, members of the Senate, the
Governours and Presidents of the several States, the principal or chief Officers of the Departments enumerated in the
10 §. of the 4th. Article, Ambassadors and other like public
Ministers, the Judges of the Supreme Court, Generals and
Admirals of the Navy shall be tried by a Court to consist of
the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the Chief Justice or
first senior Judge of the superior Court of law in each State,
of whom twelve shall constitute a Court. A majority of the
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Judges present may convict. All other persons shall be tried
on impeachment by a court to consist of the Judges of the
supreme Court and six Senators drawn by lot, a majority of
whom may convict.
Impeachments shall clearly specify the particular offence for which the party accused is to be tried, and judgment on conviction upon the trial thereof shall be either removal from office singly, or removal from office and
disqualification for holding any future Office or place of
trust; but no Judgment on impeachment shall prevent prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law; provided that no Judge concerned in such conviction shall sit as
Judge on the second trial. The Legislature may remove the
disabilities incurred by conviction on impeachment.
Article VI
Controversies about the rights of territory between the
United States and particular States shall be determined by a
Court to be constituted in manner following. The State or
States claiming in opposition to the United States as parties
shall nominate a number of persons, equal to double the
number of Judges of the Supreme Court for the time being,
of whom none shall be citizens by birth of the States which
are parties, nor inhabitants thereof when nominated, and of
whom not more than two shall have their actual residence in
one State. Out of the persons so nominated the Senate shall
elect one half, who together with the Judges of the supreme
Court, shall form the Court. Two thirds of the whole number may hear and determine the controversy, by plurality of
voices. The States concerned may at their option claim a decision by the Supreme Court only. All the members of the
Court hereby instituted, shall, prior to the hearing of the
Cause take an Oath impartially, and according to the best of
their judgments and consciences, to hear and determine the
controversy.
E. Sherman's Proposals** [3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 21, at
616]
To make laws binding on the people of the United
**Serious doubt exists whether the document containing Sherman's proposals was
prepared for the Constitutional Convention or, rather, was prepared later in Sherman's
life in order to propose amendments to the Constitution. 3 Farrand, RECORDS, supra
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States, and on the courts of law, and other magistrates and
officers, civil and military, within the several states, in all
cases which concern the common interests of the United
States: but not to interfere with the government of the individual states, in matters of internal police which respect the
government of such states only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is not affected.
That the laws of the United States ought, as far as may
be consistent with the common interests of the Union, to be
carried into execution by the judiciary and executive officers
of the respective states, wherein the execution thereof is
required.
That the legislature of the United States be authorised
to institute one supreme tribunal, and such other tribunals as
they may judge necessary for the purpose aforesaid, and ascertain their respective powers and jurisdictions.
F. Draft of Randolph Proposalsas They Emergedfrom the Deliberations of the Committee of the Whole, June 13, 1787 [1 Farrand
RECORDS, supra note 21, at 230-31]
11 Resolved. that a national Judiciary be established to consist of
One supreme Tribunal
The Judges of which to be appointed by the second
Branch of the National Legislature.
to hold their offices during good behaviour
to receive, punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation
for their services: in which no encrease or diminution
shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such encrease or diminution
12 Resolved. That the national Legislature be empowered to
appoint
inferior Tribunals.
13 Resolved. that the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary
shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the
national- revenue: impeachments of any national Officers: and questions which involve the national peace
note 21, at 615. It is clear, however, that the Sherman proposals never made an appearance at the Philadelphia Convention and did not influence the course of its deliberations. The document has not, accordingly, been given any serious consideration in this
Article.
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and harmony.
G. Randolph-Rutledge Draft in Committee of Detail [2 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 21, at 146-47]
5. The Judiciary
1. shall consist of one supreme tribunal
2. the judges whereof shall be appointed by the senate
3. and of such inferior tribunals, as the legislature may
(appoint) <establish>
(4. the judges of which shall be also appointed by the
senate-)
5. all the judges shall hold their offices during good
behaviour;
6. and shall receive punctually,
at stated times a (fixed) compensation for
their services, to be settled by the legislature
in which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect
the persons actually in office at the time of such
diminution.
and shall swear fidelity to the union.
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall
extend
I to all cases, arising under laws passed by the
general <Legislature>
2. to impeachments of officers, and
3. to such other cases, as the national legislature
may assign, as involving the national peace and
harmony,
in collection of the revenue in disputes between citizens of different states
<in disputes between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of another State>
in disputes between different states; and
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other
countries are concerned
<& in Cases of Admirality Jurisdn>
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only,
except in <Cases of Impeachment. & (in)> those instances,
in which the legislature shall make it original, and the legis-

862

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:741

lature shall organize it
8. The whole or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid
according to the discretion of the legislature may be assigned to the inferior tribunals, as original tribunals.
H.

Wilson-Rutledge Draft in Committee of Detail [2 Farrand,
supra note 21, at 172-73]

RECORDS,

The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested
in one Supreme (National) Court, and in such (other) <inferior> Courts as shall, from Time to Time, be constituted
by the Legislature of the United States.
The Judges of the Supreme (National) Court shall (be
chosen by the Senate by Ballott). (They shall) hold their Offices during good Behaviour. They shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme (National) Court shall
extend to all Cases arising under Laws passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors (and other) <other> public Ministers <& Consuls>,
to the Trial of Impeachments of Officers of the United
States; to all Cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction;
to Controversies between <States,-except those wh. regard
Jurisdn or Territory,-betwn> a State and a Citizen or
Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States
and between <a State or the> Citizens (of any of the
States) <thereof> and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In Cases of Impeachment, (those) <Cases> affecting Ambassadors (and) other public Ministers <& Consuls>, and
those in which a State shall be (one of the) <a> Part(ies)
<y>, this Jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other
Cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Legislature shall
make. The Legislature may (distribute) <assign any part
of> th(is)e Jurisdiction <above mentd.,-except the Trial
of the Executive->, in the Manner and under the Limitations which it shall think proper (among) <to> such
(other) <inferior> Courts as it shall constitute from Time
to Time.
(Crimes shall be tried <&> in the State, (in which)
<where> they shall be committed; (and) The Trial of

19841

FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

(them) <all Criml Offences,-except in Cases of Impeachment-> shall be by Jury.
<Judgmts. in Cases of Impeachmt. shall not extend
further than to removal from Office & disqualifn. to hold &
enjoy any place of Honr. Trust or Profit under the U.S. But
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable & subject to
Judl. Trial Judt & Punishment according to (the) Law of
(the Land)>
I. Report of the Committee of Detail [2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra
note 21, at 186-87]
XI[X]
Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by
the Legislature of the United States.
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the
Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall
extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors,
other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of Officers of the United States; to all cases of Admirality and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between
two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or
Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State,
between Citizens of different States, and between a State or
the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects.
In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other
Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the
other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate, with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature
shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President
of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as
it shall constitute from time to time.
Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in
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cases of impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall
be committed; and shall be by Jury.
Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust or profit,
under the United States. But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment
and punishment according to law.
J. Draft Referred to the Committee of Style [2 Farrand, RECORDS,
supra note 21, at 575-761
XI.
Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States both
in law and equity shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and
in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time
to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United
States.
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the
Inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
Sect. 3. The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases
both in law and equity arising under this Constitution and
the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which
shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting
Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to all
cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party, to controversies between two or more States (except such as shall regard
Territory and Jurisdiction) between a State and citizens of
another State, between citizens of different States, between
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State or the citizens thereof and
foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
which a State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction. In all other cases beforementioned the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to
law and fact with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make.
Sect. 4. The trial of all crimes (except in cases of im-
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peachments) shall be by jury and such trial shall be held in
the State where the said crimes shall have been committed;
but when not committed within any State then the trial shall
be at such place or places as the Legislature may direct.
The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended; unless where in cases of rebellion or invasion of
public safety may require it.
Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not
extend further than to removal office, and disqualification to
hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust or profit under the
United States. But the Party convicted shall nevertheless, be
liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law.
J.

Draft Reported Out by the Committee of Style [2 Farrand,
supra note 21, at 600-01]

RECORDS,

Sect. I. The judicial power of the United States, both
in law and equity, shall be vested in one supreme court, and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme
and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases,
both in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their authority. To all cases affecting ambassadofs, other public ministers and consuls. To all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. To controversies to
which the United States shall be a party. To controversies
between two or more States; between a state and citizens of
another state; between citizens of different States; between
citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and
foreign States, citizens or subjects.
In cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the
supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the
other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall
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make.
The trial of all .crimes, except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state
where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when
not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.
Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses
to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood nor forfeiture, except during the life of the
person attainted.

